

Aristotle Metaphysics Book 9

περί μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτου ὄντος καὶ πρὸς ὃ
πάσαι αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος
αναφέρονται εἴρηται, περὶ τῆς οὐσίας (κατὰ
γὰρ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον λέγεται τᾶλλα [30]
ὄντα, τό τε ποσόν καὶ τό ποιόν καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ
οὕτω λεγόμενα: πάντα γὰρ ἔξει τὸν τῆς οὐσίας
λόγον, ὡσπερ εἶπομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις
λόγοις): ἐπεὶ δὲ λέγεται τό ὄν τό μὲν τό τί ἢ
ποιόν ἢ ποσόν, τό δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ
ἐντελέχειαν καὶ κατὰ τό ἔργον, διορίσωμεν καὶ
περὶ δυνάμεως [35] καὶ ἐντελεχείας, καὶ πρῶτον
περὶ δυνάμεως ἢ λέγεται μὲν μάλιστα κυρίως,
οὐ μὴν χρησιμωτάτη γέ ἐστι πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα
νῦν:

[1] ἐπὶ πλεόν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ
ἐνέργεια τῶν μόνον λεγομένων κατὰ κίνησιν.
ἀλλ' εἰπόντες περὶ ταύτης, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς
ἐνεργείας διορισμοῖς δηλώσωμεν καὶ περὶ
τῶν ἄλλων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν λέγεται [5]
πολλαχῶς ἡ δύναμις καὶ τό δύνασθαι,
διώριστα ἡμῖν ἐν ἄλλοις: τούτων δ' ὅσαι μὲν
ὁμωνύμως λέγονται δυνάμεις ἀφείσθωσαν
(ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ὁμοιότητι τινὶ λέγονται, καθάπερ ἐν
γεωμετρίας καὶ δυνατά καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγομεν τῶ
εἶναι πῶς ἢ μὴ εἶναι), ὅσαι δὲ πρὸς τό αὐτό εἶδος,
πάσαι ἀρχαί [10] τινές εἰσι, καὶ πρὸς πρώτην
μίαν λέγονται, ἢ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ
ἢ ἢ ἄλλο. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παθεῖν ἐστὶ δύναμις, ἡ ἐν
αὐτῷ τῶ πάσχοντι ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς
ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἢ ἄλλο: ἡ δ' ἔξις ἀπαθείας τῆς ἐπὶ τό
χειρόν καὶ φθοράς τῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἢ ἄλλο
ὑπ' ἀρχῆς [15] μεταβλητικῆς. ἐν γὰρ

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Now, concerning the *first* Being, the *substance*,
from which all the other categories of Being are
derived (for as it was said in earlier discussions, it
is from the term *substance* that [variations] of
beings, both quantity and quality and other such
terms, have derived their meaning). And since it is
called the Being, not only according to whatness,
quality, or quantity, but also in regard to *force*
(*dýname*), *expression* (*entelécheia*) and/or the *act*
(*érgon*). In clarifying [the meaning of] *might*
(*dynáme*) and *expression*, most certainly *might*
comes first, even though here it is not at any rate
the most helpful to what we are looking for.

Now, *force* and *action* (*enérgeia*) are beyond
concepts that only [describe] the *motion* (*kínese*).
But, when these [terms] are described, we clarify
the said *action* with them. Subsequently,
elsewhere, we have mentioned¹ that *force* and
forcefulness have various meanings – whereas,
those with meaning of *might* will be dismissed (for,
just as in geometry, something is called, by
homonymity, *can* or *cannot*, we call that one, in
one way or another, *is* or *is not*), which applies to
as many principles as that kind which [has] the
same *mode* [*eídos*] with the first one being called
the principle of *transformation* [*metabolé*] within
one or the other. For instance, one whose in-itself of
his *power* [*dýname*] is to suffer, a passive
transformation initiates in that patient either by
something else or by itself through another; or one
being in a state of impassivity, nearly worsening and
deteriorating, is subjected to *change* [*metabletḗ*] by
something else or by itself through another. For, all

τούτοις ἔνεστι πᾶσι τοῖς ὄροις ὁ τῆς πρώτης
δυνάμεως λόγος. πάλιν δ' αὖται δυνάμεις λέγονται
ἢ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ παθεῖν ἢ τοῦ
καλῶς, ὥστε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τούτων λόγοις
ἐνυπάρχουσί πως οἱ τῶν προτέρων
δυνάμεων λόγοι.

φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς μία δύναμις
[20] τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (δυνατὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ
καὶ τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸ δύναμιν τοῦ παθεῖν καὶ τῷ
ἄλλο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ), ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς ἄλλη. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐν
τῷ πάσχοντι (διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ ἀρχήν, καὶ
εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀρχήν τινα, πάσχει τὸ
πάσχον, καὶ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου: τὸ λιπαρὸν μὲν
[25] γὰρ καυστὸν τὸ δ' ὑπεῖκον ὠδὶ θλαστὸν,
ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ
ποιῶντι, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομική, ἢ
μὲν ἐν τῷ θερμαντικῷ ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομικῷ:
διὸ ἢ συμπέφυκεν, οὐθὲν πάσχει αὐτὸ ὑφ'
ἑαυτοῦ: ἐν γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο.

καὶ ἡ ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον [30] ἢ τῆ
τοιαύτη δυνάμει ἐναντία στέρησις ἐστίν, ὥστε
τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πάσα δύναμις
ἀδυναμία. ἢ δὲ στέρησις λέγεται πολλαχῶς:
καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχον καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς ἂν μὴ
ἔχη, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ὅτε πέφυκεν, καὶ ἢ ὠδὶ, οἷον
παντελῶς, ἢ κἂν ὀπωσοῦν. ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ, ἂν
πεφυκότα [35] ἔχειν μὴ ἔχη βίᾳ, ἐστερηῆσθαι
ταῦτα λέγομεν.

these are within the definition of the first concept of
might. Now, again, all these are identified as *might*
merely because of expressing, enduring, or of being
well; so, as in them, i.e., the above concepts
identified as *might*, which is, in some way, their
property.

Consequently, it is clear that the *power* for
expressing and for experiencing is one (for *can be*
has the *ability* [dýname] of both expressing and
being impressed by [something]), though they appear
differently. For, in one hand, in the one who
experiences [suffering] (for by which he has some
commencement that is like a sort of commencing
material, experiencing both the initiation and the
[period of] going-through: for instance, that which is
oily burns up, and one who is on shaky ground
breaks [a deal], among many other examples); and,
on the other hand, in the one producing it: e.g., [we
see] the [*power*] in heat and in a building, either in
the one producing the heat, or in that which raises the
building. Thus, indeed, the *force-growing* [power]
does not experience it upon itself; since, it is one not
the other.

Both *inability* and *powerless*, or things like that,
are the lack of and in contrast to *power* [dýname];
therefore, every ability and [its correspondent]
inability is out of and throughout the same. But,
lacking [has] multiple meanings: that which has not;
that which grows but does not have, either in general,
or as grows up, at a point in present or entirely, or in
any way at all. And in a few [cases] when have but
by means of violation lose it, we say that is what
[they are] deprived of.

ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν
αρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν
ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, [1]
δήλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἀλ-
ογοὶ αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου: διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ
αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσιν: ἀρχαὶ
γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο.

καὶ αἱ μὲν [5] μετὰ λόγου πάσαι τῶν
ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἀλογοὶ μία ἐνός,
οἷον τό θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον' ἢ δὲ
ιατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος
ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ
πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν, πλὴν οὐχ ὡσαύτως,
καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἀμφοῖν ἔστι δ' ὡς [10] τοῦ
υπάρχοντος μᾶλλον, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς
τοιαύτας ἐπιστήμας εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων,
εἶναι δὲ τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰς τοῦ δὲ μὴ
καθ' αὐτάς: καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ
τοῦ δὲ τρόπον τινὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός:
ἀποφάσει γὰρ καὶ ἀποφορά δηλοῖ τό
ἐναντίον: ἢ γὰρ στέρησις [15] ἢ πρώτη τό
ἐναντίον, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀποφορά θατέρου. ἐπεὶ δὲ
τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἢ δ'
ἐπιστήμη δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἢ ψυχῇ
κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχὴν, τό μὲν ὑγιεινὸν ὑγίαιαν
μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τό θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ
τό ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων [20]
ἄμφω. λόγος γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν μὲν, οὐχ
ὁμοίως δὲ, καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἢ ἔχει κινήσεως ἀρχήν:
ὥστε ἄμφω ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς κινήσει πρὸς

For, since, principles as such are inherent in
soulless, and soulish, among souls and within the
reasoning of the soul, it is clear that [some]
principles of *power* will be without reason, and
[some] with reason. Therefore, all arts also all
productive sciences are *abilities*; because, they
[swing] the principles of *transformation* within one
or the other.

For all the arts/sciences that follow reason [are]
in accompany with the opposites, but those without
reason with only one; e.g., the heat produces heat
alone, while, medicine that of disease and health.
And the ground [for this] is that science *is* the
reason, and the same reason uncovers the thing and
that [which is] lacking, nevertheless, not as itself –
sometimes as both, and sometimes as belonging. It
is thus rather necessary that those sciences to be in
accompany with the opposites – being according to
one and not the other– for the reason,
corresponding to one and not the other, in some
respect, occurs as process: for by judgment and
criticism it uncovers the opposite; for the primary
lacking is the opposite, which is the criticism of the
other. And when the opposites cannot be generated
in the same [reason] and science has the power of
the reason and the soul has the principle of motion,
it is true that the hygienic produces only health, the
calorific only heat, and the frigorific only cold,
then the [reason] of science [generates] both.
Indeed, reason swings, yet not identically; and, it
has the principle of motion in soul, thus, from the
same principle, it moves [= swings] in both,

ταὐτὸ συνάψασα: διὸ τὰ κατὰ λόγον δυνατὰ τοῖς ἀνευ λόγου δυνατοῖς ποιεῖ τάναντία: μιᾷ γάρ ἀρχῇ περιέχεται, τῷ λόγῳ. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι [25] τῇ μὲν τοῦ εὖ δυνάμει ἀκολουθεῖ ἢ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ παθεῖν δύναμις, ταύτη δ' ἐκείνη οὐκ ἀεί: ἀνάγκη γάρ τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἰ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ μόνον ποιοῦντα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν.

εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ φασι, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ [30] μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν [31] μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομή: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. Δῆλον γάρ ὅτι οὐτ' οἰκοδόμος ἔσται ἐὰν μὴ οἰκοδομή (τό γάρ οἰκοδόμῳ [35] εἶναι τό δυνατῷ εἶναι ἔστιν οἰκοδομεῖν), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. Εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχειν τέχνας μὴ μαθόντα ποτέ καὶ λαβόντα, [1] καὶ μὴ ἔχειν μὴ ἀποβαλόντα ποτέ (ἢ γάρ λήθη ἢ πᾶσι τινί ἢ χρόνῳ: οὐ γάρ δὴ τοῦ γε πράγματος φθαρέντος, ἀεί γάρ ἔστιν), ὅταν παύσῃται, οὐχ ἔξει τὴν τέχνην, πάλιν δ' εὐθὺς οἰκοδομήσει πῶς λαβῶν; καὶ τὰ ἀψυχα δὴ ὁμοίως: οὔτε γάρ [5] ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε γλυκὺ οὔτε ὄλως αἰσθητὸν οὐθέν ἔσται μὴ αἰσθανομένων: ὥστε τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον συμβήσεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αἰσθησὶν ἔξει οὐδὲν ἂν μὴ αἰσθάνηται μὴδ' ἐνεργῇ. Εἰ οὖν τυφλὸν τό μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν,

fusing [one] to the opposite. It is clear that by the mighty reason mighty things are produced, and without it the opposite; for, those out of reason encompass one principle. And, indeed, it is also evident that reason follows the principle and is well *fit* [dynamé] in producing (or produce only the power to suffer) – but the same is not fit for the principle; for, by necessity, that which produces something well must have also produced it, but that which only produces something does not necessarily produce it well.

But there are some, e.g., the Megarics (school), who proclaim that something has only power when it is acting, but when it is not acting it is powerless; e.g., one who is not building [has] no power to build, but one who is building [has it] when is building – among similar examples. It is not hard to see the absurdities to these [examples]. For, clearly, one is not even a builder if one is not building (for, “to be a builder” is “one *can* build”); the same goes for the other arts. So, since it is impossible to possess these arts [without] never learning and acquiring them, never possessing and never having lost them (by ignoring, some affection, or time; for, indeed, not by destroying the matters of the [building], since it is forever), [how] when one ceases and not possessing the art, again immediately builds it; how one has acquired it? And indeed it is the same for the soulless things: for neither cold, nor hot, not the sweet, not even anything sensible will exist, if they are not being perceived (so, what happens to them is the reasoning of Protagoras). On the other hand, nothing has sensibility, if it is not perceiving, and not acting. So, since a blind that has not the sight

πεφυκὸς δὲ καὶ ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ ἔτι ὄν, οἱ αὐτοὶ
[10] τυφλοὶ ἔσονται πολλάκις τῆς ἡμέρας, καὶ
κωφοί.

ἔτι εἰ ἀδύνατον τό ἔστερημένον δυνάμεως,
τό μὴ γιγνόμενον ἀδύνατον ἔσται γενέσθαι:
τό δ' ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ὁ λέγων ἢ εἶναι ἢ
ἔσεσθαι ψεύσεται (τό γάρ ἀδύνατον τούτο
ἐσήμαινεν), ὥστε οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐξαιροῦσι καὶ
κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν.[15] ἀεὶ γάρ τό τε ἐστηκὸς
ἐστήξεται καὶ τό καθήμενον καθεδεῖται: οὐ
γάρ ἀναστήσεται ἂν καθέζηται: ἀδύνατον γάρ
ἔσται ἀναστήναι ὃ γε μὴ δύναται ἀναστήναι.
εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα λέγειν, φανερόν ὅτι
δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια ἕτερον ἐστίν (ἐκεῖνοι
δ' οἱ λόγοι δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ταῦτ' [20]
ποιοῦσιν, διό καὶ οὐ μικρόν τι ζητοῦσιν
ἀναιρεῖν), ὥστε ἐνδέχεται δυνατόν μὲν τι εἶναι
μὴ εἶναι δέ, καὶ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι εἶναι δέ,
ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν
δυνατόν βαδίζειν ὄν μὴ βαδίζειν, καὶ μὴ
βαδίζειν δυνατόν ὄν βαδίζειν. ἐστὶ δὲ δυνατόν
τούτο ᾧ ἂν ὑπάρξη [25] ἢ ἐνέργεια οὗ
λέγεται ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν, οὐθὲν ἔσται
ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ οἷον, εἰ δυνατόν καθῆσθαι
καὶ ἐνδέχεται καθῆσθαι, τούτῳ ἂν ὑπάρξη τό
καθῆσθαι, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον: καὶ εἰ
κινήθηναι ἢ κινήσαι ἢ στήναι ἢ στήσαι ἢ
εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἢ μὴ γίγνεσθαι,
ομοίως.

[30] ἐλήλυθε δ' ἢ ἐνέργεια τοῦνομα, ἢ πρὸς
τὴν ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα

but adapts it and when does, there still will be
those blinds (and deaf) who exist many times of
the day.

Yet again, since, the one deprived of power
[remains] impossible, the one not happened will be
impossible to happen; despite, one says that which
is impossible to happen, *it* either is or will be; it is
fallacy (because, this is meant by “impossible”).
These reasoning, thus, exclude both *motion* and the
state of being. For that which stands firm will
always stand, and the one which sits remains
seated; because, one does not ascend if descending
– since, it will be impossible for one to ascend if
one [has] no power to ascend. If, thus, one does not
happen to say these, [then] it is clear that *power*
and *action* are distinct (but those arguments that
make power and action identically one, that which
they are trying to exclude is not a small thing). So,
it admits, on the one hand, the thing *can be*, on
the other, *not be*, also, it *cannot be*, yet it *be*; and
similarly, in the other categories [= predicates],
can walking be not walking, and *can not walking*
be walking? But, how can *it be*, if there exists
action to which it is said to have the *power* –
none will be impossible. And, I say, as that can
sit and asserts sitting, so, none will be
impossible, there exist *it* [admitting] sitting; and,
similarly: that being moved, or moving, or
standing, or is stood, or being, or becoming, or
not being, or not becoming.

But the name *action*, which accords with
expression, and with others,

ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα: δοκεῖ γάρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἢ κινήσις εἶναι, διό και τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν οὐκ ἀποδιδόασι τό κινεῖσθαι, ἄλλας δέ τινας κατηγορίας, οἷον διανοητά και ἐπιθυμητά εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα, [35] κινούμενα δὲ οὐ, τούτο δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ὄντα ἐνεργεῖα ἔσονται ἐνεργεῖα. [1] τῶν γάρ μὴ ὄντων ἕνια δυνάμει ἔστιν: οὐκ ἔστι δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐντελεχεῖα ἔστιν.

εἰ δὲ ἔστι τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ δυνατόν ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ, φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀληθές εἶναι τό εἰπεῖν ὅτι δυνατόν μὲν [5] τοδί, οὐκ ἔσται δέ, ὥστε τὰ ἀδύνατα εἶναι ταύτη διαφεύγειν: λέγω δὲ οἷον εἴ τις φαίη δυνατόν τὴν διάμετρον μετρηθῆναι οὐ μόντοι μετρηθήσεσθαι – ὁ μὴ λογιζόμενος τό ἀδύνατον εἶναι – ὅτι οὐθὲν κωλύει δυνατόν τι ὄν εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι μὴ εἶναι μηδ' ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἀνάγκη ἐκ [10] τῶν κειμένων, εἰ και ὑποθοίμεθα εἶναι ἢ γεγονέναι ὃ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν δυνατόν δέ, ὅτι οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον: συμβήσεται δέ γε, τό γάρ μετρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατον.

οὐ γάρ δὴ ἔστι ταῦτό τό ψεύδος και τό ἀδύνατον: τό γάρ σε ἔστάναι νῦν ψεύδος μὲν, οὐκ ἀδύνατον δέ. ἀμα δὲ δήλον και ὅτι, εἰ [15] τοῦ Α ὄντος ἀνάγκη τό Β εἶναι, και δυνατοῦ ὄντος εἶναι τοῦ Α και τό Β ἀνάγκη εἶναι δυνατόν: εἰ γάρ μὴ ἀνάγκη δυνατόν εἶναι, οὐθὲν κωλύει μὴ εἶναι δυνατόν εἶναι. ἔστω δὴ τό Α δυνατόν. οὐκοῦν ὅτε τό Α

[is] particularly [derived] from *motion*; for *action* is considered to particularly be *motion*. And, thus, the *non-existing* do not render *movement*, but some other categories [predicates]; e.g., desires and intellectual things are the ones not *being* and not *moving*; this is because, they are not *being action*, but *will be action*. For, those that not *being*, some *can* be; yet not are [now], because are not [in] *expression*.

Rather, if interpreting it that *the possible* is or follows [the principle], it becomes clear that it is not true to say that such and such *is* indeed possible [now], but will not be [later]; for this reason, things that are impossible are failed to be considered. Rather, I say, for instance, if a certain thing means *possible*, to measure the diagonal would not indeed be measured – i.e., being impossible, it cannot be calculated – because, nothing withholds the *possible being thing* from *being* or *becoming* to not be or never will be. On the contrary, out of the premises, this necessity follows that if we taught that which is not *to be* or *to become*, but, in fact, it is possible that nothing is impossible; and yet, it happens that the measuring [to be] impossible.

You see, the false and the impossible are not exactly identical; for, that you are now standing is false but not impossible. At the same time, that is also clear that if as a result of A *being* [real], B must also *be*, then [when] *possibility* of A is real, so B must be *possible*; for if [something] must not *possibly be*, nothing withholds it of not being *possibly be*. Now, let's A [be] possible. Certainly not so long as A

δυνατόν εἶη εἶναι, εἰ τεθείη τό Α, οὐθὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι συνέβαινεν: τό δέ γε Β [20] ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ἀλλ' ἦν ἀδύνατον. ἔστω δὴ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὴ ἀδύνατον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τό Β, ἀνάγκη καὶ τό Α εἶναι. ἀλλ' ἦν ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον ἀδύνατον: καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα. ἂν ἄρα ἦ τό Α δυνατόν, καὶ τό Β ἔσται δυνατόν, εἴπερ οὕτως εἶχον ὥστε τοῦ Α ὄντος ἀνάγκη εἶναι τό Β. ἐὰν δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων [25] τῶν Α Β μὴ ἦ δυνατόν τό Β οὕτως, οὐδέ τὰ Α Β ἐξεῖ ὡς ἐτέθη: καὶ εἰ τοῦ Α δυνατοῦ ὄντος ἀνάγκη τό Β δυνατόν εἶναι, εἰ ἔστι τό Α ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ τό Β. τὸ γὰρ δυνατόν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ Β εἶναι, εἰ τὸ Α δυνατόν, τοῦτο σημαίνει, ἐὰν ἦ τό Α καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς ἦν δυνατόν [30] εἶναι, κάκεινο τότε καὶ οὕτως εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον.

ἀπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἷον τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δὲ ἔθει οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν, τῶν δὲ μαθήσει οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας ἔχειν, ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας [35] καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη.

[1] ἐπεὶ δὲ τό δυνατόν τί δυνατόν καὶ ποτέ καὶ πῶς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ λόγον δύναται κινεῖν καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν μετὰ λόγου, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ἄλογοι, κάκεινας μὲν ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐμπύχῳ [5] εἶναι ταύτας δὲ ἐν ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας δυνάμεις ἀνάγκη,

is to be possible, [that is], A is established, [or] no impossibility is to happen; yet B must be, though it was impossible. Now, let's it [be] impossible. Now, if B must be impossible, A must also be [impossible]. Though, as the former was impossible, so also the latter. So, if A [is] truly possible, B will also be possible; For, if as such they are related, thus, as a result of A *being* [real], B must *be*. Now, if A B are in this way related, or B is not so possible, nor the A B [are related] as it has been explained; and if as a result of A *being possible*, B must *be possible*, [then] if A *is*, also B must be. That, B is possible if A is possible means: if, truly, and indeed, A, and that, it was possible to be then in this way that one [B] is necessary.

On the other hand, the totality of the existing *abilities*, being, indeed, inborn (e.g., those of sensation), or being acquired (e.g., playing flute), or being studies (e.g., as in arts), – as many as those being acquired and reported – must, in fact, have been *pre-practiced* [pro-energé]; however, those that are not of these kind and experienced [as opposed to be acted] need not [be pre-practiced].

In as much as the [element of] possible [is concerned], within the boundaries [of its definition] not only whatness, when-ness, howness, and how much-ness of the possible, must be present but also [its] necessity, that is, not only the ones that bring about the possible *according to* reason, but also those that bring about the power of the possible *in accompany with* reason. Indeed, in them, additionally, the unreasonable ones and the power of unreasoning are ensouled *with* and *in* both of these. Such these powers [become]

ὅταν ὡς δύνανται τό ποιητικὸν καὶ τό παθητικὸν πλησιάζωσι, τό μὲν ποιεῖν τό δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκείνας δ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη: αὐταὶ μὲν γὰρ πάσαι μία ἐνός ποιητικῆ, ἐκεῖναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἅμα ποιήσῃ τὰ ἐναντία: τοῦτο δὲ [10] ἀδύνατον. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερον τι εἶναι τό κύριον: λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὀρεξίν ἢ προαίρεσίν. ὁποτέρου γὰρ ἂν ὀρέγηται κυρίως, τοῦτο ποιήσῃ ὅταν ὡς δύναται ὑπάρχη καὶ πλησιάζῃ τῷ παθητικῷ: ὥστε τό δυνατὸν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέγηται οὗ ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, [15] τοῦτο ποιεῖν: ἔχει δὲ παρόντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὠδὶ ἔχοντος ποιεῖν: εἰ δὲ μὴ, ποιεῖν οὐ δυνήσεται (τό γὰρ μηθενὸς τῶν ἐξω κωλύοντος προσδιορίζεσθαι οὐθὲν ἐτι δεῖ: τὴν γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχει ὡς ἐστὶ δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν, ἐστὶ δ' οὐ πάντως ἀλλ' ἐχόντων πῶς, ἐν οἷς ἀφορισθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἐξω κωλύοντα: [20] ἀφαιρεῖται γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσόντων ἕνια): διό οὐδ' ἂν ἅμα βούληται ἢ ἐπιθυμῇ ποιεῖν δύο ἢ τὰ ἐναντία, οὐ ποιήσῃ: οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν οὐδ' ἐστὶ τοῦ ἅμα ποιεῖν ἢ δύναμις, ἐπεὶ ὧν ἐστὶν οὕτως ποιήσῃ. [25]

ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς κατὰ κίνησιν λεγομένης δυνάμεως εἴρηται, περὶ ἐνεργείας διορίσωμεν τί τέ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνέργεια καὶ ποῖόν τι. καὶ γὰρ τό δυνατὸν ἅμα δῆλον

necessary whenever such [elements of] possible (the producing one and the one being passive) are brought in close proximity. But, producing is not necessary as experiencing it; because, each one of these is productive: as long as the producing one produces the opposites; but this is impossible. Thus, there must be some other principal; by which I mean desire or preference. For, if one has aspired to the principal, regardless of [which selection], that one produces which is in close proximity of the receptive element and whenever such [element of] possible is present. For this reason, once aspired, the *possible according to reason* is all needed, [no matter] whom and in what way one has the *ability* to produce it. At the same time, [when the element of] receptive is present, in this case it is capable to produce; otherwise, it will not be able to produce. (For nothing from outside restrain it from being determined; nothing binds [it] any longer; because it has the *ability*, in that way *it is* able (of it/him) to produce it; and *it is not* but perhaps it is closely associated with *howness*, into which it is bounded and [keeps] the restrains out; for it removes these from some attribution to the boundaries.) Because, not even if it wills or desires to produce two [things] or the opposite [things] simultaneously, it does not produce them; for, in this manner, it has not the *ability* [dýname] of them, not even it is of its ability to produce things simultaneously. After all it is in such being that produces.

But, since, it has been mentioned on the said *power* [dýname] along with *motion*, let's clarify about *action* [enérgeia]: *what* action is, and of *what kind*. For, while apportioning the [element of] *ability*

ἔσται διαιροῦσιν, ὅτι οὐ μόνον τούτο λέγομεν δυνατόν ὃ πέφυκε κινεῖν ἄλλο ἢ κινεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ απλῶς ἢ τρόπον τινά, ἀλλὰ [30] καὶ ἐτέρως, διό ζητούντες καὶ περὶ τούτων διήλθομεν.

ἔστι δὴ ἐνέργεια τό ὑπάρχειν τό πρᾶγμα μὴ οὕτως ὡσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει: λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθεῖ ἄν, καὶ επιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἂν δυνατός ἦ θεωρῆσαι: [35] τό δὲ ἐνεργεία. δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τῇ επαγωγῇ ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντός ὄρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τό ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν, ὅτι ὡς τό οικοδομοῦν πρὸς τό οἰκοδομικόν, [1] καὶ τό ἐγρηγορὸς πρὸς τό καθεῦδον, καὶ τό ὄρων πρὸς τό μῦθον μὲν ὄψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τό ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τό ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τό ἀνέργαστον. ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς [5] θατέρῳ μορίῳ ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη θατέρῳ δὲ τό δυνατόν.

λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργεία οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τούτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο, τόδ' ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τόδε: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν τὰ δ' ὡς οὐσία πρὸς τινα ὕλην.

ἀλλῶς δὲ καὶ τό ἀπειρον [10] καὶ τό κενόν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα,

at the same time, it will be clear that that which we call *ability* not only adapts to move others, or is moved by others, either simply or in its way, but also differently [as during] our inquiry about them we reviewed them.

Indeed, *action* means that the *thing to be present*, not as such we say [about] *ability* [dynamé]. We talk about *ability*, as Hermes being in the wood, and the half being in the whole; because it [can be] removed; also, one is an expert, even not [being] an observant, but one is *able* to observe something and [put it] in action. But, by induction corresponding to each one of them, which we want to say, it becomes clear and need not to seek every definition [individually] but to comprehend the analogy: e.g., one living in a building as to one who builds it; also, one who is awake as to one who is asleep; and, one who sees as to one with closed eyes (while can see); also, the separated materials, as to the [mixed] material; and also, that which is completed, as to one which is [still] incomplete. And, out of these differences, let the *action* be as in one separate part, and the *ability* as in the other part.

But it is said for the [sake of] analogy, not that all actions are similar; [it only says] that as such is in this the other in that; this to that as that to the other. In fact, the same [can be said] as motion is to power, the same is as essence is to some material.

In other words, un-boundary [infinite], vacuum, and other terms such as these,

λέγεται δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ πολλοῖς τῶν
όντων, οἷον τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ βαδίζοντι καὶ
ὀρωμένῳ. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ
ἀπλῶς ἀληθεύεσθαι ποτε (τό μὲν γὰρ
ὀρώμενον ὅτι ὀρᾶται, τό δὲ ὅτι ὀρᾶσθαι
δυνατόν): τό δ' ἀπειρον οὐχ οὕτω δυνάμει
ἐστίν ὡς [15] ἐνεργείᾳ ἐσόμενον χωριστόν,
ἀλλὰ γνώσει. τό γὰρ μὴ ὑπολείπειν τὴν
διαίρεσιν ἀποδίδωσι τό εἶναι δυνάμει
ταύτην τὴν ἐνεργείαν, τό δὲ χωρίζεσθαι οὔ.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἐστὶ πέρας οὐδεμία
τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τό τέλος, οἷον τό
ἰσχυαίνειν ἢ ἰσχυασία [20] αὐτό, αὐτά δὲ
ὅταν ἰσχυαίνῃ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν κινήσει, μὴ
υπάρχοντα ὧν ἐνεκα ἢ κινήσεις, οὐκ ἐστὶ
ταῦτα πρᾶξις ἢ οὐ τελεία γε (οὐ γὰρ τέλος):
ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνη ἢ ἐνυπάρχει τό τέλος καὶ ἢ
πρᾶξις. οἷον ὀρᾷ ἅμα καὶ ἐώρακε, καὶ φρονεῖ
καὶ πεφρόνηκε, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν,
ἀλλ' οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν [25] οὐδ'
ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγίαστα: εὖ ζῆ καὶ εὖ
ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν.
εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔδει ἂν ποτε παύεσθαι ὡσπερ ὅταν
ἰσχυαίνῃ, νῦν δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ζῆ καὶ ἔζηκεν.

τούτων δὴ δεῖ τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν,
τὰς δ' ἐνεργείας. πάσα γὰρ κινήσις ἀτελής,
ἰσχυασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις: [30]
αὐταὶ δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα
βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ
ὠκοδόμηκεν,

or many of *actual things* [όν] are called *ability*
and *action*, e.g., the observer, the walker, and the
observable. In fact, these *are simply possible*
[endéche] without being verified (for, indeed,
one who is observing something is because one
observes it and because one is able to observe it);
But the unbounded is not distinguishable from
ability (except in knowledge) as action is. That
division yields no remaining is possible in action
but not separable [from it]. In as much as
exercises have limit, [they are] not the goal, but
means to the goal, e.g., dieting to slim [the
body]. But, when dieting, the parts [of the body]
are also in motion – where the motion is not
diet's object – those [parts] are not exercising or
at least [they are] not the ultimate goal (for it is
not the goal); nevertheless, the diet includes both
the goal and the exercise. Like, seeing and have
seen; be minded and have been minded; think
and have thought. Whereas, we live well and
have lived well or are happy and been happy; but
[it's not true] that we learn what we have learned
or we are healthy but are becoming healthy. But,
if not, they had to ceased (as in dieting) yet have
not as in living now while have lived.

Indeed, out of these, one has to be called
movement [motion], the other *activity* [action].
For, every motion – dieting, learning, walking,
building – is unended; indeed, they are
movements and, with that, *unended*. For, walking
and has walked, building and has built, becoming

οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖται καὶ
κεκίνηται, ἀλλ' ἕτερον, καὶ κινεῖ καὶ
κεκίνηκεν: ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὄρα ἅμα τὸ αὐτό,
καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην
ἐνέργειαν [35] λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν. τὸ
μὲν οὖν ἐνεργεία τί τέ ἐστι καὶ ποῖον, ἐκ
τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δῆλον ἡμῖν ἐστω.

πότε δὲ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἕκαστον καὶ
πότε οὐ, διοριστέον: οὐ γὰρ ὅποτεοῦν. [1]
οἶον ἢ γῆ ἄρ' ἐστὶ δυνάμει ἄνθρωπος; ἢ οὐ,
ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὅταν ἤδη γένηται σπέρμα,
καὶ οὐδὲ τότε ἴσως; ὡσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ὑπὸ
ιατρικῆς ἀπαν ἂν ὑγιασθεῖν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τύχης,
ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τι ὃ δυνατόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν
[5] υγιαίνον δυνάμει. ὅρος δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀπὸ
διανοίας ἐντελεχείᾳ γιγνομένου ἐκ τοῦ
δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν βουληθέντος γίγνηται
μηθενὸς κωλύοντος τῶν ἐκτός, ἐκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ
ὑγιαζομένῳ, ὅταν μηθὲν κωλύῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ:
ομοίως δὲ δυνάμει καὶ οἰκία: εἰ μηθὲν κωλύει
τῶν ἐν τούτῳ καὶ τῆ [10] ὕλη τοῦ γίνεσθαι
οἰκίαν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὃ δεῖ προσγενέσθαι ἢ
ἀπογενέσθαι ἢ μεταβαλεῖν, τούτο δυνάμει
οἰκία: καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ὅσων
ἐξωθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως. καὶ ὅσων δὲ ἐν
αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι, ὅσα μηθενὸς τῶν ἐξωθεν
ἐμποδίζοντος ἔσται δι' αὐτοῦ: οἶον τὸ σπέρμα
οὔπω (δεῖ γὰρ [15] ἐν ἄλλῳ πεσεῖν καὶ
μεταβάλλειν), ὅταν δ' ἤδη διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ
ἀρχῆς ἢ τοιούτων, ἤδη τούτο δυνάμει:
ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς δεῖται, ὡσπερ ἢ γῆ

and has become, and being moved and been moved
are not [the same], but distinct. (Being in motion
and been in motion are [distinct], but seeing and
seen, or thinking and thought are not.) In fact, as I
was saying, the former is *action*, the latter *motion*.
It may be clear to us that from these and similar
[examples] that what and of what kind *activity* is.

That when every single thing is able and when
is limited [is necessary] for at any given time it is
not [able]. E.g., Whether the Earth is able to be
mankind? Or, not? At least, perhaps, when they
became spore, and perchance not even then.
Therefore, just as everything may be healed by
medicine, it is not by chance, but on the contrary it
is *that* which is able, and this one is [called] health-
ability. In fact, the definition of *expression*, by
means of speculation on that which comes from
ability [force] is 'when [something] is willed it
comes into being, [providing] nothing external
restrains it:' take that one who is recovering and
nothing prevents it; also take ability and a house:
if nothing prevents it from inside of becoming a
house (i.e., nothing is needed which [should be]
added, removed or changed) this one *can* [be] a
house. Also, it is true, in many other cases where
the principle of *becoming* [genése] is external,
and those which contain it without being blocked
externally by anything. E.g., the yet-not-now
spore (being necessary to undergo and change *in*
another), when, by means of the principle, *can*
be the already-not-yet [human]; in the former
[state] is in need of the corresponding principle,
just as the earth

οὐπω ἀνδριάς δυνάμει (μεταβαλοῦσα γάρ
ἔσται χαλκός). ἔοικε δὲ ὁ λέγομεν εἶναι
οὐ τόδε ἀλλ' ἐκείνινον – οἷον τό κιβώτιον οὐ
ξύλον ἀλλὰ ξύλινον, [20] οὐδέ τό ξύλον γῆ
ἀλλὰ γῆϊνον, πάλιν ἢ γῆ εἰ οὕτως μὴ ἄλλο
ἀλλὰ ἐκείνινον – ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο δυνάμει ἀπλῶς
τό ὕστερόν ἐστιν. οἷον τό κιβώτιον οὐ γῆϊνον
οὐδέ γῆ ἀλλὰ ξύλινον: τοῦτο γάρ δυνάμει
κιβώτιον καὶ ὕλη κιβωτίου αὐτή, ἀπλῶς μὲν
τοῦ ἀπλῶς τουδὶ δὲ τοδὶ τό ξύλον.

εἰ δὲ τί ἐστὶ πρῶτον [25] ὁ μηκέτι κατ'
ἄλλο λέγεται ἐκείνινον, τοῦτο πρῶτη ὕλη:
οἷον εἰ ἢ γῆ ἀερίνη, ὁ δ' ἀήρ μὴ πῦρ ἀλλὰ
πύρινος, τό πῦρ ὕλη πρῶτη οὐ τόδε τι οὔσα.
τούτω γάρ διαφέρει τό καθ' οὗ καὶ τό
ὑποκείμενον, τῷ εἶναι τόδε τι ἢ μὴ εἶναι: οἷον
τοῖς πάθεσι τό ὑποκείμενον ἄνθρωπος καὶ
[30] σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴ, πάθος δὲ τό μουσικὸν
καὶ λευκόν (λέγεται δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς
ἐγγενομένης ἐκεῖνο οὐ μουσικὴ ἀλλὰ
μουσικὸν, καὶ οὐ λευκότης ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ
λευκόν, οὐδέ βᾶδισις ἢ κίνησις ἀλλὰ
βαδίζον ἢ κινούμενον, ὡς τό ἐκείνινον):
όσα μὲν οὖν οὕτω, τό ἔσχατον οὐσία: ὅσα
δὲ μὴ [35] οὕτως ἀλλ' εἶδος τι καὶ τόδε τι τό
κατηγορούμενόν, τό ἔσχατον ὕλη καὶ οὐσία
υλική. καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ συμβαίνει τό ἐκείνινον
λέγεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὰ πάθη: [1]
ἄμφω γάρ ἀόριστα. (πότε μὲν οὖν λεκτέον
δυνάμει καὶ πότε οὔ, εἴρηται.)

can not yet [be] a statue (because after changes
will be bronze). So it seems – that which we say is
not on this account but on the *actual thing* – for
instance, the [made] box is not wood, but made of
wood, nor the wood is Earth, but comes off the
Earth; moreover, the Earth if taken as the ‘actual
thing’ not out of another thing – that *ability* is
always simply the latter one. E.g., the box [is]
made of wood, not made of Earth, nor the Earth;
for that [which] *can* be a box is the material of the
box, with such and such [pieces of] wood.

But, if there exists the primary [element], which
is no longer called the *actual thing* of others, this is
[then] primary matter. E.g., If the Earth is made of
air, and that, air is not fire, but made of fire, [then]
fire is primary matter; this *it* is not *actual* [όν].
For, it differs [to say] *according to it* or *underlying*
it, saying *what-this* is or is not; e.g., the
modifications underlying ‘mankind’ are both
‘body’ and ‘soul’ but [being] ‘musician’ or ‘joyful’
[are] passions (but one who is born with [talent] of
music is not called ‘music’ but ‘musician;’ and not
‘gayness’ but ‘joyful;’ not [one is] ‘walk’ or
‘motion’ but ‘is walking’ or ‘is moving’ – just as
the [above-mentioned] *actual thing*). Accordingly,
when it, as mentioned, follows [then] the last
[substratum is] *essence*; just as, when it does not
follow [then] the predicate [is] *form* – the *what* and
the *what-this* – the last [substratum is] matter or
essence of matter. It rightly exactly means the
actual thing, [which] should be called according to
that of matter and the passive [voices], because
both are aorist [tenses]. (Now, we see when one is
called *ability*, and when one is not. Interpolated.)

ἐπει δὲ τό πρότερον διώρισταί ποσαχῶς λέγεται, [5] φανερόν ὅτι πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ δυνάμεως οὐ μόνον τῆς ὠρισμένης ἢ λέγεται ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ὅλως πάσης ἀρχῆς κινήτικῆς ἢ στατικῆς. καὶ γάρ ἡ φύσις ἐν ταύτῳ γίγνεται: ἐν ταύτῳ γάρ γενεὶ τῇ δυνάμει: ἀρχὴ γάρ κινήτικῆ, ἀλλ' [10] οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτό. πάσης δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης προτέρα ἐστίν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ: χρόνῳ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν ὥς, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς οὐ.

τῷ λόγῳ μὲν οὖν ὅτι προτέρα, δήλον (τῷ γάρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστὶ τό πρώτως δυνατόν, οἷον λέγω οἰκοδομικόν τό δυνάμενον οἰκοδομεῖν, [15] καὶ ὄρατικόν τό ὄραν, καὶ ὄρατὸν τό δυνατόν ὄρασθαι: ὁ δ' αὐτός λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸν λόγον προϋπάρχειν καὶ τὴν γνώσιν τῆς γνώσεως): τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πρότερον ὧδε: τό τῷ εἶδει τό αὐτό ἐνεργούν πρότερον, ἀριθμῷ δ' οὐ. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι τούδε μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ [20] ἤδη ὄντος κατ' ἐνέργειαν καὶ τοῦ σίτου καὶ τοῦ ὄρωντος πρότερον τῷ χρόνῳ ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὄρατικόν, ἃ δυνάμει μὲν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ σίτος καὶ ὄρων, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὐπω: ἀλλὰ τούτων πρότερα τῷ χρόνῳ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα ἐγένετο: ἀεὶ γάρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει γίγνεται τό ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικός ὑπὸ

Now, after separating the prior into several different layers, it is evident that action is prior to ability. And, by *ability*, I do not just mean the separation or the definition (i.e., the principle of transformation within one or the other.) but, in general, any principle of motion or of rest. Also, because, nature comes into being in that which the ability comes, too; for it is a principle of motion, yet not in another [thing] but in itself as it[self]. Now, to every of these [forces] action is prior: both in reason and in essence; nevertheless, in time it is so [sometimes] and not so [other times].

So, whereas, [action is] prior in reason is evident (the first ability is enable [to act] because it is capable [endéche] of acting). I mean, for instance, a building-maker is enable to build; also a sighted [person is enable] to see, and an observer is enable to observe. And, the same reason [hold true] for other cases; so, it is necessary for the reason to pre-exist as [it is true] for knowledge about knowledge). Prior in time, on the other hand, is as follows: act is prior in *form* but not in *numbers*. And, therefore, this [is what] I say that concerning a human, a seed, or whom who sees, whose being are already according to action, but the matter, the spore, or the sighted one are prior in time, and which are *able* to be human, seed, or the one who sees, but not yet [in] action; however, [there are] other acting beings from which those prior in time come into being. For, always, out of *able-being* comes *action*, through which *been* in action – e.g., human from human, musician from that who

ὄντος [25] μουσικού, αἰεὶ κινουῦντός τις
πρώτου: τό δὲ κινούν ἐνεργεία ἤδη ἐστίν.
εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγοις
ὅτι πᾶν τό γιγνόμενον γίγνεται ἔκ τινος τι
καὶ ὑπὸ τινος, καὶ τούτο τῷ εἶδει τό αὐτό.
διό καὶ δοκεῖ [30] ἀδύνατον εἶναι οἰκοδόμον
εἶναι μὴ οἰκοδομήσαντα μηθὲν ἢ κιθαριστὴν
μηθὲν κιθαρίσαντα: ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων
κιθαρίζειν κιθαρίζων μανθάνει κιθαρίζειν,
ομοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. ὅθεν ὁ σοφιστικὸς
ἐλεγχος ἐγίγνετο ὅτι οὐκ ἔχων τις τὴν ἐπιστήμη
ν ποιήσει οὐδ' ἢ ἐπιστήμη: ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων
οὐκ ἔχει. [35] ἀλλὰ διὰ τό τού γιγνομένου
γεγενῆσθαί τι καὶ τού ὅλως κινουμένου
κεκινῆσθαί τι (δήλον δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ
κινήσεως τούτο) [1] καὶ τὸν μανθάνοντα
ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τι τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἴσως. ἀλλ'
οὖν καὶ ταύτη γε δήλον ὅτι ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ
οὕτω προτέρα τῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ γένεσιν
καὶ χρόνον.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσία γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ
τῇ γενέσει [5] ὕστερα τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ οὐσία
πρότερα (οἶον ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος
σπέρματος: τό μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἔχει τό εἶδος τό
δ' οὐ), καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τό
γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τό οὐ ἔνεκα,
τού τέλους δὲ ἔνεκα ἢ γένεσις), τέλος δ' ἢ
ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις [10]
λαμβάνεται. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ὄψιν ἔχουσιν ὁρῶσι τὰ
ζῶα ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁρῶσιν ὄψιν ἔχουσιν, ομοίως
δὲ καὶ οἰκοδομικὴν

knows music – [there is] always some *prime mover*: that which moves already is in action. We have interpreted in [previous] reasonings about the *essence* that everything that comes into being comes from and through some *thing*, which is the same as itself. And, on this account, it seems impossible one is a builder [while] one has not built before, nor a harpist [who] has never played a harp; for one learns to play the harp by learning how to play it; and comparably the other [cases]. Consequently, there were the sophists who argued that those who do not know the science produce science, because, the learner does not [need] to know. On the contrary, the *whatness*, through which one comes into being, has [already] come into being; and *that* [which] moves as whole has [already] moved (but this is clarified on the [reasoning] on motion) and learners, in parallel, must know *the it* of science. This [argument] also results in this that at any rate the action, according to that which comes into being and to time, [is] prior to ability.

Prior in *essence*, *in fact*, [is] naturally so, because, those that are posterior in becoming are also prior in *essence* (e.g., an adult to a child, or humans to spores: for, indeed, one already has the *form* [eidos], while the other does not); and because, everything that comes into being proceeds toward a principle and an aim (for, a principle [is] with regard to it, but the source [is] with regard to the aim). And the action is the end, and the for this reason, the ability takes hold of [it]. For, animals do not see in order to have sight, but they have sight in order to see, and also similarly, building-

ίνα [12] οἰκοδομῶσι καὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν
ίνα θεωρῶσιν: ἀλλ' οὐ θεωροῦσιν ίνα
θεωρητικὴν ἔχωσιν, εἰ μὴ οἱ μελετῶντες: οὗτοι
δε οὐχί θεωροῦσιν ἀλλ' ἢ ὠδὶ, †ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν
δέονται θεωρεῖν†.

[15] ἐτι ἡ ὕλη ἐστι δυνάμει ὅτι ἔλθοι ἂν εἰς
τό εἶδος: ὅταν δέ γε ἐνεργεία ἦ, τότε ἐν τῷ
εἶδει ἐστίν. ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ
ῶν κίνησις τό τέλος, διό ὡσπερ οἱ διδάσκοντες
ἐνεργοῦντα ἐπιδείξαντες οἴονται τό τέλος
ἀποδεδωκέσαι, καὶ ἡ φύσις ομοίως. εἰ γάρ μὴ
οὕτω γίγνεται, ὁ [20] Παύσωνος ἔσται Ἑρμῆς:
ἀδηλος γάρ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἰ ἐσω ἢ ἐξω,
ὡσπερ κάκεινος. τό γάρ ἐργον τέλος, ἡ δὲ
ἐνέργεια τό ἐργον, διό καὶ τοῦνομα ἐνέργεια
λέγεται κατὰ τό ἐργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν
ἐντελέχειαν.

ἐπει δ' ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἡ χρῆσις
(οἶον ὄψεως ἢ ὄρασις, καὶ οὐθὲν [25]
γίγνεται παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως),
ἀπ' ἐνίων δὲ γίγνεται τι (οἶον ἀπὸ τῆς
οικοδομικῆς οἰκία παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδόμησις),
ὅμως οὐθὲν ἤττον ἐνθα μὲν τέλος, ἐνθα δὲ
μᾶλλον τέλος τῆς δυνάμεώς ἐστιν: ἡ γάρ
οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, καὶ ἅμα
γίγνεται καὶ ἐστὶ τῆ οἰκία.

[30] ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστι
παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τό γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν
ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν (οἶον ἢ τε
οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἡ

ability in order to build, and perceive-able in order
to perceive, not to perceive in order to have
perceive-ability – except those being educated; but
they do not perceive, they just follow, †maybe they
do not pursue to perceive [things]†.

Moreover, matter is *force* [dynamé], in case it is
brought *into* the form; but when it is in action, then
it is *in* the form. Similarly, in others, and in those
which motion is the aim. Wherefore, just as, those
who teach expect they have delivered the aim by
putting [students] into exhibiting in action; also, it
[is] the same with nature. For if it does not occur as
such, [then] it is [the case of] Hermes the Pauson;
just as it is *uncertain* to say whether science is
'within' or 'without' in those [students]. For,
acting is the aim, and *action* is the *acting*;
wherefore, the term action means *according to the*
act, and it leads to *expression*.

Now, seeing that in some [things] the *function*
is the *final* [aim] (e.g., for sight, seeing [is the final
aim] and from sight nothing else is produced
alongside this [seeing]), and in some other [things]
what is produced, (e.g., from the construction
[come] house alongside the buildable things);
however, in one [function] is the aim, but rather in
the other aim of the force – for the buildable things
are in the things-built, and, once developed, are in
the house.

As [I was saying], alongside the usage of those
which were referred to, with many others the
action is *in* [what] they have produced (e.g., as in
buildable things in the things built, or the

ὑφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ, ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἢ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ): ὁσῶν δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλο τι ἔργον [35] παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἢ ἐνέργεια (οἶον ἢ ὄρασις ἐν τῷ ὀρῶντι καὶ ἢ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἢ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διό καὶ ἢ ευδαιμονία: [1] ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τις ἐστὶν). ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἢ οὐσία καὶ τό εἶδος ἐνέργειά ἐστὶν. κατὰ τε δὴ τούτον τὸν λόγον φανερόν ὅτι πρότερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως, καὶ ὡσπερ εἶπομεν, τοῦ χρόνου [5] ἀεὶ προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας ἕως τῆς τοῦ ἀεὶ κινουντός πρώτως.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κυριωτέρως: τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἶδια πρότερα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῶν φθαρτῶν, ἐστὶ δ' οὐθὲν δυνάμει αἶδιον. λόγος δὲ ὅδε: πάσα δύναμις ἅμα τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστὶν: τό μὲν γὰρ μὴ δυνατόν ὑπάρχειν οὐκ [10] ἂν ὑπάρξειεν οὐθενί, τό δυνατόν δὲ πᾶν ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. τό ἄρα δυνατόν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι: τό αὐτό ἄρα δυνατόν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. τὸ δὲ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι: τό δὲ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι φθαρτόν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ τοῦτο αὐτό ὃ λέγεται [15] ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ εἶναι, ἢ κατὰ τόπον ἢ κατὰ τόπος ἢ ποιόν: ἀπλῶς δὲ τό κατ' οὐσίαν. οὐθὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀφθαρτων ἀπλῶς δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς (κατὰ τι δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἶον ποιόν ἢ πού): ἐνεργεία ἄρα πάντα: οὐδὲ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων (καίτοι ταῦτα πρώτα: εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, οὐθὲν ἂν ἦν): [20] οὐδὲ δὴ κίνησις, εἴ τις ἐστὶν αἶδιος: οὐδ' εἴ τι κινούμενον αἶδιον, οὐκ ἐστὶ κατὰ δύνάμιν κινούμενον ἀλλ' ἢ ποθὲν ποί (τούτου

textiles in the things woven, as among other things; and in all, the motion is *in* the moving [target]. But, in many of whichever that act is not alongside the action, it exists within the action (e.g., observation [is] in the observer, and perception in the perceiver, also life [is] in the soul – and, on that account, happiness, on which life is [all] about). So, it is clear that essence and form are action. Now, according to this argument, it is clear that prior to the essence is power action, and just as we said, as time passes, action always catches up from one to another continually until the prime mover.

But, truly, most of all, immortals are indeed prior in essence to mortals, and nothing is able eternally. The ground of this [argument is]: [for] every force there is, anytime, an opposite one; because, in fact, no force exists if nothing has existed; everything liable to forcibility does not act. So, that which is liable to forcibility may be or not be; accordingly, the same force may both be or not be. That which is not able is not liable; and that which is mortal is with liability, either solely, or the same one which is called 'liable' it is [really] not; whether locally, or admitted within or from outside; or solely essentially. So, nothing locally immortal is locally able (but somewhat nothing, e.g., what or which, hinders); so, too, everything [that is] in action; neither any beings out of necessity. (Except, those priors, because, if they were not, nothing could be.) Neither from the stronger motion, if it is eternal; nor, from that moving eternally [which is] not according to the moving force, but from the potential [poí] (thereof

δ' ὑλην ουδέν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν), διό ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἀστρα καὶ ὅλος ὁ ουρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μὴ ποτε στή, ὃ φοβούνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. ουδέ κάμνει τούτο δρώντα: οὐ [25] γάρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ἢ κίνησις, ὥστε ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς κινήσεως: ἢ γάρ οὐσία ὑλη καὶ δύναμις οὐσα, οὐκ ἐνέργεια, αἰτία τούτου. μιμεῖται δὲ τὰ ἀφθαρτα καὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολῇ ὄντα, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ. καὶ γάρ ταῦτα ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ: [30] καθ' αὐτὰ γάρ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι δυνάμεις, ἐξ ὧν διώριστα, πάσαι τῆς ἀντιφάσεως εἰσιν: τό γάρ δυνάμενον ὡδὶ κινεῖν δύναται καὶ μὴ ὡδὶ, ὅσα γε κατὰ λόγον: αἱ δ' ἄλογοι τῷ παρεῖναι καὶ μὴ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἔσσονται αἱ αὐταί.

εἰ ἄρα τινές εἰσὶ φύσεις [35] τοιαῦται ἢ οὐσίαι οἷας λέγουσιν οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὰς ιδέας, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμον ἂν τι εἶη ἢ αὐτό ἐπιστήμη καὶ κινούμενον ἢ κίνησις: [1] ταῦτα γάρ ἐνέργειαι μᾶλλον, ἐκεῖναι δὲ δυνάμεις τούτων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρότερον ἢ ἐνέργεια καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς, φανερόν.

ὅτι δὲ καὶ βελτίων καὶ τιμιωτέρα τῆς σπουδαίας [5] δυνάμεως ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἐκ τῶνδε δήλον. ὅσα γάρ κατὰ τό δύνασθαι λέγεται, ταῦτόν ἐστι δυνατόν τὰναντία, οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι λεγόμενον ὑγιαίνειν ταῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, καὶ ἅμα: ἢ αὐτὴ γάρ δύναμις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν, καὶ ἡρεμεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ καταβάλλειν, [10] καὶ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι καὶ

but matter neither hinders to exist). In addition, the sun, stars, and all [things in] heaven always act; and neither they will ever be afraid of the constrains, nor that acting – i.e., not [afraid] of the force of the opposite one upon them. E.g., the motion of the mortals (to continue the motion) is difficult; because, the essence is matter and force, not action [as] its cause. And, they resemble the indestructible things and those beings [which are] in transitory [state]; e.g., earth and fire. For the latter always act; for they have the motion down along them and in themselves. For, indeed, the *force*, [acting] reasonably, presses for motion, it *can* also not to press for [it]; but the unreasonable ones last shortly and they possess not the opposite [force].

So, if [there are] some procedural as such or of some sort of essences, described [by] the so-called Ideas, [then] perhaps there would be more sciences of something that science itself, and more mobility than motion [itself]; for, perhaps, [there will be] more of these action than their counterpart forces of them. As indeed, then, it is clear that action is prior to forces and every principle of transformation.

As to this declaration, *action* is both improved and more elementary than the greatest of [all] *forces*. For, as many [terms] as referred to under *forcible*, the same is *enable* of [their] contrary; e.g., one referred to as *enable* to be healthy, the same one is also referred to [as enable of] being ill, and vice versa. Because, the same force [runs] under the health and illness, and rest and motion, and building and breaking down, and being built and

καταπίπτειν. τό μὲν οὖν δύνασθαι τάναντία
ἀμα ὑπάρχει: τὰ δ' ἐναντία ἀμα ἀδύνατον,
καὶ τὰς ενεργείας δὲ ἀμα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν
(οἷον ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη
τούτων θάτερον εἶναι τὰγαθόν, τό δὲ
δύνασθαι ὁμοίως ἀμώτερον ἢ οὐδέτερον:
[15] ἢ ἀρα ἐνέργεια βελτίων.

ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν τό τέλος
καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι χείρον τῆς δυνάμεως:
τό γάρ δυνάμενον ταῦτό ἄμφω τάναντία.
δήλον ἀρα ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τό κακόν παρὰ τὰ
πράγματα: ὕστερον γάρ τῆ φύσει τό κακόν τῆς
δυνάμεως. οὐκ ἀρα οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς [20]
καὶ τοῖς αἰδίοις οὐθέν ἔστιν οὔτε κακόν οὔτε
ἀμάρτημα οὔτε διεφθαρμένον (καὶ γάρ ἢ
διαφθορά τῶν κακῶν ἔστιν).

εὐρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα
ἐνεργεία: διαιροῦντες γάρ εὐρίσκουσιν. εἰ δ'
ἦν διηρημένα, φανερά ἂν ἦν: νῦν δ'
ενυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τό
τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ [25] περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν
γωνίαι ἴσαι δύο ὀρθαῖς. εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο
ἢ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθύς
δήλον διὰ τί. ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὀρθή καθόλου
διὰ τί; ἐὰν ἴσαι τρεῖς, ἢ τε βᾶσις δύο καὶ ἢ ἐκ
μέσου ἐπισταθεῖσα ὀρθή, ἰδόντι δήλον τῷ
ἐκείνο εἰδῶτι. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι τὰ δυνάμει
ὄντα εἰς [30] ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενα εὐρίσκεται:
αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι ἢ νόησις ἐνέργεια: ὥστ' ἐξ
ενεργείας ἢ δυνάμεις,

forfeited. As I was saying, while the forcibility of
contraries exists at the same time; nevertheless, the
contraries, at the same time, [are] non-forcible –
and [concerning] the action they are again non-
forcible at the same time (e.g., being healthy and
[at the same time,] ill) – so, it is necessary of one
of them to stay put, while the forcibility may [be]
in both or neither, so that, the action may improve.

But it is necessary, in those that fail, the aim
and the action to be more dire than the force; since,
the same forcible [thing applies] to each one of the
two contraries. At the same, it is clear that that
which fails is not apart from actualities [prágma];
because, that which fails is by nature posterior to
forces. And at the same time, it is not that in them
anything is eternal from the beginning; neither
failure, nor error, and no destruction (for,
destruction is of those that fail).

[This is] also found in graphing *steps*
(*enérgeia*), which are found by division. Whereas,
if they were divided, they would be apparent, but
now [the division] is forcibly inherent. *Why* two
right angles [equate] those [internal angles] of a
triangle? Because, the angles about one point
equate two right angles. If, then, the [line] next to
the side elevated, it would be, at once, clear to
imagine the *why*. *Why* in a semicircle [is] really
right angle at all? Of three equal [lines], the base
[divided into] two, upon of the [its] middle the
third one is placed, right angle [thus is produced];
it [would be] clear to imagine to one who knows.
So, it is clear that the forcible beings are found *into*
conducted actions, for the reason that action [is] a
thought-process. Thus, *force* [works] by *action*,

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ποιῶντες γινώσκουσιν
(ὕστερον γὰρ γενέσει ἢ ἐνέργεια ἢ κατ'
αριθμόν).

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὄν λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν τὸ μὲν
κατὰ [35] τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν, τὸ
δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν τούτων ἢ
τάναντία, [1] τὸ δὲ κυριώτατα ὄν ἀληθές
ἢ ψεύδος, τούτο δ' ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων
ἐστὶ τῶ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διηρηῆσθαι, ὥστε
ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρημένον οἰόμενος
διηρηῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι,
ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως [5] ἔχων ἢ τὰ
πράγματα, πότε ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀληθές
λεγόμενον ἢ ψεύδος; τούτο γὰρ σκεπτέον τί
λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἶεσθαι ἀληθῶς
σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἴ σύ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σέ
εἶναι λευκὸν ὑμεῖς οἱ φάντες τούτο
ἀληθεύομεν. εἰ δὴ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ σύγκειται καὶ
αδύνατα διαιρεθῆναι, [10] τὰ δ' ἀεὶ διήρηται
καὶ αδύνατα συντεθῆναι, τὰ δ' ἐνδέχεται
τάναντία, τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἔστι τὸ συγκεῖσθαι
καὶ ἔν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι
ἀλλὰ πλείω εἶναι: περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ
ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ αὐτὴ γίγνεται ψευδής καὶ
ἀληθής δόξα καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, καὶ
ἐνδέχεται ὅτε [15] μὲν ἀληθεύειν ὅτε δὲ
ψεύδεσθαι: περὶ δὲ τὰ αδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν
οὐ γίγνεται ὅτε μὲν ἀληθές ὅτε δὲ ψεύδος,
ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ταῦτα ἀληθὴ καὶ ψευδῆ.

and through it knowledge is produced (for,
posterior in becoming [is] either in action or in
number.

And, since, 'being' and 'not-being' [are
divided] partly according to the types of the
categories [= predicates] and partly according to
force or action of these [predicates] or the opposite
[of these predicates], then they [can] be
particularly correct or wrong. But, meantime, this
depends on actualities [prágma] to be composed or
divided. For this reason, indeed, for one, expecting
that which is divided to be divided, and that which
is composed, to be composed, it is [a statement] of
truth; but for one that actualities have opposing
[meaning], in fact, they are [statements] of error.
When is a so-called [something] right or wrong?
Whenever the so-called something [is] in one's
mind. For, it is not that because we expect you to
be white, then it is *true* that you are white; but
because you are white, we consider it as being *true*.
Now, if, on the one hand, those that are always
composed and *cannot* be divided, and on the other
hand, those that are always divided and *cannot* be
composed – [plus] others liable to opposite [states]
– then 'to be' is 'to be composed' and to be *unity*,
but, 'not to be' is 'not to be composed,' and be
multiplicity. Therefore, about those liable things,
the same expectation and the same reasoning
becomes both wrong and right, and a liable thing
[can] at one time be right, and at another time be
wrong; and about those, which *cannot* be
otherwise, they do not become at one time right
and at another wrong, but they [can be] always
right and wrong.

περί δὲ δὴ τὰ ἀσύνθετα τί τό εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τό ἀληθές καὶ τό ψεύδος; οὐ γάρ ἐστι σύνθετον, ὥστε εἶναι μὲν ὅταν συγκέηται, μὴ εἶναι δὲ [20] ἐὰν διηρημένον ἦ, ὥσπερ τό λευκόν τό ξύλον ἢ τό ἀσύμμετρον [21] τὴν διάμετρον: οὐδέ τό ἀληθές καὶ τό ψεύδος ομοίως ἐτι ὑπάρξει καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων. ἢ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθές ἐπὶ τούτων τό αὐτό, οὕτως οὐδέ τό εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐστι τό μὲν ἀληθές ἢ ψεύδος, τό μὲν θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι ἀληθές (οὐ γάρ ταῦτὸ κατάφασις [25] καὶ φάσις), τό δ' ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν. (ἀπατηθῆναι γάρ περί τό τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: ομοίως δὲ καὶ περί τὰς μὴ συνθετὰς οὐσίας, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀπατηθῆναι: καὶ πάσαι εἰσὶν ἐνεργεῖα, οὐ δυνάμει, ἐγίνοντο γάρ ἂν καὶ ἐφθείροντο, νῦν δὲ τό ὄν αὐτό οὐ γίνεταί οὐδὲ φθείρεται, [30] ἔκ τινος γάρ ἂν ἐγίνετο: ὅσα δὴ ἐστιν ὅπερ εἶναι τι καὶ ἐνεργεῖαι, περί ταῦτα οὐκ ἐστιν ἀπατηθῆναι ἀλλ' ἢ νοεῖν ἢ μὴ: ἀλλὰ τό τί ἐστι ζητεῖται περί αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ἢ μὴ):

τό δὲ εἶναι ὡς τό ἀληθές, καὶ τό μὴ εἶναι τό ὡς τό ψεύδος, ἐν μὲν ἐστιν, εἰ σύγκειται, ἀληθές, τό [35] δ' εἰ μὴ σύγκειται, ψεύδος: τό δὲ ἔν, εἴπερ ὄν, οὕτως ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, οὐκ ἐστιν: [1] τό δὲ ἀληθές τό νοεῖν ταῦτα: τό δὲ ψεύδος οὐκ ἐστιν, οὐδέ ἀπάτη, ἀλλὰ ἀγνοια, οὐχ οἷα ἢ τυφλότης: ἢ μὲν γάρ τυφλότης ἐστίν ὡς ἂν εἰ τό νοητικὸν ὅλως μὴ ἔχοι τις.

And, now, about those non-synthesized things: what is 'to be' or 'not to be' and right and wrong? For, [something] is not synthesized when once it is composed, it is, and when decomposed, it is not, like 'the wood [is] white,' or 'diametrically asymmetric [is unmeasurable];' neither right nor wrong is there as yet, as in those [previous cases]. Or, just as 'right' is not the same for these [cases], so neither 'to be.' But, in fact, right and wrong are: *grasping* and *consideration* are *right* (for affirmation and information [are] not identical) and *ignorance* [is] *not-grasping*. (For, we are not deceived about the *whatness*, unless accidentally; also similarly about those which [are] not synthesized essences, since we are not deceived [about them]. And [these] are all *actions* not *abilities*; for [otherwise] they would be generated and decayed: but, now, Being itself [is] neither created nor annihilated; for [otherwise] it would be created out of something. And, as many as [things] which is a matter of whatness and action, about them, we are not deceived, but either we think [of them] or not. But, the [question of] whatness seeks about them whether they are or are not).

But, when one [thing] is right, and when it is wrong: If [things are] composed, unity is right, but if not composed, it is wrong. Also, a unity [can be], if [it is] actual (όν), so it is, but if not [actual], so it is not. Right is to take note of these; but, wrong is not [to take note] nor it is deception, but only ignorance – not some sort of blindness, which, indeed, it is like one would be totally deprived of taking note of things.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι περὶ τῶν ακινήτων [5]
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπάτη κατὰ τό ποτέ, εἴ τις
υπολαμβάνει ακίνητα. οἷον τό τρίγωνον εἰ
μὴ μεταβάλλειν οἶεται, οὐκ οἰήσεται ποτέ
μὲν δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν ποτέ δὲ οὐ
(μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἂν), ἀλλὰ τί μὲν τί δ' οὐ,
οἷον ἄρτιον αριθμὸν πρῶτον εἶναι μηθένα,
ἢ τινὰς μὲν τινὰς δ' οὐ: αριθμῶ δὲ περὶ ἓνα
οὐδέ [10] τοῦτο: οὐ γὰρ ἐτι τινὰ μὲν τινὰ
δὲ οὐ οἰήσεται, ἀλλ' ἀληθεύσει ἢ ψεύσεται
ὡς ἀεὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος.

¹ δύναμις λέγεται ἢ μὲν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἢ
μεταβολῆς ἢ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἢ ἕτερον, οἷον ἢ
οἰκοδομικὴ δύναμις ἔστιν ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐν τῷ
οἰκοδομουμένῳ, ἀλλ' ἢ ἰατρικὴ δύναμις οὐσα
ὑπάρχει ἂν ἐν τῷ ἰατρευομένῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ
ἰατρευόμενος. ἢ μὲν οὖν ὅλως ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς
ἢ κινήσεως λέγεται δύναμις [20] ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἢ
ἕτερον, ἢ δ' ὑφ' ἐτέρου ἢ ἢ ἕτερον (καθ' ἣν
γὰρ τό πάσχον πάσχει τι, ὅτε μὲν ἐὰν ὅτιοῦν,
δυνατὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι παθεῖν, ὅτε δ' οὐ
κατὰ πᾶν πάθος ἀλλ' ἂν ἐπὶ τό βέλτιον): ἐτι ἢ
τοῦ καλῶς τοῦτ' ἐπιτελεῖν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν:
ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς μόνον ἂν πορευθέντας ἢ
εἰπόντας, μὴ [25] καλῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ ὡς
προεἶλοντο, οὐ φαμεν δύνασθαι λέγειν ἢ
βαδίζειν: ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν. ἐτι
ὅσαι ἐξεις καθ' ἃς ἀπαθὴ ὅλως ἢ ἀμετάβλητα
ἢ μὴ ῥαδίως ἐπὶ τό χεῖρον εὐμετακίνητα,
δυνάμεις λέγονται: κλᾶται μὲν γὰρ καὶ συντρι-
βεται καὶ κάμπτεται καὶ ὅλως φθειρεται
οὐ τῷ [30] δύνασθαι ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι
καὶ ἐλλείπειν τινός: ἀπαθὴ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἂ
μόλις καὶ ἡρέμα πάσχει διὰ δύναμιν καὶ τῷ
δύνασθαι καὶ τῷ ἔχειν πῶς.

λεγομένης δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως τοσανταχῶς,
καὶ τό δυνατὸν ἓνα μὲν τρόπον λεχθήσεται
τό ἔχον κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἢ μεταβολῆς (καὶ
γὰρ [35] τό στατικὸν δυνατὸν τι) ἐν ἐτέρῳ

And, evidently, with regard to immovables
(providing that one assumes immovables) there is
almost never no deception. If we suppose that the
triangle is unalterable, we shall not suppose that
when it contains two right angles and when it does
not (for [this implies] alteration); but, what and
what not [shall be assumed], e.g., even number is
never a prime number, or some are and some are
not. But about one number never this [assumption
occur], because, we do not suppose 'some' are and
'some' are not; but, in this case, being right or
wrong is always [the same].

Forcibility means the principle of motion or
transformation which is either *in* another, or *at*
another; e.g., building-ability is [with] things-built
[but] does not exist in them; whereas, the medicinal-
ability will be existing *in* one who recovers but is not
with him or her. So, the principle of transformation or
motion especially means forcibility which is *in*
another or *at* another, and/or which is *by* another [or]
with another (for according to which we say one
undergoes some changes if and if only that which is
forcible is devised skillfully; but often not during
every undergoing, but when improvement is at sight).
Always, the welfare of that one [is] accomplished
that [is] according to a purpose; for, at times, for
those would be go-and-make who [do what they] say.
But, not in welfare [of one] that [has] no options –
we do not say it is forcible, meaning that heading to
[somewhere]; similarly, one who undergoes [some
changes]. Yet, as many undergoing [states] as we
have, especially those that do not transform towards
worse mobilities, are called *forcible* [states].
Because, in fact, those [that are] breakable,
damageable, bendable, and all those destroyable
[things] are not forcible; they [consist] of non-
forcibility and of some absences; and their
undergoing [is] once and slowly, by means of force,
through forcibility, and in a definite state.

Since, the so-called *forcibility* [is used] in a
number of ways, so too that which [is] *possible*.
That which has the principle of motion or
transformation is *in* another

ἢ ἢ ἕτερον, ἓνα δ' ἐὰν ἔχη τι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο δύναμιν τοιαύτην, [1] ἓνα δ' ἐὰν ἔχη μεταβάλλειν ἐφ' ὅτιοῦν δύναμιν, εἴτ' ἐπιτό χειρόν εἴτ' ἐπι τό βέλτιον (καί γάρ τό φθειρόμενον δοκεῖ δυνατόν εἶναι φθειρεσθαι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν φθαρήναι εἰ ἦν ἀδύνατον: νῦν δὲ ἔχει τινά [5] διάθεσιν καί αἰτίαν καί ἀρχήν τού τοιούτου πάθους: ὅτε μὲν δὴ τῷ ἔχειν τι δοκεῖ, ὅτε δὲ τῷ ἐστερηθῆσθαι τοιούτον εἶναι: εἰ δ' ἢ στερησίς ἐστιν ἐξίς πως, πάντα τῷ ἔχειν ἂν εἴη τι, εἰ δὲ μὴ ὥστε τῷ τε ἔχειν ἐξιν τινά καί ἀρχήν ἐστι δυνατόν ὁμωλύμως καί τῷ ἔχειν τὴν τούτου στερησιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται [10] ἔχειν στερησιν: εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὁμωλύμως) ἓνα δὲ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἢ ἀρχήν ἄλλο ἢ ἢ ἄλλο φθαρτικὴν. ἐτι δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἢ τῷ μόνον ἂν συμβῆναι γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι, ἢ τῷ καλῶς. καί γάρ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἔνεστιν ἢ τοιαύτη δύναμις, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις: τὴν μὲν γάρ δύνασθαι φασί [15] φθέγγεσθαι λύραν, τὴν δ' οὐδέν, ἂν ἢ μὴ εὐφωνος.

ἀδυναμία δὲ ἐστὶ στερησις δυνάμεως καί τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς οἷα εἴρηται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ τῷ πεφυκότι ἔχειν, ἢ καί ὅτε πέφυκεν ἤδη ἔχειν: οὐ γάρ ὁμοίως ἂν φαῖεν ἀδύνατον εἶναι γεννάν παῖδα καί ἀνδρα καί εὐνοῦχον. ἐτι δὲ καθ' ἑκατέραν [20] δύναμιν ἐστὶν ἀδυναμία ἀντικειμένη, τῇ τε μόνον κινητικὴ καί τῇ καλῶς κινητικὴ. καί ἀδύνατα δὴ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ταύτην λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον, οἷον δυνατόν τε καί ἀδύνατον, ἀδύνατον μὲν οὐ τό ἐναντίον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθές (οἷον τό τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον εἶναι [25] ἀδύνατον ὅτι ψεύδος τό τοιούτον οὐ τό ἐναντίον οὐ μόνον ἀληθές ἀλλὰ καί ἀνάγκη ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι: τό ἀρα σύμμετρον οὐ μόνον ψεύδος ἀλλὰ καί ἐξ ἀνάγκης ψεύδος): τό δ' ἐναντίον τούτω, τό δυνατόν, ὅταν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τό ἐναντίον ψεύδος εἶναι, οἷον τό καθῆσθαι ἄνθρωπον δυνατόν: οὐ [30] γάρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τό μὴ καθῆσθαι ψεύδος. τό μὲν οὖν δυνατόν ἓνα μὲν τρόπον, ὡσπερ εἴρηται, τό μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ψεύδος σημαίνει, ἓνα δὲ τό ἀληθές εἶναι, ἓνα δὲ τό ἐνδεχόμενον ἀληθές εἶναι.

κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ ἢ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ

or *at* another – for even that which is static [has] the *forcible it*. And, some would need to change by devising the forcible skillfully, whether for worsening, or for improvement. (For that which seems destroyable is forcible to be destroyed, which it would not be destroyed if it were not forcible. But, as it is, it has some moods, causes, and principles to undergo of these [changes]. Now, it sometimes supposes of *having it*, because it [can] be deprived of it. But if privation is in a definite state, everything in such state will be *it*. But, if it does not have [*it*], [the element of] forcible is agreeing in a certain state and principle and has its privation, providing it asserts of having privation – otherwise they agree.) And others, not having the principle nor the same [element of] forcible in others, which [can] destroy them. Yet again, all these which [are] of being [in a certain state] may only happen to become or not to, or [be in a] stronger [state]. For the [element of] forcible is in soulless as such, e.g., in the [musical] instruments – for, it is agreed that a lyre with forcibility makes a sound, but one without it would not if it [had] no good tone.

On the other hand, non-forcibility is a privation of forcibility, and of the principle of those above-mentioned [soulless things], either altogether, or in those that adapt or have already adapted. For, it is not the same to say as a child, a man, or a neutered is not reproducible. There is two-by-two correspondence [between] a force and a counter-force, one [corresponding] to merely a motion, the [other] to the well [developed] motion. And, now, as it is referred to those counter-forces corresponding to counter-forces, yet others to a different sense, such as, force and counter-force. Counter-force, then, [means] that of which the contrary is *necessarily* true (e.g., the symmetry [=measurement] of a diagonal [in a square] is *impossible*, because this is false, of which the contrary [is] not only true, but also it is *necessarily* asymmetric. Thus, the symmetric [here is] not only false, but necessarily false). And its contrary, i.e., the *possible*, is when the contrary is not necessarily false; e.g., a sitting human [is] possible; for, of whom not to be seated [is] not necessarily false. Hence, *possible* in some examples means (as it was defined) that which is not necessarily false; and in some that which is true; and in others that which asserts to be true.

And, *force*, in geometry,

λέγεται δύναμις. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ δυνατά οὐ
κατὰ δύναμιν: [35] τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα κατὰ
δύναμιν πάντα λέγεται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην μίαν:
[1] αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ
ἄλλο. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα λέγεται δυνατά τῷ τὰ μὲν
ἔχειν αὐτῶν ἄλλο τι τοιαύτην δύναμιν τὰ δὲ μὴ
ἔχειν τὰ δὲ ὠδὶ ἔχειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ
αδύνατα. ὥστε ὁ κύριος ὅρος [5] τῆς πρώτης
δυνάμεως ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικῆ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ
ἢ ἄλλο.

is termed metaphorically. These [senses] though
[are] of possibilities, they do not refer to force.
And those that do refer to force, all are referred to
[its] primary sense; and this [is] the principle of
transformation within one or the other. For,
although, those are said 'possible,' yet some have
such possibility over them, some do not have it,
and other have it collectively. Also, similar for
those [that are called] *impossible*. So, the
fundamental premise of the primary forcibility will
be a principle of transformation within one or the
other.

περί according	μὲν –	οὖν therefore	τοῦ of	πρῶτος first	ὄντος being	καὶ and
πρὸς to	ὃ which, what	πάσαι all	αἱ ἄλλαι the other	κατηγορίαι categories	τοῦ of	ὄντος Being
ἀναφέρονται led up	εἴρηται it's been said	περὶ about	τῆς οὐσίας the substance	(κατὰ (according to	γάρ for	τὸν the
τῆς οὐσίας of Being	λόγον word	λέγεται says	τᾶλλα [30] the others	ὄντα, Beings	τό the	τε
ποσόν quantity	καὶ and	τό the	ποιόν quality	καὶ and	τᾶλλα others	τὰ the
οὕτω such	λεγόμενα: called	πάντα always	γάρ for	ἔξει have been	τὸν the	τῆς οὐσίας of the substance
λόγον, word	ὡσπερ just as	εἶπομεν was said	ἐν in	τοῖς the	πρώτοις first	λόγοις): discussion).
ἐπεὶ since	δὲ and	λέγεται it's said	τό ὄν the Being	τό the	μὲν accordingly	τό τί what
ἢ ποιόν quality	ἢ ποσόν, quantity	τό δὲ but the	κατὰ concerning	δύναμιν force	καὶ and	ἐντελέχειαν expression
καὶ and	κατὰ concerning	τό ἔργον, the act	διορίσωμεν clarifying	καὶ also	περὶ about	δυνάμεως [35] might
καὶ and	ἐντελεχείας, expression,	καὶ but	πρῶτον first	περὶ about	δυνάμεως might	ἢ λέγεται called
μὲν accordingly	μάλιστα certainly	κυρίως, mainly	οὐ μὴν not	χρησιμωτάτη useful	γέ at any rate	ἐστὶ is
πρὸς toward	ὃ that	βουλόμεθα preferred	νῦν: at this time.	[1] ἐπὶ upon	πλέον beyond	γάρ now
ἐστὶν is	ἡ δύναμις the force	καὶ and	ἡ ἐνέργεια the action	τῶν the	μόνον only	λεγομένων sayings
κατὰ about	κίνησιν. motion.	ἀλλ' But	εἰπόντες when said	περὶ about	ταύτης, these,	
ἐν in	τοῖς the	περὶ about	τῆς ενεργείας the action	διορισμοῖς mentioned	δηλώσομεν clear	καὶ and
περὶ	τῶν ἄλλων. others.	ὅτι	μὲν	οὖν	λέγεται[5]	πολλαχῶς

about	the others	that	subsequently	then	meaning	many
ἡ δύναμις the force	καὶ and	τό δύνασθαι, the power	διώρισται mentioned	ἡμῖν we	ἐν in	ἄλλοις: elsewhere
τούτων those	δ' ὅσαι whereas	μὲν with	ὁμωνύμως homonyms	λέγονται meaning	δυνάμεις might	ἀφείσθωσαν dismissed
(ἔναι (it's	γὰρ for	ὁμοιότητί homonymity	τινι by	λέγονται, called	καθάπερ just as	ἐν in
γεωμετρία geometry	καὶ and	δυνατά can	καὶ and	αδύνατα can't	λέγομεν call	τῷ that one
εἶναι is	πῶς some way	ἢ or	μὴ εἶναι) isn't)	ὅσαι as many	δὲ concurrently	πρὸς to
τό αὐτό the same	εἶδος, mode	πάσαι each	αρχαί [10] principles	τινές εἰσι, that sort is	καὶ and	πρὸς to
πρώτην first	μίαν one	λέγονται, called	ἣ the	ἐστίν is	αρχή principle	μεταβολῆς change
ἐν ἄλλῳ in another	ἢ or	ἢ ἄλλο. one	ἣ the	μὲν with	γὰρ for	τοῦ of
παθεῖν suffer	ἐστίν is	δύναμις, force	ἣ the	ἐν in	αὐτῷ itself	τῷ that one
πάσχοντι patient	αρχή begin	μεταβολῆς transformation	παθητικῆς passive	ὑπ' ἄλλου by something	ἢ or	ἢ ἄλλο: qua other
ἣ the	δ' ἔξις having	ἀπαθείας impassivity	τῆς of the	ἐπὶ nearly	τὸ χεῖρον deteriorating	καὶ and
φθοράς worsening	τῆς of the	ὑπ' ἄλλου by something	ἢ or	ἢ ἄλλο qua other	ὑπ' αρχῆς [15] at start	μεταβλητικῆς. changability
ἐν in	γὰρ for	τούτοις these	ἔνεστι within	πᾶσι all	τοῖς the	ὅροις definition
ὁ the	τῆς πρώτης the first	δυνάμεως might	λόγος. concept.	πάλιν again	δ' αὐταί now all	δυνάμεις mights
λέγονται expressed	ἢ τοῦ either of	μόνον only	ποιῆσαι exercise	ἢ τοῦ or of	παθεῖν suffering	ἢ τοῦ or of
καλῶς, well	ὥστε hence	καὶ ἐν as in	τοῖς the	τούτων these	λόγοις concepts	ἐνυπάρχουσί present in

πως some way	οἱ the	τῶν προτέρων the previously	δυνάμεων might	λόγοι. concepts		
φανερὸν evidently	οὖν consequently	ὅτι ἐστὶ that is	μὲν as	ὡς μία for one	δύναμις force	[20] τοῦ of
ποιεῖν express	καὶ and	πάσχειν experience	(δυνατόν (might	γάρ for	ἐστὶ be	καὶ and
τῷ that one	ἔχειν has	αὐτό it	δύναμιν power	τοῦ of	παθεῖν expressing	καὶ and
τῷ that one	ἄλλο other	ὑπ' αὐτοῦ), on it),	ἐστὶ is	δὲ as	ὡς for	ἄλλη. another.
ἢ the	μὲν with	γάρ for	ἐν in	τῷ that one	πάσχοντι experience	(διὰ (through
γάρ for	τό it	ἔχειν has	τινά ἀρχήν, some origin	καὶ εἶναι καὶ as is also	τὴν ὕλην the stuff	ἀρχήν commencing
τινα, some,	πάσχει experiencing	τό πάσχον, the experience	καὶ ἄλλο as one	ὑπ' ἄλλου: upon another:	τό λιπαρὸν the oily one	μὲν [25] γάρ as for
καυστὸν burning	τὸ δ' and the one	ὑπεῖκον shaky	ὠδὶ calls for	θλαστόν, break	ὁμοίως like	δὲ καὶ and as
ἐπὶ on	τῶν ἄλλων), others),	ἢ the	δ' ἐν τῷ and in the one	ποιοῦντι, producing	οἶον as in	τὸ θερμὸν the heat
καὶ ἢ and the	οικοδομική, building	ἢ either	μὲν with	ἐν in	τῷ the one	θερμαντικῷ heat
ἢ δ' ἐν or as in	τῷ the one	οἰκοδομικῷ: builds;	διό since	ἦ truly	συμπέφυκεν, force growing	οὐθέν no
πάσχει experiences	αὐτό this one	ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ: upon itself	ἐν in	γάρ for	καὶ οὐκ and not	ἄλλο. another.
καὶ and	ἢ ἀδυναμία the inability	καὶ and	τό ἀδύνατον the powerless	ἢ or	τῇ τοιαύτῃ like such	δυνάμει power
ἐναντία contrary	στέρησις lack	ἐστίν, is,	ὥστε therefore	τοῦ αὐτοῦ of the same	καὶ κατὰ and through	τό αὐτό the same thing
πάσα every	δύναμις ability	ἀδυναμία. inability.	ἢ δὲ – but	στέρησις lacking	λέγεται means	πολλαχῶς: multiple

καὶ and	γὰρ for	τό that	μὴ ἔχον not have	καὶ and	τό that	πεφυκὸς grows
ἂν while	μὴ ἔχη, doesn't have	ἢ either	ὅλως in general	ἢ or	ὅτε when	πέφυκεν, growing
καὶ and	ἢ ὠδὶ, or hither	οἷον as in	παντελῶς, completely,	ἢ or	κἂν and if	ὅπωςοῦν. in any way.
ἐπ’ in	ἐνίων a few	δὲ, and,	ἂν if	πεφυκότεα [35] growing	ἔχειν have	μὴ ἔχη have not
βία, violation	ἐστερηῆσθαι deprived	ταῦτα that's what	λέγομεν. we say			
ἐπεὶ δ’ since	αἱ the	μὲν for	ἐν τοῖς in the	ἀψύχοις soulless	ἐνυπάρχουσιν inherent	αρχαί principles
τοιαῦται, as these,	αἱ the	δ’ and	ἐν τοῖς in the	ἐμψύχοις soulish	καὶ and	ἐν ψυχῇ in soul
καὶ and	τῆς ψυχῆς of soul	ἐν in	τῷ the one	λόγον reason	ἔχοντι, have	[1] δῆλον it's clear
ὅτι that	καὶ and	τῶν δυνάμεων of power	αἱ the	μὲν for	ἔσονται be	ἄλογοι without reason
αἱ the	δὲ and	μετὰ with	λόγου: reason.	διὸ therefore	πᾶσαι all	αἱ τέχναι the art
καὶ αἱ also the	ποιητικαὶ productive	ἐπιστῆμαι sciences	δυνάμεις abilities	εἰσιν: are	αρχαί principles	γὰρ for
μεταβλητικαί transformation	εἰσιν are	ἐν ἄλλῳ in one	ἢ or	ἢ ἄλλο. the other.	καὶ and	αἱ the
μὲν [5] for	μετὰ accompany	λόγου reason	πάσαι all	τῶν ἐναντίων the opposites	αἱ αὐταί, those,	αἱ the
δὲ but	ἄλογοι no-reason	μία one	ἐνός, only,	οἷον as in	τό θερμὸν the heat	τοῦ that of
θερμαίνειν heating	μόνον’ alone	ἢ the	δὲ whereas	ιατρικὴ medicine	νόσου disease	καὶ ὑγείας. and health.
αἴτιον ground	δὲ ὅτι and that	λόγος reason	ἐστὶν is	ἢ ἐπιστήμη, the science,	ὁ the	δὲ and

λόγος reason	ὁ αὐτός that one	δηλοῖ uncover	τὸ πρᾶγμα the thing	καὶ and	τὴν στέρησιν, the lacking,	πλὴν
οὐχ not	ὡσαύτως, as itself;	καὶ ἔστιν and is	ὡς as	ἀμφοῖν of both	ἐστι is	δ' ὡς [10] and as
τού of	υπάρχοντος belonging	μᾶλλον, rather	ὥστ' thus	ανάγκη necessary	καὶ and	τὰς τοιαύτας those one
ἐπιστήμας science	εἶναι is	μὲν with	τῶν ἐναντίων, the opposites	εἶναι be	δὲ either	τοῦ of
μὲν with	καθ' αὐτάς to one	τοῦ of	δὲ or	μὴ καθ' αὐτάς: not of one;	καὶ and	γάρ for
ὁ λόγος the reason	τού of	μὲν with	καθ' αὐτὸ of one	τού of	δὲ but	τρόπον in a way
τινά some	κατά according to	συμβεβηκός: process:	ἀποφάσει judgment	γάρ for	καὶ and	αποφορά criticism
δηλοῖ uncover	τό ἐναντίον: the opposite:	ἢ γάρ the for	στέρησις [15] lacking	ἡ πρώτη the first	τό ἐναντίον, the opposite,	αὕτη this
δὲ and	αποφορά criticism	θατέρου. of the other.	ἐπεὶ when	δὲ and	τὰ ἐναντία the opposites	οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται not generated
ἐν in	τῷ αὐτῷ, the same one	ἢ δ' the and	ἐπιστήμη science	δύναμις power	τῷ λόγον of the reason	ἔχειν, has
καὶ and	ἡ ψυχὴ the soul	κινήσεως of motion	ἔχει has	αρχήν, principle,	τό the	μὲν it's true
ὑγιεινὸν hygenic	ὑγίειαν health	μόνον only	ποιεῖ produces	καὶ τό and the	θερμαντικὸν calorific	θερμότητα heat
καὶ τό and the	ψυχτικὸν frigorific	ψυχρότητα, cold,	ὁ the [reason]	δ' but	ἐπιστήμων of science	[20] ἄμφω. in both.
λόγος reason	γάρ for	ἐστιν is	ἀμφοῖν of double	μὲν, indeed	οὐχ ὁμοίως not identically	δὲ, but;
καὶ and	ἐν ψυχῇ in soul	ἢ the	ἔχει has	κινήσεως of motion	αρχήν: principle,	ὥστε therefore
ἄμφω in both	ἀπὸ from	τής αὐτῆς the same	ἀρχῆς principle	κινήσει moves	πρὸς ταῦτό to it	συνάψασα: fusing
διό therefore	τὰ the	κατά against	λόγον reason	δυνατά possible	τοῖς the	ἀνευ without

thus	the	by	reason	mighty	the [things]	without
λόγου reason	δυνατοῖς mighty	ποιεῖ produces	τάναντία: the opposites;	μιᾶ one	γάρ for	αρχή principle
περιέχεται, encompass	τῷ λόγῳ. of reason.	φανερὸν it's evident	δὲ and	καὶ also	ὅτι [25] that	τῇ to her
μὲν indeed	τού of him	εὖ well	δυνάμει ability	ακολουθεῖ follows	ἢ or	τού of him
μόνον only	ποιῆσαι producing	ἢ the	παθεῖν suffer	δύναμις, power,	ταύτη the same thing	δ' but
ἐκείνη that one [she]	οὐκ ἀεί: not priodic;	ἀνάγκη necessity	γάρ for	τὸν something	εὖ well	ποιοῦντα producing
καὶ also	ποιεῖν, produces,	τὸν something	δὲ but	μόνον only	ποιοῦντα producing	οὐκ not
ἀνάγκη necessary	καὶ also	εὖ well	ποιεῖν. produce.			
εἰσὶ there're	δέ but	τινες some	οἱ those	φασιν, proclaim	οἷον such as	οἱ Μεγαρικοί, the Megarics
ὅταν when	ἐνεργῆ [30] acting	μόνον only	δύνασθαι, power	ὅταν when	δὲ but	μὴ not
ἐνεργῆ acting	οὐ δύνασθαι, powerless	οἷον for instance	τὸν [31] that	μὴ not	οἰκοδομοῦντα building	οὐ δύνασθαι cannot
οἰκοδομεῖν, to build,	ἀλλὰ but	τὸν that	οἰκοδομοῦντα building	ὅταν when	οικοδομή: are building	ομοίως similarly
δὲ καὶ and also	ἐπὶ in	τῶν ἄλλων. the others.	Οἷς to them	τὰ the	συμβαίνοντα happening	ἄτοπα abnormal
οὐ χαλεπὸν not hard	ιδεῖν. to see.	Δῆλον Evidently	γάρ for	ὅτι that	οὔτ' not even	οἰκοδόμος builder
ἔσται is	ἐὰν if not	μὴ οἰκοδομή not building	(τό (to	γάρ for	οἰκοδόμῳ builder	[35] εἶναι to be
τό to	δυνατῷ can	εἶναί to be	ἔστιν is	οἰκοδομεῖν), to build),	ομοίως similarly	δὲ καὶ and also
ἐπὶ	τῶν ἄλλων	τεχνῶν.	Εἰ	οὔν	αδύνατον	τάς

on	the other	arts.	since	so	impossible	the
τοιαύτας these	έχειν to have	τέχνας arts	μὴ not	μαθόντα learning	ποτέ και never also	λαβόντα, acquiring,
[1] και and	μὴ έχειν not having	μὴ not	αποβαλόντα having lost	ποτέ never	(ἢ (either	γάρ for
λήθη ignoring	ἢ or	πάθει passion	τινί some	ἢ or	χρόνω: time	οὐ not
γάρ for	δὴ indeed	τοῦ of the [built]	γε even	πράγματος matters	φθαρέντος, destruction,	ἀεὶ forever
γάρ since	ἐστίν), is),	ὅταν when	παύσεται, ceases	οὐχ ἔξει not have	τὴν τέχνην, the art,	πάλιν again
δ' ευθύς and directly	οικοδομήσει builds	πῶς how	λαβόν; acquired?	και and	τὰ ἀψυχα the soulless	δὴ indeed
ομοίως: similarly:	οὔτε not	γάρ [5] for	ψυχρὸν cold	οὔτε not	θερμὸν hot	οὔτε not
γλυκύ sweet	οὔτε not	ὄλως in general	αἰσθητόν sensible	οὐθὲν will not	ἔσται be	μὴ [if] not
αἰσθανομένων: being perceived	ὥστε therefore	τὸν the	Πρωταγόρου of Protagoras	λόγον reasoning	συμβήσεται happening	λέγειν to say
αὐτοῖς. to them.	ἀλλὰ on the other	μὴν hand	οὐδ' nothing	αἰσθησίν sensibility	ἔξει has	οὐδέν not
ἂν if	μὴ not	αἰσθάνηται perceiving	μηδ' and not	ἐνεργῆ. acting.	Ei since	οὕν so
τυφλὸν blind	τό the	μὴ ἔχον not have	ὄψιν, sight,	πεφυκὸς adapted	δὲ και but and	ὅτε when
πέφυκε adapts	και and	ἔτι still	όν, exist,	οἱ αὐτοὶ [10] those	τυφλοὶ blinds	ἔσονται will be
πολλάκις many times	τῆς ἡμέρας, of the day;	και also	κωφοί. deaf.			
ἔτι still	εἰ since	αδύνατον impossible	τό the one	ἔστερημένον deprived	δυνάμεως, of might,	τό the one
μὴ not	γιγνόμενον happening	αδύνατον impossible	ἔσται will be	γενέσθαι: to happen;	τό δ' the but	αδύνατον impossible

γενέσθαι to happen	ὁ that one	λέγων saying	ἢ εἶναι either is	ἢ ἔσεσθαι or will be	ψεύσεται will falsify	(τό (the
γάρ for	αδύνατον impossible	τούτο this one	ἐσήμαινεν), meant).	ὥστε therefore	οὔτοι these	οἱ λόγοι the reasonings
ἐξαιροῦσι exclude	καὶ both	κίνησιν motion	καὶ and	γένεσιν. state of being.	[15] ἀεὶ always	γάρ for
τό τε that one and	ἑστηκὸς stands firm	ἐστήξεται will stand	καὶ and	τό καθήμενον that one sits	καθεδεῖται: will sit;	οὐ γάρ not for
ἀναστήσεται ascending	ἂν if	καθέζηται: descending	αδύνατον impossible	γάρ ἔσται for be	ἀναστῆναι ascend	ὁ the one
γε μὴ otherwise not	δύναται power	ἀναστῆναι. ascend.	εἰ If	οὖν thus	μὴ ἐνδέχεται not assert	ταῦτα these
λέγειν, to say	φανερὸν evidently	ὅτι that	δύναμις power	καὶ and	ἐνέργεια action	ἕτερον distinct
ἐστίν are	(ἐκεῖνοι (those ones	δ' but	οἱ λόγοι the arguments	δύναμιν power	καὶ and	ἐνέργειαν action
ταὐτὸ [20] identically one	ποιοῦσιν, make,	διό wherefore	καὶ and	οὐ μικρὸν not small	τι that thing	ζητοῦσιν seeking
ἀναιρεῖν), to exclude),	ὥστε so that	ἐνδέχεται it admits	δυνατὸν can	μέν on the one hand	τι thing	εἶναι be
μὴ εἶναι not be	δέ, one the other	καὶ also	δυνατὸν can	μὴ εἶναι not be	εἶναι δέ, be yet,	ὁμοίως similarly
δὲ καὶ and also	ἐπὶ in	τῶν ἄλλων the other	κατηγοριῶν categories	δυνατὸν can	βαδίζειν walking	ὄν being
μὴ βαδίζειν, not walking,	καὶ and	μὴ βαδίζειν not walking	δυνατὸν can	ὄν being	βαδίζειν. walking.	ἐστὶ it's
δὲ but	δυνατὸν can	τούτο this one	ὧ how	ἐὰν if	ὑπάρξει there is	[25] ἢ the
ἐνέργεια action	οὗ to which	λέγεται it's said	ἔχειν to have	τὴν the	δύναμιν, power,	οὐθὲν not one
ἔσται will be	ἀδύνατον. impossible.	λέγω I say	δὲ and	οἷον, as	εἰ that	δυνατὸν can

καθῆσθαι sit	καὶ and	ἐνδέχεται asserts	καθῆσθαι, sitting	τούτω so	ἐὰν —	ὑπάρξει there's
τό it	καθῆσθαι, sitting	οὐδέν not one	ἔσται will be	ἀδύνατον: impossible;	καὶ εἰ also that	κινηθῆναι being moved
ἢ κινῆσαι or moving	ἢ στῆναι or standing	ἢ στῆσαι or is stood	ἢ εἶναι or being	ἢ γίνεσθαι or becoming	ἢ μὴ εἶναι or not being	ἢ μὴ γίνεσθαι, or not becoming
ομοίως. similarly.	[30] ἐλήλυθε come from	δ' ἢ but the	ἐνέργεια action	τοῦνομα, the name	ἢ the	πρὸς τὴν with the
ἐντελέχειαν expression	συντιθεμένη, placed	καὶ ἐπὶ and with	τὰ ἄλλα the others	ἐκ out	τῶν κινήσεων of motion	μάλιστα: particularly;
δοκεῖ considered	γάρ for	ἡ ἐνέργεια the action	μάλιστα specially	ἡ κίνησις the motion	εἶναι, be,	διό wherefore
καὶ and	τοῖς those	μὴ not	οὔσιν existing	οὐκ not	ἀποδιδόασιν render	τό the
κινεῖσθαι, movement	ἄλλας other	δέ but	τινας some	κατηγορίας, categories,	οἷον as	διανοητά intellectuals
καὶ and	ἐπιθυμητά desires	εἶναι are	τὰ the ones	μὴ not	ὄντα, [35] being	κινούμενα moving
δὲ οὐ, and not	τούτο this	δὲ but	ὅτι because	οὐκ not	ὄντα being	ἐνέργεια action
ἔσονται they'll be	ἐνέργεια. action.	[1] τῶν of the	γάρ for	μὴ not	ὄντων being	ἔνια some
δυνάμει can	ἐστίν: be;	οὐκ not	ἐστι is	δέ, but,	ὅτι because	οὐκ not
ἐντελεχεία expression	ἐστίν. is.					
εἰ δέ if rather	ἐστι is	τό it	εἰρημένον interpreting	τό the	δυνατόν possible	ἢ or
ακολουθεῖ, goes along with	φανερὸν it's clear	ὅτι οὐκ that not	ἐνδέχεται asserts	αληθές truly	εἶναι be	τό that
εἰπεῖν to say	ὅτι that	δυνατόν possible	μὲν [5] indeed	τοδί, such and such	οὐκ ἔσται not will be	δέ, but,
ὥστε	τὰ	ἀδύνατα	εἶναι	ταύτη	διαφεύγειν: avoid	λέγω δὲ

for this reason,	the things	impossible	to be	this which	escape.	I say rather
οἷον as	εἴ if	τις a certain thing	φαίη mean	δυνατόν possible	τήν the	διάμετρον diagonal
μετρηθῆναι to measure	οὐ not	μέντοι though	μετρηθήσεσθαι be measured	– ὁ – that one	μὴ not	λογιζόμενος calculated
τό the one	ἀδύνατον impossible	εἶναι – be –	ὅτι because	οὐθὲν not one	κωλύει prevent	δυνατόν possible
τι thing	ὄν being	εἶναι be	ἢ or	γενέσθαι becoming	μὴ εἶναι not be	μηδ’ not ever
ἔσεσθαι. to be.	ἀλλ’ on the contrary	εκείνο that one	ανάγκη necessity	ἐκ [10] τῶν out of the	κειμένων, laid down	εἰ καὶ if that
ὑποθοίμεθα teach	εἶναι be	ἢ or	γεγονέναι become	ὁ the one	οὐκ ἐστὶ not is	μὲν in fact
δυνατόν possible	δέ, but,	ὅτι that	οὐθὲν not one	ἔσται is	ἀδύνατον: impossible;	συμβήσεται happening
δέ and	γε, yet,	τό that one	γάρ for	μετρεῖσθαι measuring	ἀδύνατον. impossible.	
οὐ not	γάρ you see	δὴ exactly	ἐστὶ is	ταὐτὸ identical	τό ψεύδος the false	καὶ and
τό ἀδύνατον: the impossible;	τό that	γάρ for	σε you	ἑστάναι standing	νῦν now	ψεύδος false
μὲν, –	οὐκ not	ἀδύνατον impossible	δέ. but.	ἀμα At the same time	δὲ that is	δήλον it's clear
καὶ also	ὅτι, that,	εἰ [15] if	τού out of	A A	ὄντος being	ανάγκη necessary
τό B the B	εἶναι, be,	καὶ also	δυνατοῦ possibility	ὄντος real	εἶναι is	τού of
A A	καὶ also	τό B the B	ανάγκη must	εἶναι be	δυνατόν: possible;	εἰ if
γάρ for	μὴ not	ανάγκη must	δυνατόν possible	εἶναι, be,	οὐθὲν nothing	κωλύει prevents
μὴ not	εἶναι be	δυνατόν possible	εἶναι. be.	ἔστω let it	δὴ now	τό the

A A	δυνατόν. possible.	οὐκοῦν certainly not	ὅτε as long as	τὸ the	A A	δυνατόν possible
εἶη is	εἶναι, be,	εἰ while	τεθείη established	τό A, the A,	οὐθέν nothing	ἀδύνατον impossible
εἶναι be	συνέβαιεν: happen;	τό the	δέ but	γε yet	B [20] B	ανάγκη must
εἶναι. be,	ἀλλ' though	ἦν was	ἀδύνατον. impossible.	έστω taking	δῆ now	ἀδύνατον. impossible
εἰ if	δῆ now	ἀδύνατον impossible	ανάγκη must	εἶναι be	τό B, the B,	ανάγκη must
καὶ also	τό A the A	εἶναι. be.	ἀλλ' though	ἦν was	ἄρα as	τὸ πρῶτον the former
ἀδύνατον: impossible;	καὶ also	τὸ δεύτερον the latter	ἄρα. as.	ἂν if	ἄρα therefore	ἦ truly
τό A the A	δυνατόν, possible,	καὶ also	τό B the B	έσται will be	δυνατόν, possible;	εἵπερ For as
οὕτως so	εἶχον they're related	ὥστε therefore	τού of	A A	ὄντος being	ανάγκη must
εἶναι be	τό B. the B.	ἐάν If	δῆ now	οὕτως so	εχόντων being related	[25] τῶν A the A
B B	μὴ not	ἢ or	δυνατόν possible	τό B the B	οὕτως, so,	οὐδέ nor
τὰ the	A B A B	έξει has	ὡς as	ετέθη: been explained;	καὶ and	εἰ if
τού of	A a	δυνατοῦ possible	ὄντος being	ανάγκη must	τό B the B	δυνατόν possible
εἶναι, be,	εἰ is	έστι is	τό A the A	ανάγκη must	εἶναι be	καὶ τό B. also the B.
τὸ the	γὰρ that	δυνατόν possible	εἶναι be	ἐξ ἀνάγκης out of necessity	τὸ B the B	εἶναι be
εἰ if	τὸ A the A	δυνατόν, possible,	τούτο this	σημαίνει, means:	ἐάν if	ἦ truly

τό A the A	καί and	ότε when	καί and	ὡς as	ἦν was	δυνατόν possible
[30] εἶναι, be,	κάκεινο that one [B]	τότε then	καί and	οὕτως in this way	εἶναι be	ἀναγκαῖον. necessary.
ἅπασῶν totality	δὲ but	τῶν of	δυνάμεων abilities	οὐσῶν existing	τῶν of	μὲν either
συγγενῶν inborn	οἶον being	τῶν of	αἰσθήσεων, sensations,	τῶν of	δὲ or	ἔθει acquired
οἶον being	τής that	τού of	αὐλεῖν, playing flute,	τῶν of	δὲ or	μαθήσει studies
οἶον being	τής that	τῶν τεχνῶν, of arts,	τάς the	μὲν in fact	ἀνάγκη must	προενεργήσαντας pre-practiced
έχειν, have,	ὅσαι as many as	ἔθει acquired	καί and	λόγω, reported,	τάς the ones	δὲ but
μὴ not	τοιούτας of these	[35] καί and	τάς the ones	ἐπὶ upon	τού of	πάσχειν experienced
οὐκ ἀνάγκη. not must	[1] ἐπεὶ In asmuch	δὲ as	τό δυνατόν the possible	τί thing	δυνατόν possible	καί and
ποτέ when	καί πῶς and how	καί ὅσα and much	ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη but necessity	προσεῖναι be present	ἐν in	τῷ διορισμῷ, the boundaries,
καί not only	τὰ μὲν the ones i.e.,	κατά according to	λόγον reason	δύναται possibles	κινεῖν to bring about	καί but also
αἱ δυνάμεις the powers	αυτῶν of them	μετὰ in accompany	λόγου, with reason.	τὰ the ones	δὲ additionally	ἀλογα unreasonable
καί αἱ and the	δυνάμεις powers	ἀλογοί, unreasoning	κάκεινας – in those	μὲν indeed	ἀνάγκη must	ἐν ἐμψύχῳ in ensouled
[5] εἶναι be	ταύτας with these	δὲ and	ἐν ἀμφοῖν, in both.	τάς the ones	μὲν –	τοιούτας such as these
δυνάμεις powers	ἀνάγκη, necessary	ὅταν whenever	ὡς as	δύνανται possibles	τό ποιητικόν the producing	καί and
τό παθητικόν the passive	πλησιάζωσι, in proximity.	τό it	μὲν –	ποιεῖν to produce	τό it	δὲ but
πάσχειν, be affected,	ἐκεῖνας those	δ' οὐκ not	ἀνάγκη: necessity:	αὐταί they	μὲν –	γὰρ for

to experience	that one	but not	necessary;	these	–	for
πᾶσαι each	μία one	ένός is	ποιητική, productive.	ἐκεῖναι that one	δὲ but	τῶν ἐναντίων, of opposite,
ὥστε so long as	ἅμα when	ποιήσει produces	τὰ ἐναντία: the opposites	τούτο this one	δὲ [10] but	ἀδύνατον. impossible.
ανάγκη must	ἄρα thus	ἕτερον other	τι thing	εἶναι be	τό κύριον: the principal:	λέγω I mean
δὲ –	τούτο this	ὀρεξίν desire	ἢ or	προαίρεσίν. preference.	ὁποτέρου whichever of	γάρ for
ἂν if	ὀρέγεται aspired	κυρίως, of principal,	τούτο that one	ποιήσει produces	ὅταν when	ὥς such
δύναται possible	ὑπάρχει there's	καὶ and	πλησιάζη in proximity	τῷ παθητικῷ: of receptive one	ὥστε for this reason	τό δυνατὸν the possible
κατά according to	λόγον reason	ἅπαν all	ανάγκη, needed	ὅταν whenever	ὀρέγεται aspired	οὗ ἔχει whom has
τὴν δύναμιν the ability	καὶ and	ὥς ἔχει, as such has,	[15] τούτο it	ποιεῖν: to produce.	ἔχει it has	δὲ at the same time
παρόντος being present	τού the	παθητικού receptive	καὶ and	ὡδὶ in this case	ἔχοντος capable	ποιεῖν: to produce;
εἰ if	δὲ μὴ, but not,	ποιεῖν to produce	οὐ not	δυνήσεται will be able.	(τό (the one	γάρ for
μηθενὸς none	τῶν ἔξω of out	κωλύοντος restrain	προσδιορίζεσθαι be determined	οὐθέν nothing	ἔτι no longer	δεῖ: binds;
τὴν the	γάρ because	δύναμιν ability	ἔχει it has	ὥς as such	ἔστι is	δύναμις able
τού of him	ποιεῖν, to produce;	ἔστι is	δ' οὐ and not	πάντως but perhaps	ἄλλ' however	εχόντων of close associate
πώς, how	ἐν in	οἷς those	ἀφορισθήσεται being bounded	καὶ τὰ and the ones	ἔξω out	κωλύοντα: [20] restrains;
αφαιρείται it removes	γάρ for	ταῦτα these	τῶν from	ἐν τῷ in the	διορισμῷ boundaries	προσόντων of attributions
ἔνια): some.)	διό Because	οὐδ' not even	ἐὰν if	ἅμα at the same time	βούληται wills	ἢ ἐπιθυμῇ or desires

ποιεῖν to produce	δύο two	ἢ or	τὰ ἐναντία, the opposites	οὐ ποιήσει: not produces;	οὐ γάρ not for	οὕτως in this way
ἔχει has	αὐτῶν of them	τὴν the	δύναμιν power	οὐδ’ not even	ἐστὶ is	τοῦ of
ἀμα simultaneously	ποιεῖν to produce	ἢ δύναμις, the power,	ἐπεὶ after all	ᾧ ἐστίν being is	οὕτως in this way	ποιήσει.[25] produces.
ἐπεὶ δὲ since but	περὶ on	τῆς the one	κατὰ along with	κίνησιν motion	λεγομένης saying	δυνάμεως of power
εἴρηται, it's been said	περὶ about	ενεργείας action	διορίσωμεν clarifying:	τί what	τέ ἐστίν – is	ἡ ἐνέργεια the action
καὶ and	ποῖόν what kind	τι. –	καὶ γάρ and for	τό the one	δυνατόν ability	ἀμα at the same time
δήλον clear	ἔσται will be	διαροῦσιν, apportioning	ὅτι that	οὐ μόνον not only	τούτο this	λέγομεν we say
δυνατόν ability	ὃ the one	πέφυκε adapts	κινεῖν to move	ἄλλο other	ἢ κινεῖσθαι or is moved	ὑπ’ ἄλλου by other
ἢ ἀπλῶς or simply	ἢ τρόπον or in a way	τινά, its,	ἀλλὰ but	[30] καὶ also	ἐτέρως, differently	διό because
ζητούντες inquiring	καὶ περὶ and about	τούτων these	διήλθομεν. we reviewed.			
ἐστὶ is	δὴ indeed	ἐνέργεια action	τό the	ὑπάρχειν to be present	τό the	πρᾶγμα thing
μὴ οὕτως not so	ὡσπερ just as	λέγομεν we say	δυνάμει: ability.	λέγομεν we say	δὲ but	δυνάμει ability
οἶον being	ἐν in	τῷ ξύλῳ the wood	Ἑρμῆν Hermes	καὶ ἐν and in	τῇ the	ὅλη whole
τὴν the	ἡμίσειαν, half	ὅτι because	ἀφαιρεθείη removed	ἄν, –	καὶ and	επιστήμονα expert
καὶ also	τὸν the	μὴ not	θεωροῦντα, observant	ἂν if	δυνατός able	ἢ θεωρῆσαι: is to observe
[35] τό it	δὲ but	ἐνεργεία. in action.	δήλον it's clear	δ’ but	ἐπὶ τῶν upon them	καθ’ ἕκαστα according to each

τῆ of the	επαγωγή induction	ὃ which	βουλόμεθα we want	λέγειν, to say,	καὶ οὐ and not	δεῖ need
παντός all	ὄρον definition	ζητεῖν seek	ἀλλὰ but	καὶ τό – the	ἀνάλογον analogy	συνορᾶν, to comprehend
ὅτι that	ὥς as such	τό that one	οικοδομοῦν building	πρὸς τό toward the	οἰκοδομικόν, building;	[1] καὶ also
τό ἐγρηγορὸς the awaken one	πρὸς τό toward the one	καθεῦδον, sleeping;	καὶ also	τό ὁρῶν the one sees	πρὸς τό toward the one	μῦον closed eyes
μὲν in fact	ὄψιν seeing	δὲ but	έχον, have;	καὶ τό and the one	ἀποκεκριμένον separated	ἐκ τῆς ὕλης of the materials
πρὸς toward	τὴν ὕλην, the material;	καὶ τό and the one	ἀπειργασμένον complete	πρὸς τό toward the	ἀνέργαστον. incomplete.	ταύτης of these
δὲ τῆς but the	διαφορᾶς differences	[5] θατέρω separate	μορίω part	έστω be	ἢ ἐνέργεια the action	ἀφορισμένη aparted
θατέρω separate	δὲ τό and the	δυνατόν. ability.	λέγεται said	δὲ but	ἐνεργεία action	οὐ πάντα not all
ομοίως of the same	ἀλλ' ἢ but for	τῷ the	ἀνάλογον, analogy,	ὥς as	τούτο this	ἐν τούτῳ in that
ἢ πρὸς or toward	τοῦτο, the other.	τόδ' this	ἐν in	τῷδε that	ἢ πρὸς or toward	τόδε: that.
τὰ those	μὲν γάρ indeed –	ὥς as such	κίνησις motion	πρὸς toward	δύναμιν power	τὰ δ' those things
ὥς as such	ουσία essence	πρὸς toward	τινα some	ὕλην. matter.		
ἄλλως δὲ in other words	καὶ τό – the	ἀπειρον unboundary	[10] καὶ τό and the	κενόν, vacuum	καὶ ὅσα and other	τοιαῦτα, like these
λέγεται are said	δυνάμει ability	καὶ and	ἐνεργεία action	ἢ πολλοῖς or many	τῶν ὄντων, of actuals,	οἷον as in
τῷ the	ὁρῶντι observer	καὶ and	βαδίζοντι walker	καὶ and	ὁρωμένω. observable.	ταῦτα these
μὲν γάρ indeed –	ενδέχεται are possible	καὶ –	απλῶς simply	ἀληθεύεσθαι been verified	ποτε without	(τό (it
μὲν γάρ	ὁρώμενον	ὅτι	ὁρᾶται,	τό δὲ	ὅτι	ὁρᾶσθαι

indeed for	observing	because	observes	it and	because	to observe
δυνατόν): able);	τό δ' the one but	ἄπειρον unbounded	οὐχ not	οὕτω in that	δυνάμει ability	ἐστίν is
ὥς [15] as such	ἐνεργεία action	ἐσόμενον will be	χωριστόν, divisible,	ἀλλὰ only	γνώσει. in knowledge.	τό γάρ that –
μὴ ὑπολείπειν no remaining	τὴν διαίρεσίν of division	ἀποδίδωσι yields	τό εἶναι that is	δυνάμει able	ταύτην to this	τὴν ἐνέργειαν, the action
τό δὲ that one but	χωρίζεσθαι οὐ. separate not.	ἐπεὶ δὲ In as much as	τῶν πράξεων of exercises	ὧν ἐστι of it is (are)	πέρας limit	οὐδεμία not any
τέλος goal	ἀλλὰ but	τῶν περί companions to	τό τέλος, the goal,	οἶον like	τό –	ἰσχναίνειν to slim
ἢ ἰσχνασία the diet	[20] αὐτό, –	αὐτά δὲ those but	ὅταν when	ἰσχναίνῃ dieting	οὕτως so	ἐστίν is
ἐν κινήσει, in motion,	μὴ υπάρχοντα there aren't	ὧν of it	ἐνεκα object	ἢ κίνησις, the motion	οὐκ ἐστι not is	ταῦτα those
πρᾶξις exercise	ἢ οὐ or not	τελεία ultimate goal	γε at least	(οὐ γὰρ τέλος): (not for goal):	ἀλλ' ἐκείνη but that one	ἣ which
ενυπάρχει includes	τό τέλος the goal	καὶ and	ἢ πρᾶξις. the exercise.	οἶον like	ὁρᾷ seeing	ἀμα but
καὶ ἐώρακε, also seen	καὶ φρονεῖ also be minded	καὶ πεφρόνηκε, – been minded	καὶ νοεῖ and think	καὶ νενόηκεν, also thought,	ἀλλ' but	οὐ μαθησθήσεται not learn
καὶ μεμάθηκεν and learned	[25] οὐδ' or not	ὑγιάζεται καὶ be healthy &	ὑγιάσται: becomi' healthy	εὖ ζῆ καὶ live well &	εὖ ἔζηκεν ve lived well	ἀμα, however
καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ – be happy	καὶ and	εὐδαιμόνηκεν. been happy.	εἰ δὲ μὴ, if yet not,	ἔδει had to	ἂν ποτε if ever	παύεσθαι ceased
ὥσπερ as	ὅταν when	ἰσχναίνῃ, dieting,	νῦν now	δ' οὐ, and not	ἀλλὰ ζῆ but live	καὶ ἔζηκεν. and 've lived
τούτων out of those	δὴ δεῖ indeed have to	τὰς the one	μὲν –	κινήσεις movement	λέγειν, called	τὰς δ' the other
ἐνεργείας. activity.	πάσα γὰρ every for	κίνησις motion	ατελής, unended,	ἰσχνασία dieting	μάθησις learning	βάδισις walking
οἰκοδόμησις: building;	[30] αὐταὶ these	δὴ indeed	κινήσεις, movements	καὶ ατελείς and unended	γε. with that.	οὐ γὰρ ἀμα not for but

βαδίζει και walking and	βεβάδικεν, has walked	οὐδ’ and not	οικοδομεῖ και building and	ᾠκοδόμηκεν, has built	οὐδὲ and not	γίγνεται και is becoming and
γέγονεν ἢ has become or	κινεῖται being moved	και κεκίνηται, & been moved	ἀλλ’ ἕτερον, but distinct	και κινεῖ και & in motion &	κεκίνηκεν: was in motion	ἑώρακε seen
δὲ και but also	ὄρᾳ seeing	ἀμα τό αυτο, but that one,	και νοεῖ and think	και νενόηκεν. also thought.	τήν the one	μὲν indeed
οὖν then	τοιαύτην former	ἐνέργειαν action	[35] λέγω, say	εκείνην δὲ the latter –	κίνησιν. motion.	τό μὲν the thing –
οὖν then	ἐνεργεία action	τί τέ what both	ἐστι is	και and	ποῖον, what kind	ἐκ τούτων και of these and
τῶν τοιούτων of similars	δήλον it's clear	ἡμῖν us	ἔστω. be.			
πότε δὲ when but	δυνάμει able	ἐστιν is	ἕκαστον each	και πότε οὐ, and when not	διοριστέον: setting limit	οὐ γάρ not for
ὅποτε οὖν. at any time.	[1] οἶον ἢ γῆ as the earth	ἄρ’ ἐστι whether is	δυνάμει able	ἄνθρωπος; mankind?	ἢ οὐ, or not?	ἀλλὰ μάλλον at least, perhaps
ὅταν when	ἤδη already	γένηται became	σπέρμα, spore,	και ουδέ and not	τότε then	ἴσως; perhaps.
ὡσπερ just as	οὖν therefore	οὐδ’ and not	ὑπὸ by	ιατρικῆς medicine	ἅπαν everything	ἂν if
ὑγιασθεῖη healed	οὐδ’ and not	ἀπὸ from	τύχης, chance,	ἀλλ’ on the contrary	ἐστι τι ὃ is that which	δυνατόν able
ἐστι, is,	και and	τουτ’ that one	ἐστιν [5] is	υγιαίνον health-	δυνάμει. ability.	ὅρος definition
δὲ τού – of the	μὲν ἀπὸ in fact from	διανοίας speculation	ἐντελεχειά expression	γιγνομένου come into being	ἐκ τού out of the	δυνάμει force [ability]
ὄντος, and is,	ὅταν when	βουληθέντος willed	γίγνηται become	μηθενὸς no one	κωλύοντος restraining	τῶν of
εκτός, outside,	ἐκεῖ that one	δ’ ἐν τῷ – in the	ὑγιαζομένῳ, recovering	ὅταν when	μηθὲν nothing	κωλύη prevents
τῶν of	ἐν αὐτῷ: in him;	ομοίως δὲ similarly	δυνάμει ability	και οικία: and house	εἰ μηθὲν if nothing	κωλύει prevents

τῶν of	ἐν τούτῳ in it	καὶ and	τῇ [10] ὕλῃ the self	τοῦ of	γίνεσθαι becomes	οἰκίαν, house,
οὐδ’ nothing	ἔστιν ὃ is which	δεῖ needs	προσγενέσθαι addition	ἢ ἀπογενέσθαι or subtraction	ἢ μεταβαλεῖν, or changing,	τούτο this one
δυνάμει can [be]	οἰκία: a house;	καὶ ἐπὶ also in	τῶν ἄλλων the others	ὡσαύτως as these	ὄσων many	ἐξωθεν externally
ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς the principle of	γενέσεως. becoming.	καὶ ὄσων and many	δὴ the	ἐν αὐτῷ in this	τῷ of	ἔχοντι, have
ὅσα as many	μηθενὸς none	τῶν of the	ἐξωθεν externally	ἐμποδίζοντος blocking	ἔσται will be	δι’ αὐτοῦ: by means of it
οἶον like	τό σπέρμα the spore	οὔπω not yet	(δεῖ (needs	γάρ [15] for	ἐν ἄλλῳ in other	πεσεῖν καὶ to undergo and
μεταβάλλειν), to change),	ὅταν when	δ’ ἤδη but already	διὰ τῆς by means of the	αὐτοῦ that one	ἀρχῆς principle	ἢ τοιοῦτον, is as such
ἤδη already	τούτο this	δυνάμει: can;	ἐκεῖνο δὲ in former –	ετέρας corresponding	ἀρχῆς of principle	δεῖται, in need,
ὡσπερ just as	ἡ γῆ the earth	οὔπω not yet	ἀνδριάς statue	δυνάμει can	(μεταβαλοῦσα (changing	γάρ ἔσται for will be
χαλκός). bronze).	ἔοικε so it seems	δὲ ὃ – that which	λέγομεν we call	εἶναι οὐ is not	τόδε on this account	ἀλλ’ but
ἐκεῖνινον – that actual thing	οἶον like	τό the	κιβώτιον box	οὐ ξύλον not wood	ἀλλὰ but	ξύλινον, out of wood,
[20] οὐδέ nor	τό ξύλον the wood	γῆ earth	ἀλλὰ but	γῆϊνον, out of earth,	πάλιν again	ἡ γῆ the earth
εἰ οὕτως if taken	μὴ ἄλλο not other	ἀλλὰ but	ἐκεῖνινον – that actual thing	ἀεὶ always	ἐκεῖνο that one	δυνάμει ability
ἀπλῶς simply	τό the	ὑστερόν latter one	ἔστιν. is.	οἶον as	τὸ κιβώτιον the box	οὐ γῆϊνον not out of earth
οὐδὲ γῆ nor Earth	ἀλλὰ but	ξύλινον: of wood;	τοῦτο this one	γάρ for	δυνάμει able	κιβώτιον a box
καὶ ὕλη and matter	κιβωτίου of box	αὕτη, this one,	ἀπλῶς such	μὲν –	τοῦ of [it]	ἀπλῶς such
τουδὶ	δὲ	τοδὶ	τό ξύλον.			

this	and	this	the wood.			
εἰ δέ if but	τί ἐστι it is	πρῶτον the primary	[25] ὃ which	μηκέτι no longer	κατ' according to	ἄλλο other
λέγεται called	ἐκείνινον, the actual thing	τούτο this one	πρῶτη primary	ύλη: matter.	οἶον as	εἰ ἢ γῆ if the earth
ἀερίνη, of air	ὁ δ' that and	αἴρ air	μη πῦρ not fire	ἀλλά however	πύρινος, of fire,	τό πῦρ the fire
ύλη matter	πρῶτη primary	οὐ τόδε not this	τι ούσα. it actual.	τούτω to it	γάρ for	διαφέρει τό differ that
καθ' οὗ according to it	καὶ τό and that	ὑποκείμενον, underlying it	τῷ saying which	εἶναι is	τόδε τι what-this	ἢ or
μη εἶναι: not is;	οἶον like,	τοῖς the	πάθεσι modifications	τό ὑποκείμενον underlying	άνθρωπος mankind	καὶ [30] both
σῶμα καὶ body and	ψυχῆ, soul,	πάθος passion	δὲ but	τό μουσικόν the musician	καὶ λευκόν and joyful	(λέγεται (called
δὲ τῆς but of the	μουσικῆς music	ἐγγενομένης is born	ἐκεῖνο that one	οὐ μουσική not music	ἀλλά but	μουσικόν, musician
καὶ οὐ and not	λευκότης joyness	ὁ άνθρωπος the mankind	ἀλλά but	λευκόν, joyful,	οὐδέ not even	βάδισις walk
ἢ κίνησις or motion	ἀλλά but	βαδίζον walking	ἢ κινούμενον, or moving,	ὡς τό as the	ἐκείνινον): actual thing).	ὅσα μὲν as accordingly
οὖν as mentioned	οὕτω, it follows that	τό ἔσχατον the last one	ουσία: essence;	ὅσα δὲ just as and	μη [35] not	οὕτως it follows
ἀλλ' but	εἶδος form	τι καὶ what and	τόδε τι τό what-this the	κατηγορούμενόν, predicate	τό ἔσχατον the last one	ύλη καὶ matter and
ουσία essence	υλική. of matter.	καὶ and	ορθῶς rightly	δῆ exactly	συμβαίνει means	τό ἐκείνινον the actual thing
λέγεσθαι is called	κατά according to	τὴν ύλην of matter	καὶ and	τὰ πάθη: the passives	[1] ἄμφω γάρ both for	ἀόριστα. aorists.
πότε when	μὲν now	οὖν in fact	λεκτέον be called	δυνάμει ability	καὶ πότε οὐ, and when not,	εἴρηται. inserted.
ἐπεὶ δὲ after now	τό πρότερον the prior	διώρισται set limit to	ποσαχῶς different ways	λέγεται, it's said	[5]φανερὸν it's obvious	ὅτι that

πρότερον prior	ἐνέργεια action	δυνάμεως to ability	ἐστιν. is.	λέγω δὲ I say and	δυνάμεως to ability	οὐ μόνον not just
τῆς ὠρισμένης the separation	ἢ λέγεται or defined	αρχή principle	μεταβλητική transformation	ἐν ἄλλῳ in other	ἢ or	ἢ ἄλλο, that another
ἀλλ' but	ὄλως generally	πάσης any	αρχῆς principle	κινητικῆς of motion	ἢ στατικῆς. or of rest.	καὶ γάρ also because
ἡ φύσις the nature	ἐν ταύτῳ in that	γίνεται: comes in being	ἐν ταύτῳ into being	γάρ –	γένει comes	τῇ δυνάμει: the ability;
αρχή principle	γάρ for	κινητική, motion	ἀλλ' but	[10] οὐκ not	ἐν ἄλλῳ in other	ἀλλ' but
ἐν αὐτῷ in it	ἢ αὐτό. by it.	πάσης of every	δὴ now	τῆς τοιαύτης of these[abilities]	προτέρα prior	ἐστίν is
ἡ ἐνέργεια the action	καὶ λόγῳ both reason	καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ: and essence;	χρόνῳ in time	δ' ἐστι μὲν ὥς, but is – so,	ἐστι δὲ is –	ὥς οὐ. so not.
τῷ λόγῳ to reason	μὲν οὖν ὅτι so while that	προτέρα, prior	δήλον evident	(τῷ (en-	γάρ for	ἐνδέχασθαι it's capable
ἐνεργῆσαι of acting	δυνατόν able	ἐστι τό is the	πρώτως first	δυνατόν, ability,	οἶον like	λέγω I say
οἰκοδομικόν building-maker	τό δυνάμενον be enable	οἰκοδομεῖν, to build	[15] καὶ and	ὄρατικόν sighted one	τό ὄραν, to see	καὶ ὄρατὸν and observer
τὸ δυνατόν be anble	ὀρᾶσθαι: to observe.	ὁ δ' the and	αὐτός same	λόγος reason	καὶ ἐπὶ also upon	τῶν ἄλλων, the others
ὥστ' such that	ἀνάγκη necessary	τὸν λόγον the reason	προϋπάρχειν to pre-exist	καὶ and	τὴν γνώσιν the knowledge	τῆς γνώσεως): of knowledge).
τῷ δὲ in thus	χρόνῳ time	πρότερον prior	ὥδε: as follows:	τό τῷ the in the	εἶδει form	τό αὐτό this one
ἐνεργούν act	πρότερον, prior,	αριθμῶ numbers	δ' οὐ. but not.	λέγω δὲ I say and	τούτο ὅτι this that	τούδε thus
μὲν τοῦ – concerning	ανθρώπου mankind	τοῦ [20] whose	ἤδη already	ὄντος being	κατ' ἐνέργειαν acc. to action	καὶ τοῦ σίτου and concer. seed
καὶ τοῦ and concerning	ὀρῶντος seeing	πρότερον prior	τῷ χρόνῳ in time	ἡ ὕλη καὶ the matter and	τό σπέρμα the spore	καὶ τό ὄρατικόν, and the sighted

ἡ δυνάμει which ability	μὲν ἐστίν but is	ἄνθρωπος mankind	καὶ σίτος and seed	καὶ ὁρῶν, and was seeing	ἐνεργεῖα action	δ' οὐπω: but not yet.
ἀλλὰ however	τούτων concer. those	πρότερα prior	τῷ χρόνῳ in time	ἕτερα other	ὄντα beings	ἐνεργεῖα acting
ἐξ ὧν of which	ταῦτα these	ἐγένετο: come in. being	ἀεὶ γάρ always for	ἐκ τοῦ out of	δυνάμει able-	ὄντος [25] being
γίνεται comes	τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν that action	ὅν which	ὑπὸ through	ἐνεργεῖαν action	ὄντος, been –	οἷον e.g.,
ἄνθρωπος human	ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, from mankind	μουσικός musician	ὑπὸ μουσικού, by music-know	ἀεὶ always	κινουῦντός mover	τινος some
πρώτου: prime	τὴν δὲ κινεῖ that – moves	ἐνεργεῖαν in action	ἤδη already	ἐστίν. is.		
εἴρηται interpreted	δὲ ἐν τοῖς – in the	περὶ τῆς οὐσίας on the essence	λόγοις reasoning	ὅτι πᾶν that everything	τὸ γινόμενον that becomes	γίνεται comes
ἐκ τινος of some	τι καὶ thing and	ὑπὸ τινος, through some,	καὶ τούτο and that one	τῷ εἶδει the something	τὸ αὐτό. with itself.	διό καὶ wherefore and
δοκεῖ [30] seems	ἀδύνατον impossible	εἶναι is	οἰκοδόμον builder	εἶναι μὴ is not	οἰκοδομήσαντα built before	μηθὲν nor
ἢ κιθαριστὴν the harpist	μηθὲν never	κιθαρίσαντα: played a harp;	ὁ γάρ the one for	μανθάνων learns	κιθαρίζειν to play harp	κιθαρίζων by harping
μανθάνει learning	κιθαρίζειν, to harp,	ομοίως similarly	δὲ and	καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. also other ones.	ὅθεν consequently	ὁ σοφιστικὸς the sophists
ἐλέγχος refutation	ἐγένετο there were	ὅτι οὐκ ἔχων that not know	τις that	τὴν ἐπιστήμην the science	ποιήσει produces	οὐ ἡ ἐπιστήμη: not the science;
ὁ γάρ the one for	μανθάνων learner	οὐκ ἔχει. not know.	[35] ἀλλὰ on the contrary	διὰ τὸ through that of	τοῦ γινομένου coming in bein.	γεγενῆσθαι it becomes
τι καὶ what and δ' ἐν but in	τοῦ of the τοῖς the	ὅλως all περὶ on	κινουμένου moved κινήσεως motion	κεκινήσθαι is moved τούτο) this)	τι what [1] καὶ τὸν and the	(δήλον (it's clear μανθάνοντα learners
ἀνάγκη necessity	ἔχειν to know	τι what	τῆς ἐπιστήμης of science	ἴσως. in parallel.	ἀλλ' but	οὖν now
καὶ also	ταύτη this one	γε δήλον at a. rate clear	ὅτι ἡ that the	ἐνέργεια action	καὶ and	οὕτω it follows

προτέρα prior	τῆς δυνάμεως to ability	κατά according to	γένεσιν becoming	καὶ χρόνον. and time.		
ἀλλὰ but	μὴν naturally	καὶ οὐσία also in essence	γε, <i>in fact</i>	πρώτον prior	μὲν ὅτι so because	τὰ those
τῇ γενέσει in becoming	[5] ὑστερα posterior	τῷ εἶδει the same one	καὶ τῇ also [in] the	οὐσία essence	πρότερα prior	(οἷον (e.g.,
ἀνήρ adult	παιδὸς καὶ to child or	ἄνθρωπος human	σπέρματος: to spore;	τό one	μὲν γάρ indeed for	ἤδη ἔχει already has
τό εἶδος the form	τό δ' οὐ), one but not);	καὶ ὅτι and because	ἅπαν everything	ἐπ' ἀρχὴν toward principle	βαδίζει proceeds	τό γιγνόμενον coming in. being
καὶ τέλος and to aim	(ἀρχὴ (a principle	γάρ τό οὗ for to that	ἐνεκα, with regard to	τοῦ τέλους δὲ of the aim but	ἐνεκα with regard to	ἢ γένεσις), the origin).
τέλος aim	δ' ἢ ἐνέργεια, and the action	καὶ τούτου and of this	χάριν reason	ἢ δύναμις [10] the ability	λαμβάνεται. takes hold of.	οὐ γάρ not for
ἵνα ὄψιν so that sight	ἔχωσιν have	ὀρῶσι see	τὰ ζῶα the animals	ἀλλ' ὅπως but –	ὀρῶσιν to see	ὄψιν sight
ἔχουσιν, they have,	ομοίως similarly	δὲ καὶ and also	οἰκοδομικὴν building-ability	ἵνα [12] in order to	οἰκοδομῶσι build	καὶ τὴν and the
θεωρητικὴν perceive-able	ἵνα in order to	θεωρῶσιν: perceive,	ἀλλ' οὐ but not	θεωροῦσιν perceive	ἵνα in order to	θεωρητικὴν perceive-able
ἔχωσιν, have,	εἰ μὴ οἱ if not those	μελετῶντες: being educated	οὔτοι δὲ they but	οὐχί not	θεωροῦσιν perceive	ἀλλ' ἢ but only
ὠδὶ, follow,	†ἢ ὅτι † or because	οὐδέν not	δέονται pursue	θεωρεῖν†. to perceive†.		
[15] ἐτι In addition	ἢ ὕλη the matter	ἔστι is	δυνάμει power	ὅτι because	ἔλθοι is brought	ἂν if
εἰς τό εἶδος: into the form;	ὅταν when	δέ γε but indeed	ἐνεργείᾳ in action	ἦ, is,	τότε then	ἐν τῷ in the
εἶδει form	ἐστίν. is.	ομοίως the same	δὲ καὶ and also	ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, in the others	καὶ ὧν and those that	κίνησις motion
τό τέλος, the aim.	διό wherefore	ὡσπερ just as	οἱ those	διδάσκοντες who teach	ἐνεργοῦντα put in action	ἐπιδείξαντες exhibiting

οίονται expecting	τό τέλος the aim	ἀποδεδωκέναι, have delivered	καὶ ἡ and the	φύσις nature	ομοίως. the same.	εἰ γὰρ μὴ if for not
οὕτω as such	γίγνεται, happen,	ὁ[20]Παύσωνος the Pauson	ἔσται is	Ἑρμῆς; Hermes;	ἀδηλος it's uncertain	γὰρ καὶ for also
ἡ ἐπιστήμη the science	εἰ ἐσω whether within	ἢ ἐξω, or without	ὡσπερ just as	κάκεϊνος. in those.	τό γὰρ the for	ἔργον acting
τέλος, aim,	ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια the and action	τό ἔργον, the acting,	διό καὶ wherefore and	τοῦνομα the name	ἐνέργεια action	λέγεται meant
κατά according to	τό ἔργον the act	καὶ συντείνει and leads	πρὸς τὴν to the	ἐντελέχειαν. expression.		
ἐπεὶ δ' seeing that now	ἔστι is	τῶν μὲν in [some] –	ἔσχατον <i>final</i>	ἡ χρήσης the function	(οἶον (e.g.,	ὄψεως of sight
ἡ ὄρασις, the seeing,	καὶ and	οὐθέν [25] nothing	γίγνεται is produced	παρὰ alongside	ταύτην this [seeing]	ἕτερον else
ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως), from the sight),	ἀπ' ἐνίων from some	δὲ and	γίγνεται is produced	τι what	(οἶον (e.g.,	ἀπὸ τῆς from the
οικοδομικῆς construction	οικία house	παρὰ τὴν alongside the	οἰκοδόμησις), building),	ὅμως yet	οὐθέν nothing	ἥττον less
ἐνθα where	μὲν	τέλος, aim,	ἐνθα where	δὲ but	μᾶλλον rather	τέλος aim
τῆς of the	δυνάμεώς force	ἔστιν: is;	ἡ γὰρ the for	οικοδόμησις buildable things	ἐν τῷ in the	οἰκοδομουμένῳ, things-built
καὶ ἅμα and once	γίγνεται developed	καὶ ἔστι and is	τῆς οἰκίας. the house.			
[30] ὅσων μὲν many with	οὖν as [I's saying]	ἕτερόν τι the other what	ἔστι παρὰ is alongside	τὴν χρήσιν the usage	τό γιγνόμενον, that referred to,	τούτων μὲν those –
ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν the action in	τῷ ποιουμένῳ the produced	ἔστιν is	(οἶον ἢ τε (e.g., either -	οικοδόμησις buildable things	ἐν τῷ in the	οἰκοδομουμένῳ things-built
καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις or the textiles	ἐν τῷ in the	ὑφαινομένῳ, things woven,	ομοίως as	δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ and also among	τῶν ἄλλων, the others	καὶ ὅλως and in all
ἡ κίνησις ἐν the motion in	τῷ κινουμένῳ): the moving);	ὅσων many	δὲ μὴ ἔστιν but not is	ἄλλο τι other what	ἔργον [35] act	παρὰ alongside
τὴν ἐνέργειαν, the action,	ἐν αὐτοῖς	ὑπάρχει	ἡ ἐνέργεια	(οἶον ἡ	ὄρασις	ἐν τῷ

the action,	within it	exists	the action	(e.g., the	observation	in the
ὀρῶντι observer	καὶ ἡ and the	θεωρία perception	ἐν τῷ in the	θεωροῦντι perceiver	καὶ ἡ ζωὴ and the life	ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, in the soul
διό on that account	καὶ ἡ and the	ευδαιμονία: living well	[1] ζωὴ γάρ life for	ποιά which about	τίς that one	ἐστίν). ὥστε is). Therefore
φανερὸν ὅτι it's clear that	ἡ οὐσία the essence	καὶ τὸ εἶδος and the form	ἐνέργειά action	ἐστίν. is.	κατὰ According	τε δὴ – now
τούτου to this	τὸν λόγον the reason	φανερὸν it's clear	ὅτι that	πρότερον prior	τῇ οὐσία to the essence	ἐνέργεια action
δυνάμει, of power,	καὶ ὡσπερ and just as	εἶπομεν, said,	τοῦ χρόνου of the time	[5] ἀεὶ always	προλαμβάνει catches up	ἐνέργεια action
ἕτερα one	πρὸ ἑτέρας to other	ἕως τῆς until the	τοῦ of	ἀεὶ continually	κινουῦντός mover	πρώτως. prime.
ἀλλὰ but	μὴν καὶ truly –	κυριωτέρως: most of all,	τὰ those	μὲν γάρ indeed for	αἰδία eternals	πρότερα prior
τῇ οὐσίᾳ to the essence	τῶν φθαρτῶν, of perishing	ἐστὶ δ' is and	οὐθέν nothing	δυνάμει able	αἰδίων. eternally.	λόγος the ground
δὲ ὅδε: for this:	πάσα δύναμις every force	ἅμα τῆς anytime of the	αντιφάσεώς opposite one	ἐστίν: τὸ is; the one	μὲν γάρ indeed for	μὴ δυνατόν not force
ὑπάρχειν exist	οὐκ [10] ἂν not if	ὑπάρξειεν existed	οὐθενί, nothing,	τὸ δυνατόν forcibility	δὲ πᾶν – everything	ενδέχεται liable
μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. not act.	τό ἄρα that so	δυνατόν forcibility	εἶναι is	ενδέχεται liable	καὶ εἶναι both is	καὶ μὴ εἶναι: and not is;
τό αὐτό the same	ἄρα accordingly	δυνατόν force	καὶ εἶναι both is	καὶ μὴ εἶναι. and not is.	τὸ δὲ that which –	δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι able not be
ενδέχεται liable	μὴ εἶναι: not be;	τὸ δὲ that which and	ενδεχόμενον liability	μὴ εἶναι not be	φθαρτόν, mortal,	ἢ ἀπλῶς either solely
ἢ τοῦτο the the same	αὐτὸ ὃ one which	λέγεται [15] said	ἐνδέχεσθαι liable	μὴ εἶναι, not is;	ἢ κατὰ τόπον or territorial	ἢ κατὰ or by
τό ποσόν the amount	ἢ ποιόν: or [by] whom;	ἀπλῶς δὲ solely or	τό κατ' according to	οὐσίαν. essence.	οὐθέν ἄρα nothing so	τῶν of the
ἀφθαρτων	ἀπλῶς	δυνάμει	ἐστίν	ἀπλῶς	(κατὰ τι	δὲ

immortal	locally	able	is	locally	(somewhat	but
οὐδέν nothing	κωλύει, hinders,	οἷον such as	ποιόν ἢ πού): what or which);	ἐνεργεία in action	ἀρα πάντα: so everything;	οὐδέ neither any
τῶν out	ἐξ ἀνάγκης of necessity	όντων beings	(καίτοι (in spite of	ταῦτα πρότα: those priors;	εἰ γάρ if because	ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, these not were
οὐθέν nothing	ἂν ἦν): [20] would be).	οὐδέ neither	δὴ from stronger	κίνησις, εἴ τις motion, if the	ἐστίν is	ἄϊδιος: eternal;
οὐδ’ nor	εἴ τι if that	κινούμενον moving	ἄϊδιον, eternally,	οὐκ ἐστὶ κατὰ not is according	δύναμιν to force	κινούμενον moving
ἀλλ’ ἢ ποθεν but the whence	ποί potential	(τούτου (thereof	δ’ ὑλὴν but matter	οὐδέν neither	κωλύει hinders	ὑπάρχειν), to exist).
διό in addition	ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ always act	ἥλιος καὶ sun and	ἀστρα καὶ stars and	ὅλος all	ὁ οὐρανός, of heaven,	καὶ οὐ and no
φοβερόν awful	μὴ ποτε στή, not ever be,	ὃ φοβούνται that are scared	οἱ περὶ those about	φύσεως. constraints.	οὐδέ Nor	κάμνει doeth
τούτο this	δρώντα: acting;	οὐ [25] γάρ not for	περὶ τὴν δύναμιν about the force	τῆς of the	ἀντιφάσεως opposite one	αὐτοῖς, upon them
οἷον τοῖς e.g., the	φθαρτοῖς, mortals	ἢ κίνησις, the motion,	ὥστε to	ἐπίπονον difficult	εἶναι is	τὴν συνέχειαν the continuity
τῆς κινήσεως: of the motion;	ἢ γὰρ οὐσία the for essence	ὑλὴ καὶ matter and	δύναμις force	οὐσα, being,	οὐκ ἐνέργεια, not action	αἰτία τούτου. cause of this
μιμείται δὲ resembl and	τὰ ἀφθαρτα the immotrlals	καὶ τὰ ἐν also those in	μεταβολή transformation	ὄντα, beings,	οἷον γῆ e.g., earth	καὶ πῦρ. and fire.
καὶ γάρ – for	ταῦτα these [latter]	ἀεὶ always	ἐνεργεῖ: act;	[30] καθ’ down along	αὐτά them	γάρ καὶ for and
ἐν αὐτοῖς in themselves	ἔχει have	τὴν κίνησιν. the motion	αἱ δὲ the but	ἄλλαι other	δυνάμεις, forces,	ἐξ ὧν out of which
διώρισται, mentioned,	πάσαι each one	τῆς of the	ἀντιφάσεώς opposite ones	εἰσιν: is;	τό γάρ that one for	δυνάμενον force
ὥδι calls for	κινεῖν motion	δύναται power	καὶ μὴ ὥδι, also not call for	ὅσα γε as to indeed	κατὰ λόγον: reasonably;	αἱ δ’ the ones but
ἄλογοι unreasonable	τῷ mean time	παρεῖναι lasting	καὶ μὴ τῆς and not of the	ἀντιφάσεως opposite one	ἔσσονται be [= possess]	αἱ αὐταί. these ones.

εἰ ἄρα if thus	τινές some	εἰσὶ is	φύσεις [35] procedural	τοιαῦται as such	ἢ οὐσίαι or essences	οἷας of some sort
λέγουσιν described as	οἱ ἐν the –	τοῖς λόγοις so-called	τὰς ιδέας, the Ideas	πολύ many	μᾶλλον perhaps	ἐπιστήμον sciences
ἄν would	τι εἴη something be	ἢ αὐτό than itself	ἐπιστήμη καὶ science and	κινούμενον mobility	ἢ κίνησις: than motion;	[1] ταῦτα γάρ these for
ἐνέργειαι actions	μᾶλλον, perhaps	ἐκεῖναι counterparts	δὲ than	δυνάμεις forces	τούτων. of them.	ὅτι μὲν as indeed
οὖν πρότερον then prior	ἢ ἐνέργεια the action	καὶ δυνάμεως than of forces	καὶ πάσης and every	αρχῆς principle	μεταβλητικῆς, of transformation	φανερὸν. it's clear.
ὅτι δὲ καὶ that and both	βελτίων καὶ improving &	τιμιωτέρα more elementary	τῆς σπουδαίας of greatest	[5] δυνάμεως of forces	ἢ ἐνέργεια, the action	ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. of this declaration
ὅσα γάρ as many as for	κατὰ τό under the	δύνασθαι forcible	λέγεται, referred to	ταυτόν ἐστι that one is	δυνατόν enable	τὰναντία, the contraries;
οἷον τὸ e.g.,	δύνασθαι enable	λεγόμενον referred to	ὑγιαίνειν be healthy	ταυτόν ἐστι the same is	καὶ τὸ also to	νοσεῖν, being ill
καὶ ἄμα: and vice versa.	ἢ αὐτὴ γάρ the same 'cause	δύναμις τοῦ force under the	ὑγιαίνειν καὶ health and	κάμνειν, καὶ illness and	ἠρεμεῖν καὶ rest and	κινεῖσθαι, καὶ motion and
οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ to build and	καταβάλλειν, to break down	[10] καὶ and	οἰκοδομεῖσθαι being built	καὶ καταπίπτειν. and forfeited.	τό μὲν that one while	οὖν as I was saying
δύνασθαι forcibility	τὰναντία contraries	ἄμα at the same time	ὑπάρχει: τὰ exists those	δ' nevertheless	ἐναντία contraries	ἄμα at the same time
ἄδύνατον, non-forcible;	καὶ τὰς and of the	ενεργείας δὲ action again	ἄμα at the same time	ἄδύνατον non-forcible	ὑπάρχειν exists	(οἷον (e.g.,
ὑγιαίνειν being healthy	καὶ κάμνειν), and being ill).	ὥστ' so	ανάγκη it's necessary	τούτων of the one	θάτερον the other	εἶναι be [= stay]
τάγαθόν, stay put,	τό δὲ the but	δύνασθαι forcibility	ομοίως may [be]	ἁμφοτέρον in both	ἢ οὐδέτερον: or neither,	[15] ἢ ἄρα the so that
ἐνέργεια action	βελτίων. [may] improve.					
ανάγκη it's necessary	δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ but – in	τῶν κακῶν the ones failing	τὸ τέλος the aim	καὶ τὴν and the	ἐνέργειαν action	εἶναι be

χείρον τῆς more dire of the	δυνάμεως: force	τό γάρ the one for	δυνάμενον forcible	ταὐτὸ that one	ἄμφω of both	τάναντία. contraries.
δήλον it's clear	ἀρα at the same time	ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι that not is	τό κακόν the failing one	παρὰ τὰ apart from	πράγματα: actualities;	ὑστερον posterior
γάρ τῇ for by	φύσει nature	τό κακόν the failing one	τῆς δυνάμεως. of the forces	οὐκ not	ἀρα at the same time	οὐδ' and not
ἐν τοῖς in them	ἐξ ἀρχῆς of beginning	[20] καὶ τοῖς or of the	ἄϊδίους eternal	οὐθέν anything	ἐστίν is	οὔτε neither
κακόν failure	οὔτε nor	αμάρτημα error	οὔτε and no	διεφθαρμένον destruction	(καὶ γάρ (– for	ἢ διαφθορά the destruction
τῶν κακῶν of failing	ἐστίν). is).	ευρίσκεται are found	δὲ καὶ τὰ and also those	διαγράμματα diagrams	ἐνεργεῖα: actions,	διαιροῦντες by division
γάρ for	εὐρίσκουσιν. are found.	εἰ δ' ἦν if but were	διηρημένα, divided,	φανερὰ clear	ἂν ἦν: would be;	νῦν δ' now but
ενυπάρχει inherent	δυνάμει. forcibly.	διὰ τί for what	δύο ὀρθαὶ two right angles	τό τρίγωνον; to a triangle?	ὅτι αἱ [25] because the	περὶ μίαν around one
στιγμὴν point	γωνίαι angles	ἴσαι equals	δύο ὀρθαῖς. two right angles.	εἰ οὖν if then	ἀνῆκτο ἢ elevated that one	παρὰ τὴν to the side of the
πλευρὰν, side,	ιδόντι imagining	ἂν ἦν would be	ευθύς at once	δήλον clear	διὰ τί. for what.	ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ in a semicircle
ορθή right angle	καθόλου really ... at all	διὰ τί; for what?	ἐὰν ἴσαι where equals	τρεις, three [lines]	ἢ τε the one both	βάσις base
δύο καὶ ἡ two and the one	ἐκ μέσου of middle	ἐπισταθεῖσα placed upon	ορθή, right angle,	ιδόντι imagining	δήλον clear	τῷ to the
ἐκεῖνο that one who	εἰδότες. knows.	ὥστε so	φανερὸν ὅτι it's clear that	τὰ those	δυνάμει forcible	ὄντα beings
εἰς [30] into	ἐνεργεῖαν action	αγόμενα conducted	ευρίσκεται: are found,	αἴτιον for the reason	δὲ ὅτι ἢ – that the	νόησις thought-process
ἐνεργεῖα: action.	ὥστ' therefore	ἐξ ἐνεργείας out of action	ἢ δύναμις, the force,	καὶ διὰ τούτο and through it	ποιοῦντες produced	γιγνώσκουσιν knowledge
(ὑστερον γάρ (posterior for	γενέσει becoming	ἢ ἐνεργεῖα either in action	ἢ κατ' or according to	αριθμόν). number).		

ἐπει δὲ since and	τό ὄν the being	καὶ τό μὴ ὄν and the not being	τό μὲν partly	κατὰ [35] τὰ according to	σχήματα τῶν forms of the	κατηγοριῶν, predicates
τό δὲ and partly	κατὰ according to	δύναμιν force	ἢ ἐνέργειαν or action	τούτων of these	ἢ τάναντία, or opposites,	[1] τό δὲ – then
κυριώτατα particularly	ὄν be	ἀληθές correct	ἢ ψεύδος, or wrong.	τούτο δ' this but	ἐπὶ τῶν upon the	πραγμάτων actualities
ἐστὶ τῷ is mean time	συγκεῖσθαι ἢ composed or	διηρῆσθαι, divided,	ὥστε for this reason	ἀληθεύει μὲν of truth indeed	ὁ τό for whom that	διηρημένον which is divided
οἰόμενος expecting	διηρῆσθαι be divided	καὶ τό and that which	συγκείμενον is composed	συγκεῖσθαι, be composed,	ἔψευσται of error	δὲ ὁ but one that
ἐναντίως opposing	[5] ἔχων have	ἢ τὰ in fact those	πράγματα, actualities.	πότε' when	ἐστὶν is	ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶ or not is
τό ἀληθές that correct	λεγόμενον so-called	ἢ ψεύδος; or wrong?	τούτο γάρ whenever that	σκεπτέον in one's mind	τί λέγομεν. thing so-called.	
οὐ γάρ not because	διὰ τό through the one	ἡμᾶς we	οἶεσθαι expect	ἀληθῶς right	σε λευκὸν you white	εἶναι be
εἴ supposing that	σύ λευκός, you white,	ἀλλὰ διὰ τό but through that	σέ εἶναι you are	λευκόν white	ὕμεις οἱ we that way	φάντες consider
τούτο this	ἀληθεύομεν. being true.	εἰ δὴ τὰ if now those	μὲν ἀεὶ – always	σύνκειται composed	καὶ ἀδύνατα and cannot	διαιρεθῆναι, be divided
[10] τὰ those	δ' ἀεὶ but always	διήρηται divided	καὶ ἀδύνατα and cannot	συντεθῆναι, be composed,	τὰ those	δ' ἐνδέχεται and liable
τάναντία, opposites,	τό μὲν that then	εἶναί be	ἐστὶ τὸ is that	συγκεῖσθαι composed	καὶ ἓν and one	εἶναι, be,
τό δὲ that and	μὴ εἶναι not be	τό μὴ that not	συγκεῖσθαι composed	ἀλλὰ but	πλείω multiplicity	εἶναι: be.
περὶ μὲν about –	οὖν τὰ then the things	ἐνδεχόμενα liable	ἢ αὐτὴ the same	γίγνεται becomes	ψευδῆς wrong	καὶ ἀληθῆς and right
δόξα καὶ expectation and	ὁ λόγος the reason	ὁ αὐτός, the same,	καὶ ἐνδέχεται and a liable	ὅτε [15] μὲν at one time	ἀληθεύειν to be right	ὅτε δὲ at another time
ψεύδεσθαι: to be wrong;	περὶ δὲ about but	τὰ ἀδύνατα those cannot	ἄλλως otherwise	ἔχειν have	οὐ γίγνεται not become	ὅτε μὲν at one time
ἀληθές	ὅτε δὲ	ψεύδος,	ἀλλ' ἀεὶ	ταῦτα	ἀληθὴ καὶ	ψευδῆ.

right	and at another	wrong,	but always	these	right and	wrong.
περι δὲ δὴ about and now	τὰ ἀσύνθετα non-synthesized	τί τό εἶναι what – be	ἢ μὴ εἶναι or not be	καὶ τό ἀληθές and – right	καὶ τό ψεύδος; and – wrong?	οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ not for is
σύνθετον, synthesized	ὥστε such that	εἶναι μὲν be once	ὅταν when	συγκέηται, composed	μὴ εἶναι not be	δὲ [20] ἐὰν other when
διηρημένον de-composed	ἢ, ὥσπερ is, such as	τό λευκόν the white	τό ξύλον the wood	ἢ τό or that one	ἀσύμμετρον [21] asymmetric	τὴν διάμετρον: with diameter
οὐδὲ neither	τό ἀληθές – right	καὶ τό ψεύδος nor – wrong	ομοίως as	ἐτι ὑπάρξει yet exist	καὶ ἐπ’ as on	ἐκείνων. those [before].
ἢ ὥσπερ or just as	οὐδὲ not either	τὸ ἀληθές the right	ἐπὶ τούτων on these	τό αὐτό, the same,	οὕτως so	οὐδέ neither
τό εἶναι, the being,	ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ but is	τό μὲν the then	ἀληθές right	ἢ ψεύδος, or wrong:	τό μὲν the –	θιγεῖν καὶ grasping and
φάναι consideration	ἀληθές right	(οὐ γὰρ (not for	ταὐτὸ identical	κατάφασις affirmation	[25] καὶ and	φάσις), information),
τό δ’ the and	ἀγνοεῖν ignorance	μὴ θιγγάνειν not grasping	(ἀπατηθῆναι (be deceived	γὰρ for	περὶ τό about that which	τί ἐστὶν οὐκ whatness is not
ἐστὶν is	ἀλλ’ ἢ otherwise that	κατὰ according to	συμβεβηκός: accident;	ομοίως similarly	δὲ καὶ and also	περὶ τὰς about those
μὴ συνθετὰς not synthesized	οὐσίας, essences,	οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν not for is	ἀπατηθῆναι: be deceived.	καὶ πάσαι and all	εἰσὶν are	ἐνεργεῖα, actions,
οὐ δυνάμει, not abilities,	ἐγίνοντο be created	γὰρ ἂν καὶ for would and	ἐφθείροντο, be annihilated	νῦν δὲ now but	τό ὄν αὐτό Being itself	οὐ γίνεταί not created
οὐδέ nor	φθείρεται, annihilated	[30] ἔκ τινος out of something	γὰρ ἂν for would	ἐγίνετο: be created.	ὅσα δὴ as many as and	ἐστὶν is
ὅπερ which a matter	εἶναι τι is whatness	καὶ ἐνέργειαι, and action,	περὶ ταῦτα about them	οὐκ ἐστὶν not is	ἀπατηθῆναι be deceived	ἀλλ’ ἢ but either
νοεῖν think	ἢ μὴ: or not.	ἀλλὰ τό τί but the whatness	ἐστὶ ζητεῖται – seeks	περὶ αὐτῶν, about them,	εἰ τοιαῦτά whether they	ἐστὶν are
ἢ μὴ): or not).	τὸ δὲ εἶναι that but be	ὥς when	τὸ ἀληθές, the right	καὶ and	τὸ μὴ εἶναι that one not be	τό ὥς that when
τό ψεύδος, the wrong:	ἔν μὲν ἐστὶν, unity – is	εἰ σύγκειται, if composed	ἀληθές, right	τό [35] δ’ that one but	εἰ μὴ σύγκειται, if not composed	ψεῦδος: wrong.

τό δὲ ἕν, that also unity,	εἴπερ ὄν, if actual	οὕτως so	ἐστίν, it is	εἰ δὲ μὴ if but not	οὕτως, so	οὐκ ἐστίν: not is
[1] τὸ δὲ the –	αληθές right	τό νοεῖν to take note of	ταῦτα: these;	τό δὲ the but	ψεύδος wrong	οὐκ ἐστίν, not is,
οὐδέ nor	ἀπάτη, deception	ἀλλὰ ἀγνοια, but ignorance,	οὐχ οἷα not some sort of	ἢ τυφλότης: – blindness	ἢ μὲν γάρ that indeed for	τυφλότης blindness
ἐστίν ὡς is like	ἂν εἰ one would	τό νοητικὸν the taking note of	ὄλως totally	μὴ ἔχοι not have	τις. it.	φανερὸν evidently
δὲ καὶ ὅτι and also that	περὶ τῶν with regard to	ακινήτων [5] immovables	οὐκ ἐστίν not is	ἀπάτη deception	κατὰ τό ποτέ, almost never,	εἴ τις if these
υπολαμβάνει one assumes	ακίνητα. immovables	οἷον e.g.,	τό τρίγωνον the triangle	εἰ μὴ if not	μεταβάλλειν changing	οἶεται, we suppose
οὐκ οἰήσεται not suppose	ποτέ μὲν when	δύο ὀρθὰς two right angles	ἔχειν ποτέ have when	δὲ οὐ and not	(μεταβάλλοι (alteration	γάρ ἂν), for would);
ἀλλὰ τί but what	μὲν τί – what	δ' οὐ, and not,	οἷον e.g.,	ἄρτιον even	αριθμὸν number	πρώτον prime
εἶναι μηθένα, is never,	ἢ τινάς or some	μὲν τινάς – some	δ' οὐ: and not.	αριθμῷ δὲ number but	περὶ about	ένα οὐδέ one never
[10] τούτο: this,	οὐ γὰρ ἔτι not for ever	τινά μὲν some –	τινά δὲ some and	οὐ οἰήσεται, not suppose,	ἀλλ' ἀληθεύσει but being right	ἢ ψεύσεται or being wrong
ὡς ἀεὶ as always	οὕτως in this way	ἔχοντος. they have.				
δύναμις force	λέγεται means	ἢ μὲν ἀρχὴ the – principle	κινήσεως ἢ of motion or	μεταβολῆς transformation	ἢ ἐν that one in	ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἢ another or is
ἕτερον, οἷον at another, e.g.,	ἢ οἰκοδομικὴ the building-	δύναμις ability	ἐστίν ἢ is or	οὐχ ὑπάρχει not exist	ἐν τῷ in the	οἰκοδομουμένῳ, things-built
ἀλλ' however	ἢ ἱατρικὴ the medicinal-	δύναμις οὕσα ability be	ὑπάρχοι existing	ἂν ἐν τῷ will in the	ἱατρουμένῳ, patient	ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ but not is
ἱατρουόμενος. with the patient.	ἢ μὲν οὖν the – thus	ὄλως especially	ἀρχὴ principle	μεταβολῆς transformation	ἢ κινήσεως or motion	λέγεται mean
δύναμις forcibility	[20] ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ in other which	ἢ ἕτερον, is at another	ἢ δ' or and	ὑφ' ἑτέρου by another	ἢ ἢ which is	ἕτερον with another

(καθ' ἣν (during which	γὰρ τὸ πάσχον for the sufferer	πάσχει τι, suffers that	ὅτε μὲν ἔαν if and if only	ὀτιοῦν, devised skillfully	δυνατὸν forcible	αὐτό that one
φάμεν said	εἶναι παθεῖν, be suffering;	ὅτε δ' οὐ often but not	κατὰ πᾶν during every	πάθος undergoing	ἀλλ' ἂν but should be	ἐπὶ τό near the
βέλτιον): improvement).	ἐτι ἢ always that one	τοῦ whose	καλῶς welfare	τοῦτ' of it	ἐπιτελεῖν accomplished	ἢ κατὰ which according
προαίρεσιν: to a goal;	ἐνίοτε γάρ at times for	τούς for whom	μόνον ἂν only would be	πορευθέντας go-and-make	ἢ εἰπόντας, who say	μὴ [25] καλῶς not good
δὲ ἢ μὴ but which not	ὡς προείλοντο, as options	οὐφάμεν not say	δύνασθαι forcible	λέγειν ἢ meaning that	βαδίζειν: heading to	ομοίως similarly
δὲ καὶ – also	ἐπὶ on account of	τοῦ πάσχειν. who undergoes.	ἐτι yet	ὅσαι ἐξεις as many as have	καθ' ὅς according to	απαθή undergoing
ὄλως ἢ especially that	αμετάβλητα untransformable	ἢ μὴ ῥαδίως which not easily	ἐπὶ τό χειρόν toward the worst	ευμετακίνητα, mobile ones,	δυνάμεις forcibles	λέγονται: called.
κλᾶται breakables	μὲν γὰρ καὶ indeed for also	συντρίβεται damagables	καὶ κάμπτεται and bendables	καὶ ὄλως and all	φθείρεται destroyables	οὐ τῷ [30] not of the
δύνασθαι forcibility	ἀλλὰ τῷ but of the	μὴ δύνασθαι not forcibility	καὶ ἐλλείπειν and of absence	τινός: some;	απαθή δὲ undergoing and	τῶν τοιούτων of them
ἃ μόλις which once	καὶ ἡρέμα and slowly	πάσχει undergoes	διὰ δύναμιν by force	καὶ τῷ δύνασθαι and of forcibility	καὶ τῷ ἔχειν and of having	πῶς. somehow.
λεγομένης δὲ so-called since	τῆς δυνάμεως the forcibility	τοσαυταχῶς, in various ways	καὶ τό δυνατόν also the possible	ένα μὲν one –	τρόπον way	λεχθήσεται is called.
τό ἔχον that which has	κινήσεως of motion	ἀρχὴν ἢ principle or	μεταβολῆς transformation	(καὶ γὰρ [35] (and for	τό στατικὸν the static one	δυνατὸν τι) forcible whatness
ἐν ἑτέρῳ in another	ἢ ἣ which is	ἕτερον, at another.	ένα δ' ἔαν one but if	ἔχη τι has it	αὐτοῦ in-itself	ἄλλο δύναμιν another force
τοιαύτην, as such,	[1] ἔνα δ' ἔαν one some would	ἔχη μεταβάλλειν has to change	ἐφ' ὀτιοῦν on devising wise	δύναμιν, forcible,	εἴτ' ἐπὶ either for	τό χειρόν worsening
εἴτ' ἐπὶ or for	τό βέλτιον improvement.	(καὶ γὰρ τό (– for that one	φθειρόμενον destroyable	δοκεῖ seems	δυνατὸν εἶναι forcible is	φθειρεσθαι, to be destroyed
ἢ οὐκ ἂν which not 'd be	φθαρῆναι destroyed	εἰ ἦν if were	ἀδύνατον: non-forcible.	νῦν as it stands	δὲ ἔχει τινά [5] but has some	διάθεσιν moods

καὶ αἰτίαν – causes	καὶ ἀρχὴν and principles	τοῦ τοιοῦτου of them [changes]	πάθους: undergoing.	ὅτε μὲν sometimes –	δὴ τῷ now of	ἔχειν having
τι δοκεῖ, it supposes	ὅτε δὲ because –	τῷ of	ἐστερῆσθαι being deprived	τοιοῦτον of this	εἶναι: be;	εἰ δ' ἢ if but the
στέρησις privation	ἐστίν is	ἐξίς πως, has somehow,	πάντα τῷ everything of	ἔχειν having	ἂν εἴη τι, will be what,	εἰ δὲ μὴ if but not
ὥστε τῷ so of the	τε ἔχειν – having	ἐξίς τινά καὶ state certain and	ἀρχὴν ἐστὶ principle is	δυνατόν forcible	ὁμωνύμως agreeing	καὶ τῷ and of
ἔχειν τὴν having the	τούτου of that	στέρησιν, privation,	εἰ ἐνδέχεται if asserts	[10] ἔχειν having	στέρησιν: privation;	εἰ δὲ μὴ, if – not
ὁμωνύμως) agree.)	ένα δὲ τῷ one but of	μὴ ἔχειν not having	αὐτοῦ same	δύναμιν forcible	ἢ ἀρχὴν or principle	ἄλλο ἢ other –
ἢ ἄλλο which other	φθαρτικὴν. destroy.	ἐτι δὲ yet again	ταῦτα πάντα all these	ἢ τῷ which of the	μόνον only	ἂν would
συμβῆναι happen	γενέσθαι come into being	ἢ μὴ or not	γενέσθαι, come into being	ἢ τῷ καλῶς. or of great.	καὶ γὰρ ἐν – for in	τοῖς ἀψύχοις those soulless
ἔνεστιν is	ἢ τοιαύτη the as these	δύναμις, forcible;	οἷον ἐν τοῖς e.g., in the	ὄργανοις: instruments;	τὴν that one	μὲν γὰρ – for
δύνασθαι forcibility	φασὶ [15] it's agreed	φθέγγεσθαι to make sound	λύραν, a lyre	τὴν the one	δ' οὐδέν, but with no	ἂν ἢ would be
μὴ εὐφωνος. not good tone.	ἀδυναμία non-forcible	δὲ on the other hand	ἐστὶ στέρησις is privation	δυνάμεως of forcibility	καὶ τῆς and of the	τοιαύτης as [soulless ones]
αρχῆς principle	οἷα of some sort	εἴρηται, as been said	ἢ ὅλως either totally	ἢ τῷ or of the	πεφυκότι adapted	ἔχειν, having
ἢ καὶ ὅτε or – when	πέφυκεν adapted	ἤδη ἔχειν: already having.	οὐ γὰρ not for	ομοίως similarly	ἂν φαῖεν if said	ἀδύνατον non-forcible
εἶναι γεννάν is begetting	παῖδα children	καὶ ἀνδρα – men	καὶ εὐνοῦχον. and a neutered.	ἐτι δὲ yet again	καθ' ἑαυτὴν corresponding to	εκατέραν [20] two by two
δύναμιν ἔστιν force there's	ἀδυναμία not-force	ἀντικειμένη, object,	τῇ τε μόνον to the – only	κινητικὴ καὶ motion and	τῇ καλῶς to the well	κινητικὴ. motion.
καὶ ἀδύνατα and non-forces	δὴ τὰ now those	μὲν κατὰ as corresponding	τὴν ἀδυναμίαν to non-forces	ταύτην to it	λέγεται, it's referred to	τὰ δὲ those but
ἄλλον	τρόπον, mode,	οἷον δυνατόν as possible	τε καὶ and	ἀδύνατον, non-forcible,	ἀδύνατον non-forcible	μὲν οὗ τό mode

to different	type	e.g., force	and also	non-force.	non-force	then whose the
εναντίον contrary	ἐξ ανάγκης of necessity	αληθές right	(οἷον τό τὴν (e.g., the to	διάμετρον diameter	σύμμετρον symmetric	εἶναι [25] is
ἀδύνατον impossible	ὅτι ψεύδος because false	τό τοιούτον this [statement]	οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον whose contrary	οὐ μόνον not only	αληθές true,	ἀλλὰ καὶ but also
ανάγκη it's necessary	ἀσύμμετρον asymmetric	εἶναι: τό be. The	ἀρα therefore	σύμμετρον symmetric	οὐ μόνον ψεύδος not only false	ἀλλὰ καὶ but also
ἐξ ανάγκης necessarily	ψεύδος): false).	τό δ' the and	εναντίον contrary	τούτω, of this	τὸ δυνατόν, the possible	ὅταν μὴ when not
ἀναγκαῖον necessary	ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον is the contrary	ψεύδος εἶναι, false is;	οἷον τό e.g., the	καθῆσθαι sitting	ἄνθρωπον human	δυνατόν: possible
οὐ [30] γάρ whose for	ἐξ ανάγκης necessarily	τό μὴ καθῆσθαι the not seated	ψεύδος. false.	τὸ μὲν οὖν the – hence	δυνατόν possible	ένα μὲν τρόπον, some – type
ὡςπερ εἴρηται, as defined,	τό μὴ that not	ἐξ ανάγκης necessarily	ψεύδος σημαίνει, false means,	ένα δὲ τό some and the	αληθές εἶναι, true is;	ένα δὲ τό other and the
ενδεχόμενον liability	αληθές εἶναι. true be.					
κατὰ μεταφορὰν metaphorically	δὲ ἢ and the	ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ in geometry	λέγεται called	δύναμις. force.	ταῦτα these	μὲν οὖν though then
τὰ δυνατά the possibles	οὐ κατὰ not according to	δύναμιν: force	[35] τὰ δὲ those and	λεγόμενα refer	κατὰ to	δύναμιν force
πάντα all	λέγεται referred	πρὸς to	τὴν πρώτην the primary	μίαν: one [= sense];	[1] αὕτη δ' this and	ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ is principle
μεταβολῆς transformation	ἐν ἄλλῳ within one	ἢ ἢ ἄλλο. or the other.	τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα those for other	λέγεται reasoned	δυνατά τῷ possible to	τὰ μὲν those though
ἔχειν have	αὐτῶν ἄλλο on them other	τι τοιαύτην that such as this	δύναμιν possibility	τὰ δὲ those and	μὴ ἔχειν not have	τὰ δὲ those and
ὠδὶ collectively	ἔχειν. have.	ομοίως similarly	δὲ καὶ for also	τὰ ἀδύνατα. the impossible	ὥστε ὁ so, the	κύριος fundamental
ὅρος premise	[5] τῆς πρώτης of the primary	δυνάμεως forcibility	ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ will be principle	μεταβλητικὴ transformation	ἐν ἄλλῳ within one	ἢ ἢ ἄλλο. or the other.