

Aristotle Metaphysics Book 9

1045β περί μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτου ὄντος καὶ πρὸς ὃ πάσαι αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος αναφέρονται εἴρηται, περί τῆς οὐσίας (κατὰ γὰρ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον λέγεται τᾶλλα [30] ὄντα, τό τε ποσόν καὶ τό ποιόν καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ οὕτω λεγόμενα: πάντα γὰρ ἔξει τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον, ὡσπερ εἶπομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις): ἐπεὶ δὲ λέγεται τό ὄν τό μὲν τό τί ἢ ποιόν ἢ ποσόν, τό δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐντελέχειαν καὶ κατὰ τό ἔργον, διορίσωμεν καὶ περί δυνάμεως [35] καὶ ἐντελεχείας, καὶ πρῶτον περί δυνάμεως ἢ λέγεται μὲν μάλιστα κυρίως, οὐ μὴν χρησιμωτάτη γέ ἐστι πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα νῦν: **1046^a** [1] ἐπὶ πλεόν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν μόνον λεγομένων κατὰ κίνησιν. ἀλλ' εἰπόντες περί ταύτης, ἐν τοῖς περί τῆς ἐνεργείας διορισμοῖς δηλώσωμεν καὶ περί τῶν ἄλλων.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν λέγεται [5] πολλαχῶς ἡ δύναμις καὶ τό δύνασθαι, διώριστα ἡμῖν ἐν ἄλλοις: τούτων δ' ὅσαι μὲν ὁμωνύμως λέγονται δυνάμεις ἀφείσθωσαν (ἔναι γὰρ ὁμοιότητί τινα λέγονται, καθάπερ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ δυνατά καὶ αδύνατα λέγομεν τῷ εἶναι πως ἢ μὴ εἶναι), ὅσαι δὲ πρὸς τό αὐτό εἶδος, πάσαι ἀρχαί [10] τινές εἰσι, καὶ πρὸς πρώτην μίαν λέγονται, ἢ ἐστὶν ἀρχή μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παθεῖν ἐστὶ δύναμις, ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι ἀρχή μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἢ ἄλλο: ἢ δ' ἔξις ἀπαθείας τῆς ἐπὶ τό χεῖρον καὶ φθοράς τῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἢ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἀρχῆς [15] μεταβλητικῆς.

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We talked about the *first* Being, the *substance*, to which all the other categories of Being are referred (for as it was said in earlier discussions, it is from the term *substance* that [variations] of beings, both quantity and quality and other such terms, have derived their meaning). And since Being conveys both whatness, quality, or quantity, and *force* (*dýname*), *expression* (*entelécheia*) and *act* (*érgon*), let us clarify [the meaning] of *enforceability* (*dynáme*) and *expression*. But, let us first talk about *enforceability*, although, at this point, it is not at any rate the most helpful to what we intend; for *force* and *action* (*enérgeia*) are beyond concepts that only [describe] the *motion* (*kínese*). But, when these [terms] are described, we clarify the said *action* with them.

While, elsewhere,¹ we have mentioned that *force* and *enforceable* have various meanings – nonetheless, those with the meaning of *force*, by homonymity, may be dismissed (for, just as in geometry, something is called, by homonymity, *enforcible* [*dynatón*] or *non-enforcible* [*adýnaton*], we call that one, in one way or another, *is* or *is not*), which applies to as many principles as that kind which [has] the same *mode* [*eídos*] with the first one being called the principle of *transformation* [*metabolé*] within one or the other. For, one [kind of] *force* is to be impacted: the threshold of passive transformation either by something else or by itself through another, which is in the patient himself; or one [kind] is insusceptibility to worsening or deteriorating by something else or by itself through another, i.e., by a threshold of change.

ἐν γάρ τούτοις ἔνεστι πᾶσι τοῖς ὅροις ὁ
τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως λόγος. πάλιν δ' αὖται
δυνάμεις λέγονται ἢ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ
[τού] παθεῖν ἢ τοῦ καλῶς, ὥστε καὶ ἐν τοῖς
τούτων λόγοις ἐνυπάρχουσί πως οἱ τῶν
προτέρων δυνάμεων λόγοι.

φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς μία δύναμις
[20] τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (δυνατὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ
καὶ τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸ δύναμιν τοῦ παθεῖν καὶ τῷ
ἄλλο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ), ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς ἄλλη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν
τῷ πάσχοντι (διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ ἀρχήν, καὶ
εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὑλὴν ἀρχὴν τινα, πάσχει τὸ
πάσχον, καὶ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου: τὸ λιπαρὸν μὲν
[25] γὰρ καυστὸν τὸ δ' ὑπεῖκον ὠδὶ θλαστὸν,
ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ
ποιῶντι, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομική, ἡ
μὲν ἐν τῷ θερμαντικῷ ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομικῷ:
διὸ ἢ συμπέφυκεν, οὐθὲν πάσχει αὐτὸ ὑφ'
ἑαυτοῦ: ἐν γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο.

καὶ ἡ ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον [30] ἢ τῇ
τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει ἐναντία στέρησις ἐστίν, ὥστε
τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πάσα δύναμις
ἀδυναμία. ἡ δὲ στέρησις λέγεται πολλαχῶς:
καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχον καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς ἂν μὴ
ἔχη, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ὅτε πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ ὠδὶ, οἷον
παντελῶς, ἢ κἂν ὀπωσοῦν. ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ, ἂν
πεφυκότες [35] ἔχειν μὴ ἔχη βίᾳ, ἐστερηῆσθαι
ταῦτα λέγομεν.

For, all these are within the definition of the first
concept of *enforceability*. And, again, all these
forces are said to be just either for exercising, and
enduring, or of being well; so, in them, i.e., in the
latter [kinds] of *enforceability*, these concepts are
somehow present.

Consequently, it is clear that the *force* for acting,
and for experiencing it, is one (for [what is]
enforcible has the *force* of both experiencing
[something] and being [impacted] by it), though they
appear differently. For, in one hand, in the one who
experiences [suffering] (for by which he has some
commencement that is like a sort of commencing
material, experiencing both the initiation and the
[period of] going-through: for instance, that which is
oily burns up, and one who is on shaky ground
breaks [a deal], among many other examples); and,
on the other hand, in the one producing it: e.g., [we
see] the [force] in heat and in a building, either in the
one producing the heat, or in that which raises the
building. Thus, indeed, the inflection point does not
experience it upon itself; since, it is one not the other.

Both *nonenforcement* and *non-enforcible*, and the
like, are the lack of and in contrast to *force*; so that
every force [and] nonenforcement, is out of and
throughout the same. But, lacking [has] multiple
meanings: that which has not; that which grows but
does not have, either in general, or as it grows up, at
a point in present or entirely, or in any way at all.
And in a few [cases] when they have [it] but by
means of violation lose it, we say that is what [they
are] deprived of.

ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν
αρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν
ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, **1046β**
[1] δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται
άλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου: διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι
καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσιν: ἀρχαὶ
γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο.

καὶ αἱ μὲν [5] μετὰ λόγου πάσαι τῶν
ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι μία ἐνός,
οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον' ἢ δὲ
ιατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας.

αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ
λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν,
πλὴν οὐχ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἀμφοῖν ἔστι δ' ὡς
[10] τοῦ υπάρχοντος μάλλον ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς
τοιαύτας ἐπιστήμας εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, εἶναι
δὲ τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰς τοῦ δὲ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς: καὶ
γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦ δὲ τρόπον τινὰ
κατὰ συμβεβηκός: ἀποφάσει γὰρ καὶ ἀποφορὰ
δηλοῖτό ἐναντίον: ἢ γὰρ στέρησις [15] ἢ πρώτη
τό ἐναντίον, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀποφορὰ θατέρου. ἐπεὶ δὲ
τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἢ δ'
ἐπιστήμη δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ
κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχὴν, τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν ὑγίαιαν
μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ
τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων [20]
ἄμφω. λόγος γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν μὲν, οὐχ
ὁμοίως δὲ, καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἢ ἔχει κινήσεως ἀρχήν:
ὥστε ἄμφω ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς κινήσει πρὸς
ταῦτ' ἀντιθέτως: διὸ τὰ κατὰ λόγον δυνατὰ τοῖς
ἀνευ λόγου δυνατοῖς ποιεῖ τὰναντία: μιᾷ γὰρ
ἀρχῇ περιέχεται, τῷ λόγῳ.

And, since, some such principles are inherent in
soulless, and soulish, and some in souls and in the
reasoning soul, it is clear that [some] *enforceability*
will be *without*, and [some] *with*, reason. Thereby, all
arts also all productive sciences are *force-fit*;
because, they [swing] the principles of
transformation within one or the other.

Now, all those that follow reason [admit] contrary
[determinations], but those without reason [admit]
only one; e.g., the heat [produces] heating alone,
whereas, medicine [force-fits] disease and health.

And the ground [for this] is that science *is* the
reason, and the same reason exposes both a thing and
that [which is] lacking, though not as itself –
sometimes as both, and sometimes as belonging. It is
thus rather necessary that such sciences to admit
contrary [determinations] – being according to one
and not the other – for, reason, corresponding to one
and not the other, in some respect, occurs as process:
for by judgment and criticism it exposes the contrary
[element]; for the contrary is the primary lacking,
which is the criticism of the other. Also, seeing that
the contraries are not in the same [element] and
science has the force of the reason and the soul has
the principle of motion, it is true that the hygienic
produces only health, the calorific only heat, and the
frigorific only cold, then the [reason] of science [has]
both. Indeed, reason swings, yet not identically; for,
it has the principle of motion in soul, thus, from the
same principle, it moves [= swings] in both, fusing
[one] to the opposite. Thereby, by enforceable reason,
enforceable [things] are produced, and without it the
opposite [things]; for reason encompass one
principle.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι [25] τῆ μὲν τοῦ εὖ
δυνάμει ακολουθεῖ ἢ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ
παθεῖν δύναμις, ταύτη δ' ἐκείνη οὐκ ἀεί:
ἀνάγκη γάρ τὸν εὖ ποιῶντα καὶ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ
μόνον ποιῶντα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν.

εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἳ φασι, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί,
ὅταν ἐνεργῆ [30] μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ
ἐνεργῆ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν [31] μὴ
οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀλλὰ
τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομή: ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα
ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. δῆλον γάρ ὅτι οὗτ'
οἰκοδόμος ἔσται ἐὰν μὴ οἰκοδομή (τό γάρ
οἰκοδόμῳ [35] εἶναι τό δυνατῶ εἶναι ἔστιν
οἰκοδομεῖν), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
τεχνῶν. εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχειν
τέχνας μὴ μαθόντα ποτέ καὶ λαβόντα, **1047a**
[1] καὶ μὴ ἔχειν μὴ αποβαλόντα ποτέ (ἢ γάρ
λήθη ἢ πάθει τινί ἢ χρόνῳ: οὐ γάρ δὴ τοῦ γε
πράγματος φθαρέντος, ἀεὶ γάρ ἐστιν), ὅταν
παύσῃται, οὐχ ἔξει τὴν τέχνην, πάλιν δ' εὐθὺς
οἰκοδομήσει πῶς λαβών; καὶ τὰ ἀψυχα δὴ
ὁμοίως: οὔτε γάρ [5] ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμὸν
οὔτε γλυκὺ οὔτε ὄλως αἰσθητὸν οὐθὲν ἔσται
μὴ αἰσθανομένων: ὥστε τὸν Πρωταγόρου
λόγον συμβήσεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν
οὐδ' αἰσθησὶν ἔξει οὐδὲν ἂν μὴ αἰσθάνηται
μηδ' ἐνεργῆ. εἰ οὖν τυφλὸν τό μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν,
πεφυκὸς δὲ καὶ ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ ἐτι ὄν, οἱ αὐτοὶ
[10] τυφλοὶ ἔσονται πολλάκις τῆς ἡμέρας, καὶ
κωφοί.

And, it is also evident that [reason] follows the
[principle] and is well *force-fit* to only exercise or
to endure a force, but the same is not always true
for her [the principle]; for, that which works
something out well must also do it, but that which
only do something does not necessarily work it out
well.

But there are some, e.g., the Megarics (school),
who proclaim that something is enforceable only
when it is acting, but when it is not acting it is not
enforceable; e.g., one who is not building is not
enforceable to build, but one who is building [is]
when one is building – among similar examples. It
is not hard to see how inept these are. For, clearly,
one is not even a builder if one is not building (for,
“to be a builder” is “to be *force-fit* to build”); the
same goes for other arts. So, since it is non-
enforcible to possess these arts [without] never
learning and acquiring them, never possessing and
never having lost them (either by ignoring some, or
[through] time; for, indeed, not by destroying the
object of the [building], since it is forever), [how]
does one, when ceases and not possesses the art,
again immediately builds it; how has one acquired
it? And indeed, it is the same for the soulless
things: for neither cold, nor hot, not the sweet, not
even anything sensible will exist, [if] they are not
being perceived; so, what happens to them is the
reasoning of Protagoras. On the other hand,
nothing has sensibility, if it is not perceiving, and
not acting. So, if a blind that has not the sight but
adapted [to it], and when he adapts, he continues to
be [blind], these blinds still will be [blind] (also a
deaf) all day long.

ἔτι εἰ ἀδύνατον τό ἐστερημένον δυνάμεως, τό μὴ γιγνόμενον ἀδύνατον ἔσται γενέσθαι: τό δ' ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ὁ λέγων ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ψεύσεται (τό γάρ ἀδύνατον τούτο ἐσήμαινεν), ὥστε οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐξαιροῦσι καὶ κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν.[15] ἀεὶ γάρ τό τε ἐστηκὸς ἐστήξεται καὶ τό καθήμενον καθεδεῖται: οὐ γάρ ἀναστήσεται ἂν καθέζηται: ἀδύνατον γάρ ἔσται ἀναστήναι ὃ γε μὴ δύναται ἀναστήναι. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα λέγειν, φανερόν ὅτι δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια ἕτερον ἐστίν (ἐκεῖνοι δ' οἱ λόγοι δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ταὐτὸ [20] ποιοῦσιν, διό καὶ οὐ μικρόν τι ζητοῦσιν ἀναιρεῖν), ὥστε ἐνδέχεται δυνατόν μὲν τι εἶναι μὴ εἶναι δέ, καὶ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι εἶναι δέ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν δυνατόν βαδίζειν ὃν μὴ βαδίζειν, καὶ μὴ βαδίζειν δυνατόν ὃν βαδίζειν. ἐστὶ δὲ δυνατόν τούτο ὧ ἂν ὑπάρξῃ [25] ἢ ἐνέργεια οὗ λέγεται ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ οἷον, εἰ δυνατόν καθῆσθαι καὶ ἐνδέχεται καθῆσθαι, τούτῳ ἂν ὑπάρξῃ τό καθῆσθαι, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον: καὶ εἰ κινήθῃναι ἢ κινήσῃ ἢ στήναι ἢ στήσῃ ἢ εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἢ μὴ γίγνεσθαι, ὁμοίως.

[30] ἐλήλυθε δ' ἢ ἐνέργεια τοῦνομα, ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα: δοκεῖ γάρ ἢ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἢ κινήσις εἶναι, διό καὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν οὐκ ἀποδιδόασιν τό κινεῖσθαι, ἄλλας δὲ τινὰς κατηγορίας,

Moreover, if the one lacking enforceability [remains] non-enforcible, it will be non-enforcible [for something] to happen, for not having come into being; but, one who says that what is non-enforcible to happen either is or will be, is in fallacy (because, this is meant by “non-enforcible”). These reasonings, thus, exclude both *motion* and *production*. For that which stands firm will always stand, and the one which sits will [always] sit; because, one does not ascend if descending – since, it will be non-enforcible for one to ascend if one is not enforcible to ascend. So, if one does not happen to say these, [then] it is clear that *force* and *action* are distinct (but those arguments that make force and action identically one, that which they are trying to exclude is not a small matter). Consequently, it is likely, on the one hand, a thing to be *enforcible* of being, [and yet] not be, and on the other, [a thing] not to be, and yet be *enforcible* of being; and it is also the same in other categories: [a thing is] *enforcible* of walking, [yet] do not walk, and *enforcible* of not walking, [yet] does walk. But, *it* [= a thing] is enforcible, which, if there will be nothing non-enforcible, shows the *action* of which it is said to have the *force*. And I mean, for example, [that] if [something is] enforcible of sitting and admits sitting, so, there will be nothing non-enforcible, in sitting; and, similarly: that being moved, or moving, or standing, or is stood, or being, or becoming, or not being, or not becoming.

But, developing the term *action*, which is well-suited with *expression*, action is particularly [identified] with *motion* and other [things]; for *action* is particularly considered to be *motion*. And, thus, is assigned *movement* to *non-existing* [things]; but some other categories [are also assigned].

οἷον διανοητά καὶ επιθυμητά εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα, [35] κινούμενα δὲ οὐ, τούτο δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ὄντα ἐνεργεῖα ἔσονται ἐνεργεῖα. **1047β** [1] τῶν γὰρ μὴ ὄντων ἓνια δυνάμει ἐστίν: οὐκ ἐστὶ δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐντελεχεῖα ἐστίν.

εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ δυνατόν ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ, φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι δυνατόν μὲν [5] τοδί, οὐκ ἔσται δέ, ὥστε τὰ ἀδύνατα εἶναι ταύτη διαφεύγειν: λέγω δὲ οἷον εἴ τις φαίη δυνατόν τὴν διάμετρον μετρηθῆναι οὐ μόντοι μετρηθήσεσθαι – ὁ μὴ λογιζόμενος τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι – ὅτι οὐθὲν κωλύει δυνατόν τι ὄν εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι μὴ εἶναι μηδ' ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἀνάγκη ἐκ [10] τῶν κειμένων, εἰ καὶ ὑποθοίμεθα εἶναι ἢ γεγονέναι ὃ οὐκ ἐστὶ μὲν δυνατόν δέ, ὅτι οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον: συμβήσεται δὲ γε, τὸ γὰρ μετρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατον.

οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ ταυτό τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον: τὸ γὰρ σε ἐστάναι νῦν ψεῦδος μὲν, οὐκ ἀδύνατον δέ. ἀμα δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι, εἰ [15] τοῦ Α ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὸ Β εἶναι, καὶ δυνατοῦ ὄντος εἶναι τοῦ Α καὶ τὸ Β ἀνάγκη εἶναι δυνατόν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀνάγκη δυνατόν εἶναι, οὐθὲν κωλύει μὴ εἶναι δυνατόν εἶναι. ἐστὼ δὴ τὸ Α δυνατόν. οὐκοῦν ὅτε τὸ Α δυνατόν εἶη εἶναι, εἰ τεθεῖη τὸ Α, οὐθὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι συνέβαινεν: τὸ δὲ γε Β [20] ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ἀλλ' ἦν ἀδύνατον. ἐστὼ δὴ ἀδύνατον.

E.g., the non-being ones are [byproducts] of intellect and desires, but not of *motion*; and it is because, they could be *action*, [but are] non-being *action*. For, out of those that [are] non-being, some is *force*; yet is not [now], because is not [in] *expression*.

Now, if interpreting that *the enforceable* or [the force] is such, [for something] follows from it, it is clear that it is not true to say that such and such is indeed *enforceable*, but will not *be*; then, non-enforceable things [would] be left out. Rather, I mean, [through] assuming a certain thing meant *enforceable*, e.g., to measure the diagonal, even though [it could] not be measured – it [can] not be calculated [for] it is non-enforceable – because, nothing hinders an *enforceable thing* from *being* or *becoming* to not be or never come to be. On the contrary, out of the premises, this necessity follows that if we taught that which is not *to be* or *to become*, but, in fact, it is enforceable, then nothing [would be] non-enforceable; and yet, it happens that the measuring [to be] non-enforceable.

You see, the false and the non-enforceable are not exactly identical; for, [it is] false that you are now standing, but not non-enforceable. At the same time, that is also clear that if as a result of A *being* [real], B must also *be*, then [when] A is indeed enforceable, so B must also be enforceable; for if [something] must not be enforceable, nothing hinders it of not being enforceable. Now, let's A [be] enforceable. Certainly not so long as A is to be enforceable, [when] A is established, no non-enforceable is to happen; yet B must be, though it was non-enforceable. Now, let [B be] non-enforceable.

εἰ δὴ ἀδύνατον [ανάγκη] εἶναι τὸ Β, ἀνάγκη
καὶ τὸ Α εἶναι. ἀλλ' ἦν ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον
ἀδύνατον: καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα. ἂν ἄρα ἦ τὸ Α
δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ Β ἔσται δυνατόν, εἴπερ οὕτως
εἶχον ὥστε τοῦ Α ὄντος ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ Β. ἐὰν
δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων [25] τῶν Α Β μὴ ἦ δυνατόν
τὸ Β οὕτως, οὐδέ τὰ Α Β ἔξει ὡς ἐτέθη: καὶ εἰ
τοῦ Α δυνατοῦ ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὸ Β δυνατόν
εἶναι, εἰ ἐστὶ τὸ Α ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ τὸ Β. τὸ
γὰρ δυνατόν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ Β εἶναι, εἰ τὸ
Α δυνατόν, τοῦτο σημαίνει, ἐὰν ἦ τὸ Α καὶ ὅτε
καὶ ὡς ἦν δυνατόν [30] εἶναι, κάκεινο τότε καὶ
οὕτως εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον.

ἀπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν
μὲν συγγενῶν οἷον τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δὲ ἔθει
οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν, τῶν δὲ μαθήσει οἷον τῆς
τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας
ἔχειν, ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας
[35] καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη.

1048a [1] ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν τί δυνατόν
καὶ ποτέ καὶ πῶς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀνάγκη
προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ
λόγον δύναται κινεῖν καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις
αὐτῶν μετὰ λόγου, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα καὶ αἱ
δυνάμεις ἄλογοι, κάκεινας μὲν ἀνάγκη
ἐν ἐμπύχῳ [5] εἶναι ταύτας δὲ ἐν ἀμφοῖν,
τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας δυνάμεις ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὡς
δύνανται τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν
πλησιάζωσι, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν,
ἐκείνας δ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη: αὗται μὲν γὰρ πάσαι

Now, if B must be non-enforcible, A must also be
so. But, as the former was non-enforcible, so also
the latter. So, if A [is] truly enforcible, B will also
be enforcible; For, if as such they are related, thus,
as a result of A *being* [real], B must *be*. Now, if A
or B are in this way related, B is not so enforcible,
then the A B are not [related] as it has been
explained; and if as a result of A *being enforcible*,
B must *be enforcible*, [then] if A *is*, also B must
be. [Saying] that B is necessarily enforcible if A is
enforcible, it means: if, truly, and indeed, A *is*, and
that, it was enforcible to *be*, then that one [B] must
be and be in that way [enforcible].

But, from the totality of the existing
enforceability: those being inborn (e.g., sensation),
or being acquired (e.g., playing flute), or being
studies (e.g., as in arts), those that are acquired and
learned must, in fact, have been *pre-practiced* [pro-
energé]; however, it is not necessary [so] for those
that are not such and [necessitate] passivity.

Now, seeing that the enforcible [is] enforcible at
this time, in this way and this amount, it must be
present within boundaries; not only there are
enforcible that move *according to* reason, but also
their force [is] *in accompany with* reason. And,
there are also the unreasonable ones [whose] forces
[are] unreasonable. Indeed, the former must be in
ensouled ones; and the latter in both. Then,
necessarily, those of the latter force, whenever the
producing one is enforcible, and the passive one is
brought in close proximity [to it], then one
produces and the other experiences; but, not
necessarily for those of the former [force]: for,
these each

μία ενός ποιητική, ἐκεῖναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἅμα ποιήσει τὰ ἐναντία: τούτο δὲ [10] ἀδύνατον. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερον τι εἶναι τό κύριον: λέγω δὲ τούτο ὀρεξίν ἢ προαίρεσίν. ὁποτέρου γάρ ἂν ὀρέγηται κυρίως, τούτο ποιήσει ὅταν ὡς δύναται ὑπάρχη καὶ πλησιάζῃ τῷ παθητικῷ: ὥστε τό δυνατόν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέγηται οὗ ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, [15] τούτο ποιεῖν: ἔχει δὲ παρόντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὠδὶ ἔχοντος [ποιεῖν]: εἰ δὲ μὴ, ποιεῖν οὐ δυνήσεται (τό γάρ μηθενὸς τῶν ἐξω κωλύοντος προσδιορίζεσθαι οὐθὲν ἐτι δεῖ: τὴν γάρ δύναμιν ἔχει ὡς ἐστὶ δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν, ἐστὶ δ' οὐ πάντως ἀλλ' ἐχόντων πῶς, ἐν οἷς ἀφορισθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἐξω κωλύοντα: [20] ἀφαιρεῖται γάρ ταῦτα τῶν ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσόντων ἕνια): διό οὐδ' ἂν ἅμα βούληται ἢ ἐπιθυμῇ ποιεῖν δύο ἢ τὰ ἐναντία, οὐ ποιήσει: οὐ γάρ οὕτως ἔχει αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν οὐδ' ἐστὶ τοῦ ἅμα ποιεῖν ἢ δύναμις, ἐπεὶ ὧν ἐστὶν οὕτως ποιήσει. [25]

ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς κατὰ κίνησιν λεγομένης δυνάμεως εἴρηται, περὶ ἐνεργείας διορίσωμεν τί τέ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνέργεια καὶ ποῖόν τι. καὶ γάρ τό δυνατόν ἅμα δήλον ἔσται διαιρουσιν, ὅτι οὐ μόνον τούτο λέγομεν δυνατόν ὃ πέφυκε κινεῖν ἄλλο ἢ κινεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ τρόπον τινά, ἀλλὰ [30] καὶ ἑτέρως, διό ζητούντες καὶ περὶ τούτων διήλθομεν.

is the product of one, whereas, those are [the product] of [two] opposites. So, when they produce the opposites, it is violatable [adýnaton]. Thus, there must be some other thing that is dominant; by which I mean desire or preference. For, if one desires dominantly, then it will produce, [providing] when such [that is] enforceable *is* and *remains* in close proximity of the receptive element. For this reason, necessarily, all that is reasonably enforceable, when it desires that which has the force, and as such it has it, it does produce. At the same time, [when] it has [it] – the [element] of receptive is present – in this case, it is capable [éche] to produce; otherwise, it will not be enforceable to produce. (Because nothing from outside hinders it from being determined, nothing binds [it] any longer; for it has the force, so long as it is a force to produce. But this is not [in general], but only it is of those closely associated with *howness*, into which those external [objects] are bounded and will be hindered; for it removes some of these qualifications to the boundaries.) Because, not even if it wills or desires to produce two [things] or the opposite [things] simultaneously, it does not produce them; for, in this manner, it has not their force, nor it is of the force to produce simultaneously; after all it is in such being that it produces.

But, since, it has been mentioned on the said *enforceability* in relation to *motion*, let us straighten out *action*: both *what* action is, and of *what kind* it is. For, while apportioning the [element of] *enforceable*, at the same time, it will be clear that that which we call *enforceable*, not only adapts to move others, or is moved by others, either simply or in its way, but also *differently*; [as during] our inquiry about them we reviewed them.

ἔστι δὴ ἐνέργεια τό ὑπάρχειν τό πρᾶγμα
μη οὕτως ὡσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει: λέγομεν δὲ
δυνάμει οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὄλῃ
τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθεῖη ἄν, καὶ
επιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἂν δυνατός
ἦ θεωρῆσαι: [35] τό δὲ ἐνεργεία. δήλον δ' ἐπὶ
τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τῇ επαγωγῇ ὃ βουλόμεθα
λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντός ὄρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ
τό ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν, ὅτι ὡς τό οικοδομοῦν
πρὸς τό οἰκοδομικόν, **1048β** [1] καὶ τό
ἐγρηγορὸς πρὸς τό καθεῦδον, καὶ τό ὄρων
πρὸς τό μῦον μὲν ὄψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τό
ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, καὶ
τό ἀπειρασμένον πρὸς τό ἀνέργαστον.
ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς [5] θατέρῳ μορίῳ
ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφορισμένη θατέρῳ
δὲ τό δυνατόν.

λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργεία οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως
ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τούτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ
πρὸς τοῦτο, τόδ' ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τόδε: τὰ μὲν
γάρ ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν τὰ δ' ὡς οὐσία
πρὸς τινα ὕλην.

ἄλλως δὲ καὶ τό ἀπειρον [10] καὶ τό
κενόν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, λέγεται δυνάμει καὶ
ἐνεργεία <ἢ> πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων, οἷον τῷ
ὄρωντι καὶ βαδίζοντι καὶ ὀρωμένῳ. ταῦτα μὲν
γάρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀληθεύεσθαι ποτε
(τό μὲν γάρ ὀρώμενον ὅτι ὀρᾶται, τό δὲ ὅτι
ὀρᾶσθαι δυνατόν): τό δ' ἀπειρον οὐχ οὕτω
δυνάμει ἔστιν ὡς [15] ἐνεργεία ἐσόμενον
χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ γνώσει.

Indeed, *action* is the existence of a thing not
as such we say about *force* – as Hermes [the god]
being *force-fit* in the wood, and a half in the whole,
because it [can be] removed; or, one, even not
[being] an observant, is an expert, if one is
enforcible to observe – but as action. But, by
induction corresponding to each one of them, that
which we want to say becomes clear and need not
to seek every definition [individually] but to
comprehend the analogy: as, one that builds to one
[who tends] to build; also, one who is awake to one
[who tends] to sleep; and, one who sees to one
[who], while in fact sees, [tends] to close eyes,
also, as one [that is] separated out of material to the
[one changing] to material; and also, as that which
is completed to [one still] incomplete. And, out of
these differences, let *action* be [defined by] one
separate part, and *enforcible* by the other.

But these are said for the [sake of] analogy, not
that all actions are similar; [it only says] that as such
is in this, the other is in that; this to that as that to the
other. In fact, the same [can be said] as motion to
force, so too, as substance to some material.

In other words, the unbounded, and the
vacuum, and other [things] such as these, are said
to be force-fit and active [comparing] to many
actualities [όν], like, to the observer, to the
walker, and to the observable. In fact, these *are*
simply possible [endéche] without being verified
(for, that which [is] observable is because either
one observes it, or because one is enforcible to
observe it). But the unbounded is not force-fit –
except in knowledge – such that it will be active.

τό γάρ μη ὑπολείπειν τὴν διαίρεσιν
ἀποδίδωσι τό εἶναι δυνάμει ταύτην τὴν
ἐνέργειαν, τό δὲ χωρίζεσθαι οὐ.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἐστὶ πέρας οὐδεμία
τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τό τέλος, οἷον τό
ἰσχυαίνειν ἢ ἰσχυασία [20] αὐτό, αὐτά δὲ
ὅταν ἰσχυαίνη οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν κινήσει, μὴ
υπάρχοντα ὧν ἔνεκα ἢ κινήσεις, οὐκ ἐστὶ
ταῦτα πρᾶξις ἢ οὐ τελεία γε (οὐ γάρ τέλος):
ἀλλ' ἐκείνη <ἦ> ἐνυπάρχει τό τέλος καὶ [ἦ]
πρᾶξις. οἷον ὄρᾳ ἅμα <καὶ ἐώρακε,> καὶ
φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε,> καὶ νοεῖ καὶ
νενόηκεν, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν
[25] οὐδ' ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγίασται: εὖ ζῆ καὶ εὖ
ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν.
εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔδει ἂν ποτε παύεσθαι ὡσπερ ὅταν
ἰσχυαίνη, νῦν δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ζῆ καὶ ἔζηκεν.

τούτων δὴ <δεῖ> τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν,
τὰς δ' ἐνεργείας. πάσα γὰρ κινήσις ἀτελής,
ἰσχυασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις: [30]
αὐταὶ δὴ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γάρ ἅμα
βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ
ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ
κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται, ἀλλ' ἕτερον, καὶ κινεῖ
καὶ κεκίνηκεν: ἐώρακε δὲ καὶ ὄρᾳ ἅμα τό
αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν
τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν [35] λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ
κίνησιν.

That division yields no remaining is enforcible [as
can] this [be shown] in action, but not separate
[from it].

In as much as exercises have limit, [they are]
not the goal, but means to the goal, e.g., dieting to
slim [the body]. But, when dieting, the parts [of the
body] are also in motion – where the motion is not
diet's object – those [parts] are not exercising or at
least [they are] not the ultimate goal (for it is not
the goal); nevertheless, the diet includes both the
goal and the exercise. Like, seeing and have seen;
be minded and have been minded; think and have
though. Whereas, we live well and have lived well
or are happy and been happy; but [it's not true] that
we learn what we have learned or we are healthy
and we are becoming healthy. But, if not, they had
to cease (as in dieting) yet have not as in living
now while have lived.

Indeed, out of these, one has to be called
movement, the other *activity*. For, every motion –
dieting, learning, walking, building – is unended;
indeed, they are *movements* and, with that,
unended. For, walking and has walked, building
and has built, becoming and has become, and being
moved and been moved are not [the same], but
distinct. Being in motion and been in motion are
[distinct], but seeing and seen, or thinking and
thought are not. In fact, as I was saying, the former
is *action*, the latter *motion*.

τό μὲν οὖν ἐνεργεία τί τέ ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖον, ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δήλον ἡμῖν ἐστω. πότε δὲ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἕκαστον καὶ πότε οὐ, διοριστέον: οὐ γὰρ ὁποτεοῦν. **1049a** [1] οἷον ἢ γῆ ἄρ' ἐστὶ δυνάμει ἄνθρωπος; ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὅταν ἤδη γένηται σπέρμα, καὶ οὐδέ τότε ἴσως; ὡσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ὑπὸ ἰατρικῆς ἅπαν ἂν ὑγιασθεῖν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τι ὃ δυνατὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν [5] υγιαίνον δυνάμει. ὅρος δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐντελεχείᾳ γιγνομένου ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν βουληθέντος γίγνηται μηθενὸς κωλύοντος τῶν ἐκτός, ἐκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ ὑγιαζομένῳ, ὅταν μηθὲν κωλύῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ: ομοίως δὲ δυνάμει καὶ οἰκία: εἰ μηθὲν κωλύει τῶν ἐν τούτῳ καὶ τῇ [10] ὕλῃ τοῦ γίνεσθαι οἰκίαν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὃ δεῖ προσγενέσθαι ἢ ἀπογενέσθαι ἢ μεταβαλεῖν, τούτο δυνάμει οἰκία: καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ὅσων ἐξωθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως. καὶ ὅσων δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι, ὅσα μηθενὸς τῶν ἐξωθεν ἐμποδίζοντος ἔσται δι' αὐτοῦ: οἷον τό σπέρμα οὐπω (δεῖ γὰρ [15] ἐν ἄλλῳ <πεσεῖν> καὶ μεταβάλλειν), ὅταν δ' ἤδη διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς ἢ τοιούτον, ἤδη τούτο δυνάμει: ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς δεῖται, ὡσπερ ἢ γῆ οὐπω ἀνδριάς δυνάμει (μεταβαλοῦσα γὰρ ἔσται χαλκός). ἔοικε δὲ ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι οὐ τόδε ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνινον – οἷον τό κιβώτιον οὐ ξύλον ἀλλὰ ξύλινον, [20] οὐδέ τό ξύλον γῆ ἀλλὰ γῆνινον, πάλιν ἢ γῆ εἰ οὕτως μὴ ἄλλο

It may be clear to us that from these, and similar [examples], what and of what kind *activity* is. But, we [must] set a limit as to when each [thing] is enforcible and when it is not; for at a given time it [may] not be. E.g., whether the Earth is enforcible to be mankind? Or, not? At least, perhaps, when they became spore, and perchance not even then. Therefore, just as everything may not be healed by medicine, or by chance, but on the contrary, *that* which is enforcible is enforcible of being healed. And, in fact, the definition of *expression*, by means of speculation, on that which grow from force is ‘when [something] is willed it comes into being, [providing] nothing external hinders it:’ take that one who is recovering and nothing hinders it; similarly [those that are] force-fit for a house, if nothing hinders it – in the material – of becoming a house; i.e., nothing is needed which [should be] added, removed or changed – this [is] force-fit to be a house. Also, it is true, in many other cases where the principle of *becoming* [genése] is external, and those which have *it* without being blocked externally by anything. E.g., the not-yet spore (because it needs to be in another [thing], to fall, and to change). But, when it is already such by means of the principle, it is force-fit; in the former [state] it needs the corresponding principle, just as the earth is not yet force-fit to [be] a statue (but when changed it will be bronze). So, it seems that which we say is not *this* but will [be] *that* – for instance, a box is not wood, but wooden, nor the wood is Earth, but earthen; moreover, the Earth if taken not as the other

ἀλλὰ ἐκείνινον – αἰεὶ ἐκεῖνο δυνάμει ἀπλῶς
τό ὕστερόν ἐστιν. οἷον τὸ κιβώτιον οὐ γήϊνον
οὐδὲ γῆ ἀλλὰ ξύλινον: τοῦτο γάρ δυνάμει
κιβώτιον καὶ ὕλη κιβωτίου αὕτη, ἀπλῶς μὲν
τοῦ ἀπλῶς τουδὶ δὲ τοδὶ τό ξύλον.

εἰ δὲ τί ἐστι πρῶτον [25] ὁ μηκέτι κατ’
ἄλλο λέγεται ἐκείνινον, τοῦτο πρῶτη ὕλη:
οἷον εἰ ἡ γῆ ἀερίνη, ὁ δ’ ἀήρ μὴ πῦρ ἀλλὰ
πῦρινος, τό πῦρ ὕλη πρῶτη οὐ τότε τι οὔσα.
τοῦτω γάρ διαφέρει τό καθ’ οὔ καὶ τό
ὑποκείμενον, τῷ εἶναι τότε τι ἢ μὴ εἶναι: οἷον
τοῖς πάθεσι τό ὑποκείμενον ἄνθρωπος καὶ
[30] σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴ, πάθος δὲ τό μουσικὸν
καὶ λευκόν (λέγεται δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς
ἐγγενομένης ἐκεῖνο οὐ μουσικὴ ἀλλὰ
μουσικὸν, καὶ οὐ λευκότης ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ
λευκόν, οὐδὲ βᾶδισις ἢ κίνησις ἀλλὰ
βαδίζον ἢ κινούμενον, ὡς τό ἐκείνινον):
όσα μὲν οὖν οὔτω, τό ἔσχατον οὐσία: ὅσα
δὲ μὴ [35] οὔτως ἀλλ’ εἶδος τι καὶ τότε τι τό
κατηγορούμενόν, τό ἔσχατον ὕλη καὶ οὐσία
υλική. καὶ ορθῶς δὴ συμβαίνει τό ἐκείνινον
λέγεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὰ πάθη: **1049β**
[1] ἄμφω γάρ ἀόριστα. (πότε μὲν οὖν
λεκτέον δυνάμει καὶ πότε οὔ, εἴρηται.)

ἐπεὶ δὲ τό πρότερον διώριστα ποσαχῶς
λέγεται, [5] φανερόν ὅτι πρότερον
ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως ἐστιν. λέγω δὲ δυνάμεως
οὐ μόνον τῆς ὀρισμένης ἢ λέγεται ἀρχὴ
μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο, ἀλλ’ ὅλως

but as *that* – *it* is always force-fit as such for the
thereafter-one. E.g., a box [is] not earthen, nor out
of earth, but wooden; for it [is] force-fit to be a box
and the material of the box, and *this* wood is as
such *that* [box].

But, if there exists the primary [element], which
is no longer called *that*, this is the primary
material. E.g., If the earth is made of air, and also,
air is not fire, but made of fire, [then] fire is the
primary material; this *it* is not *actuality* [όν]. For,
it differs [to say] *according to it* or *underlying it*,
saying *what-this* is or is not; e.g., the modifications
underlying ‘mankind’ are both ‘body’ and ‘soul’
but [being] ‘musician’ or ‘joyful’ [are] passions
(but one who is born with [talent] of music is not
called ‘music’ but ‘musician;’ and not ‘gayness’
but ‘joyful;’ not [one is] ‘walk’ or ‘motion’ but ‘is
walking’ or ‘is moving’ – just as the [above-
mentioned] *that*). Accordingly, when *it*, as
mentioned, follows [then] the last [substratum is]
substance; just as, when it does not follow [then]
the predicate [is] *mode* – the *what* and the *what-
this* – the last [substratum is] material or substance
of material. It exactly rightly means the *that*,
[which] should be called according to that of
material and the passive [voices], because both are
aorist [tenses]. (Now, we see when one is called
force-fit, and when one is not. Interpolated.)

Now, after separating the prior into several
different layers, it is evident that *action* is prior to
enforceability. And, by *enforceability*, I do not just
mean the limitation, which is said [to be] the
principle of transformation within one or the
other, but in general

πάσης αρχῆς κινητικῆς ἢ στατικῆς. καὶ γάρ ἡ φύσις ἐν ταῦτῳ [γίγνεται: ἐν ταῦτῳ γάρ] γένοι τῇ δυνάμει: ἀρχὴ γάρ κινητικὴ, ἀλλ' [10] οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτό. πάσης δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης προτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ: χρόνῳ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν ὥς, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς οὐ.

τῷ λόγῳ μὲν οὖν ὅτι προτέρα, δῆλον (τῷ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτως δυνατόν, οἷον λέγω οἰκοδομικόν τὸ δυνάμενον οἰκοδομεῖν, [15] καὶ ὁρατικόν τὸ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ὁρατὸν τὸ δυνατόν ὁρᾶσθαι: ὁ δ' αὐτός λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸν λόγον προϋπάρχειν καὶ τὴν γνώσιν τῆς γνώσεως): καὶ δὲ χρόνῳ πρότερον ὧδε: τὸ τῷ εἶδει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργούν πρότερον, ἀριθμῷ δ' οὐ. λέγω δὲ τούτο ὅτι τούδε μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ [20] ἤδη ὄντος κατ' ἐνέργειαν καὶ τοῦ σίτου καὶ τοῦ ὀρώντος πρότερον τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὁρατικόν, ἀδυναμει μὲν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ σίτος καὶ ὀρῶν, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὐπω: ἀλλὰ τούτων πρότερα τῷ χρόνῳ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα ἐγένετο: αἰεὶ γάρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος [25] γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικός ὑπὸ μουσικού, αἰεὶ κινουῦντός τις πρῶτου: τὸ δὲ κινούν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἐστὶν.

εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγοις ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεται ἔκ τινος τι καὶ ὑπὸ τινος, καὶ τούτο τῷ εἶδει τὸ αὐτό. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ [30] ἀδύνατον εἶναι οἰκοδόμον εἶναι μὴ

every principle of motion or of rest. Because, nature also [comes into being in that] which the force does; for it is a principle of motion, yet not in another [thing] but in itself as it[self]. Now, to every of these, action is prior: both in reason and in substance; nevertheless, in time it is so [sometimes] and not so [other times].

That, [action is] prior in reason is evident (firstly, that which is enforcible [is so] because it is capable [endéche] of acting. I mean, for instance, a building-maker is force-fit to build; also, a sighted [person is] to see, and an observer is enforcible to observe. And, the same reason [is true] for other cases; so, it is necessary that the reason or knowledge [of one] pre-exist the knowledge of [the other]). And [action is] prior in time as follows: act is prior in *mode* but not in *numbers*. And, therefore, this [is what] I say that concerning the material, the spore, and the one with sight, which are: one which is force-fit to be, a seed, or, a human, but not-yet-in-action are prior in time to that seeing, seed, or human, which are active; however, these come into being from other active beings, which are prior in time; for, always, that which is active comes out of *a force*, through that which has been active – e.g., human from human, musician from musician; [there is] always some *prime mover*, and a mover is already active.

We have interpreted in [previous] reasonings about the *substance* that everything that comes into being comes *from* and *through* something, which is the same as itself. And it seems, on this account, that it is non-enforcible that one is a builder who

οικοδομήσαντα μηθὲν ἢ κιθαριστὴν
μηθὲν κιθαρίσαντα: ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων
κιθαρίζειν κιθαρίζων μανθάνει κιθαρίζειν,
ομοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. ὅθεν ὁ σοφιστικὸς
ἐλεγχος ἐγίγνετο ὅτι οὐκ ἔχων τις τὴν
ἐπιστήμην ποιήσει οὐδ' ἢ ἐπιστήμη: ὁ γὰρ
μανθάνων οὐκ ἔχει. [35] ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τοῦ
γιγνομένου γεγενῆσθαι τι καὶ τοῦ ὅλως
κινουμένου κεκινήσθαι τι (δήλον δ' ἐν τοῖς
περὶ κινήσεως τούτου) **1050a** [1] καὶ τὸν
μανθάνοντα ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τι τῆς ἐπιστήμης
ἴσως. ἀλλ' οὖν καὶ ταύτη γε δήλον
ὅτι ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ οὕτω προτέρα τῆς
δυνάμεως κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ χρόνον.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσία γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ
τῇ γενέσει [5] ὕστερα τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ
πρότερα (οἶον ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος
σπέρματος: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ
δ' οὐ), καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ
γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα,
τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἔνεκα ἢ γένεσις), τέλος δ' ἢ
ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις [10]
λαμβάνεται. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ὄψιν ἔχωσιν ὀρῶσι τὰ
ζῶα ἀλλ' ὅπως ὀρῶσιν ὄψιν ἔχουσιν, ομοίως
δὲ καὶ οἰκοδομικὴν ἵνα [12] οἰκοδομῶσι καὶ
τὴν θεωρητικὴν ἵνα θεωρῶσιν: ἀλλ' οὐ
θεωροῦσιν ἵνα θεωρητικὴν ἔχωσιν, εἰ μὴ οἱ
μελετῶντες: οὕτοιδε οὐχὶ θεωροῦσιν ἀλλ' ἢ
ὠδὶ, †ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν δέονται θεωρεῖν†.

[15] ἐτι ἢ ὕλη ἐστι δυνάμει ὅτι ἔλθοι ἂν εἰς
τὸ εἶδος: ὅταν δὲ γε ἐνεργείᾳ ἦ, τότε ἐν τῷ

has not built before, nor a harpist [who] has never
played a harp; for one learns to play the harp by
learning how to play it; and comparably the other
[cases]. Consequently, there were the sophists who
argued that those who do not know the science
produce science, because, the learner does not
[need] to know. On the contrary, the *whatness*,
through which one comes into being, has [already]
come into being; and *that* [which] moves as whole
has [already] moved (but this is clarified on the
[reasoning] on motion) and learners, in parallel,
must know *the it* of science. This [argument] also
results in this that at any rate the action is prior to
enforceability in both becoming and time.

[Action is] *in fact*, naturally prior in *substance*,
because, those that are posterior in becoming are
also prior in *mode* and substance (e.g., an adult to a
child, or humans to spores: for, indeed, one already
has the *mode*, while the other has not); and
because, everything that comes into being proceeds
toward a principle and an aim (for, a principle [is]
with regard to it, but the source [is] with regard to
the aim). And the action is the aim [= end], and for
this reason, the force takes hold of [it]. For,
animals do not see in order to have sight, but they
have sight in order to see, and also similarly,
building-ability in order to build, and theorize-
ability in order to theorize, not to theorize in order
to have theorize-ability – except those being
educated; but they do not theorize, they just follow,
†maybe they do not pursue to speculate†.

Moreover, material remains *force-fit*, until it
arrives at its mode; but when it is active, only then
it is in

εἶδει ἐστίν. ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ κίνησις τὸ τέλος, διό ὡσπερ οἱ διδάσκοντες ἐνεργοῦντα ἐπιδείξαντες οἴονται τὸ τέλος ἀποδεδωκέναι, καὶ ἡ φύσις ομοίως. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτω γίνεταί, ὁ [20] Παύσωνος ἔσται Ἑρμῆς: ἀδηλος γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἰ ἐσω ἢ ἐξω, ὡσπερ κάκεῖνος. τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλος, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον, διό καὶ τοῦνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἡ χρῆσις (οἷον ὄψεως ἢ ὄρασις, καὶ οὐθὲν [25] γίνεταί παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως), ἀπ' ἐνίων δὲ γίνεταί τι (οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκίας παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδόμησις), ὁμῶς οὐθὲν ἤττον ἐνθα μὲν τέλος, ἐνθα δὲ μάλλον τέλος τῆς δυνάμεώς ἐστιν: ἡ γὰρ οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, καὶ ἅμα γίνεταί καὶ ἐστὶ τῆ οἰκία.

[30] ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν (οἷον ἢ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ, ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ): ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλο τι ἔργον [35] παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια (οἷον ἢ ὄρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διό καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία: **1050a**[1] ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τίς ἐστίν). Ὡστε φανερόν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργειά ἐστίν. κατὰ τε δὴ τούτον τὸν λόγον φανερόν ὅτι πρότερον τῆ οὐσία ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως, καὶ ὡσπερ

mode. Similarly, in others, and in those which motion, is the aim. Wherefore, just as, those who teach expect they have delivered the aim by putting [students] into exhibiting in action; also, it [is] the same with nature. For if it did not occur as such, [then] it is [the case of] Hermes the Pauson; just as it is *uncertain* to say whether science is 'within' or 'without' in those [students]. For, *acting* is the aim, and *action* is the *acting*; wherefore, the term *action* means *according to the act*, and it leads to *expression*.

Now, seeing that in some [things] the *use* is the *final* [aim] (e.g., for sight, seeing [is the final aim] and from sight nothing else is produced alongside this [seeing]), and in some other [things] *what is produced*, (e.g., from the construction [comes] a house alongside the [act of] building); yet, in neither it is any less or rather [more than] the aim of the force – for the [act of] building is in the things-built, and, once developed, is in the house.

As I was saying, alongside those which the outcome is [other than] use, action is *in* [what] they produce (e.g., the [act of] building [is] in the things being built, or the [act of] weaving in the things being woven, as among other things; and in all, the motion is *in* the moving [object]). But, in many of those that alongside the action nothing [else] acts, the action exists in them (e.g., observation [is] in the observer, and theorizing in the theorist, and life in the soul – and, on that account, happiness, on which life is [all] about). So, it is clear that substance and/or the mode is active.

Now, according to this argument, it is clear that action [is] prior to force in substance. And just as

εἶπομεν, τού χρόνου [5] αἰεὶ προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια
ἐτέρα πρὸ ἐτέρας ἕως τῆς τού αἰεὶ κινουῦντός
πρώτως.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κυριωτέρως: τὰ μὲν γάρ
αἰδία πρότερα τῆ οὐσία τῶν φθαρτῶν, ἐστὶ δ'
οὐθὲν δυνάμει αἰδίων. λόγος δὲ ὅδε: πάσα δύναμις
ἀμα τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστίν: τό μὲν γάρ μὴ
δυνατόν ὑπάρχειν οὐκ [10] ἂν ὑπάρξειεν
οὐθενί, τό δυνατόν δὲ πάν ἐνδέχεται μὴ
ἐνεργεῖν. τό ἀρα δυνατόν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται καὶ
εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι: τό αὐτό ἀρα δυνατόν καὶ εἶναι
καὶ μὴ εἶναι. τὸ δὲ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι ἐνδέχεται μὴ
εἶναι: τό δὲ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι φθαρτόν, ἢ
ἀπλῶς ἢ τούτο αὐτό ὃ λέγεται [15] ἐνδέχεσθαι
μὴ εἶναι, ἢ κατὰ τόπον ἢ κατὰ τό ποσόν ἢ
ποιόν: ἀπλῶς δὲ τό κατ' οὐσίαν. οὐθὲν ἀρα τῶν
ἀφθαρτων ἀπλῶς δυνάμει ἐστίν ἀπλῶς (κατὰ τι
δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον ποιόν ἢ πού): ἐνεργεῖα
ἀρα πάντα: οὐδέ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων (καίτοι
ταῦτα πρώτα: εἰ γάρ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, οὐθὲν ἂν ἦν):
[20] οὐδέ δὴ κίνησις, εἴ τις ἐστίν αἰδίου: οὐδ' εἴ
τι κινούμενον αἰδίων, οὐκ ἐστὶ κατὰ δύναμιν
κινούμενον ἀλλ' ἢ ποθὲν ποί (τούτου δ' ὕλην
οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν), διό αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος
καὶ ἀστρα καὶ ὅλος ὁ ουρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερόν μὴ
ποτε στή, ὃ φοβούνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. οὐδέ
κάμνει τούτο δρώντα: οὐ [25] γάρ περὶ τὴν
δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς
φθαρτοῖς, ἢ κίνησις, ὥστε ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὴν
συνέχειαν τῆς κινήσεως: ἢ γάρ οὐσία ὕλη καὶ
δύναμις οὐσα, οὐκ ἐνέργεια, αἰτία τούτου.
μιμείται δὲ τὰ ἀφθαρτα καὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολῇ
ὄντα, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ. καὶ γάρ

we said, one action always continually catches up
in time from another right back to the prime
mover.

But, truly, most of all, eternal things are indeed
prior in substance to perishing ones, and nothing is
eternally force-fit. The ground of this [argument
is]: [for] every force there is, anytime, an opposite
one; because, in fact, no force exists if nothing has
existed; everything liable [to be] enforcible may
not act. So, that which is liable to be enforcible
may be or not be; accordingly, the same may be
enforcible or may not. That which is not enforcible
is not liable; and has no liability to be mortal,
either solely, or in which it is said to be liable itself
[for] not to be; whether locally, or from within or
from without; or solely in reference to substance.
So, nothing [which is] locally immortal is locally
enforcible (but somewhat nothing – e.g., what or
where – hinders it). So, everything [is] active; no
beings [is] out of necessity. (Except, those priors,
because, if they were not, nothing could be.) Truly
neither motion, if it is eternal, nor that which is
moved eternally, would move according to force,
except in regard to *whence* and *wither*. (And,
nothing hinders the material to exist, thereof). In
addition, the sun, stars, and all [things in] heaven
always act; and neither they will ever be afraid of
the constrains, nor exhausted of going around; for
there is no opposing force in them, as in mortals,
which the continuity of their motion is weary; for,
the cause is their substance, which is material and
force, not an action. And, they resemble the
indestructible things and those beings [which are]
in transitory [state]; e.g., earth and fire. For the

ταῦτα ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ: [30] καθ' αὐτὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι δυνάμεις, ἐξ ὧν διώρισταί, πάσαι τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς εἰσιν: τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ὠδὶ κινεῖν δύναται καὶ μὴ ὠδὶ, ὅσα γε κατὰ λόγον: αἱ δ' ἄλογοι τῶ παρεῖναι καὶ μὴ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἔσσονται αἱ αὐταί.

εἰ ἄρα τινές εἰσι φύσεις [35] τοιαῦται ἢ οὐσίαι οἷας λέγουσιν οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὰς ιδέας, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμον ἂν τι εἶη ἢ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη καὶ κινούμενον ἢ κίνησις: **1051a** [1] ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνέργειαι μᾶλλον, ἐκεῖναι δὲ δυνάμεις τούτων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρότερον ἢ ἐνέργεια καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς, φανερόν.

ὅτι δὲ καὶ βελτίων καὶ τιμιωτέρα τῆς σπουδαίας [5] δυνάμεως ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι λέγεται, ταῦ τὸν ἐστὶ δυνατόν τὰναντία, οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι λεγόμενον ὑγιαίνειν ταῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, καὶ ἅμα: ἢ αὐτὴ γὰρ δύναμις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν, καὶ ἡρεμεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ καταβάλλειν, [10] καὶ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι καὶ καταπίπτειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν δύνασθαι τὰναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχει: τὰ δ' ἐναντία ἅμα ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας δὲ ἅμα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν (οἷον ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τούτων θάτερον εἶναι τὰγαθόν, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι ὁμοίως ἀμφότερον ἢ οὐδέτερον:

latter always act; for they have the motion down along them and in themselves. But, each one of the other forces, as described [above], is [with] opposing one; for, the force that necessitate moving, it may also not necessitate that which [moves] reasonably. And the unreasonable ones will also be present [with] the opposing one, or won't.

So, if [there are] some procedural as such or of some sort of substances, described [by] the so-called Ideas, [then] perhaps there would be more sciences of something than science itself, and more mobility than motion [itself]; for, perhaps, [there will be] more of these action than their counterpart forces of them. As indeed, then, it is clear that action is prior to forces and to every principle of transformation.

As to the next declaration, *action* is both improved and more elementary than the greatest *forces*. For, as many [things] as referred to under *enforceable*, the same is *enforcible* to contrary [determinations]; e.g., [that which is] referred to be enforceable of being healthy, the same is also of being ill, and vice versa; because, the same force [runs] under the health and illness: also [so] of being at rest and in motion, and of building and breaking down, and of being built and forfeited. As I was saying, it is enforceable for the contraries to exist in the same thing and at the same time; but it is non-enforcible for the contraries to be active at the same time and it is non-enforcible to exist (e.g., being healthy and [at the same time,] ill). So, either one or the other must stay put, but what is enforceable may [be] in both or neither,

[15] ἡ ἀρα ἐνέργεια βελτίων.

ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι χεῖρον τῆς δυνάμεως: τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ταῦτὸ ἄμφω τὰναντία. δῆλον ἀρα ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν παρὰ τὰ πράγματα: ὕστερον γὰρ τῆ φύσει τὸ κακὸν τῆς δυνάμεως. οὐκ ἀρα οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς [20] καὶ τοῖς αἰδίοις οὐθὲν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀμάρτημα οὔτε διεφθαρμένον (καὶ γὰρ ἡ διαφθορά τῶν κακῶν ἔστιν).

εὐρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργεία: διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὐρίσκουσιν. εἰ δ' ἦν διηρημένα, φανερά ἂν ἦν: νῦν δ' ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἰ [25] περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι ἴσαι δύο ὀρθαῖς. εἰ οὖν ἀνήκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθύς δῆλον διὰ τί. ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὀρθὴ καθόλου διὰ τί; ἐὰν ἴσαι τρεῖς, ἢ τε βάσις δύο καὶ ἡ ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταθεῖσα ὀρθή, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκείνο εἰδότη. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς [30] ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενα εὐρίσκεται: αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι ἡ νόησις ἐνέργεια: ὥστ' ἐξ ενεργείας ἡ δύναμις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες γινώσκουσιν (ὕστερον γὰρ γενέσει ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ κατ' ἀριθμόν).

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὄν λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν τὸ μὲν κατὰ [35] τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν τούτων ἢ τὰναντία, **1051β** [1] τὸ δὲ [κυριώτατα ὄν] ἀληθές ἢ ψεύδος, τούτο δ' ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων

so that, the action may improve.

But it is necessary, in those that fail, the aim and the action to be more dire than enforceability; for, the same enforceability is that of both contraries. So, at the same time, it is manifested that that which fails is not apart from actuals [práγμα]; because, the [element of] failure is by nature posterior to enforceability. And, at the same time, in those that are eternal and [exist] from the beginning; there is neither failure, nor error, and no destruction (for, destruction is of those that fail).

And, via activity diagrams are found; they are found by means of division. But, if they were [yet] divided, that would have been apparent; but they are now there, enforcible. *Why* two right angles [equate] those [internal angles] of a triangle? Because, the angles about one point equate two right angles. If, then, the [line] next to the side [were] elevated, it would be, at once, clear to imagine the *why*. *Why* in a semicircle [is] really right angle at all? [For] of three equal [lines], the base [divided into] two, upon of [its] middle the third one is placed, is right angle; it [would be] clear to imagine to one who knows it. So, it is clear that those beings that are enforcible are found [when] tried by actions; for the reason that action [is] a thought-process. Thus, the *force* proceeds from an *action*, and through it knowledge is produced (for, numerically, action follows). Now come, 'being' and 'not-being' [which are] concerned partly with the figures of the categories and partly with force or action of these [categories] or their contraries, and yet particularly with their being right or wrong. And in actuals [pragmata],

ἐστὶ τῷ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διηρηθῆσθαι, ὥστε
αληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρημένον οἰόμενος
διηρηθῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι,
ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως [5] ἔχων ἢ τὰ
πράγματα, πότε ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αληθές
λεγόμενον ἢ ψεύδος; τούτο γὰρ σκεπτέον τί
λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἶεσθαι αληθῶς
σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἰ σύ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σέ
εἶναι λευκὸν υμεῖς οἱ φάντες τούτο
ἀληθεύομεν. εἰ δὴ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ σύγκειται καὶ
αδύνατα διαιρεθῆναι, [10] τὰ δ' ἀεὶ διήρηται
καὶ αδύνατα συντεθῆναι, τὰ δ' ἐνδέχεται
τὰναντία, τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἔστι τὸ συγκεῖσθαι
καὶ ἔν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ
συγκεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ πλείω εἶναι: περὶ μὲν οὖν
τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ αὐτὴ γίγνεται ψευδῆς καὶ
αληθῆς δόξα καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, καὶ
ἐνδέχεται ὅτε [15] μὲν ἀληθεύειν ὅτε δὲ
ψεύδεσθαι: περὶ δὲ τὰ αδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐ
γίγνεται ὅτε μὲν αληθές ὅτε δὲ ψεύδος, ἀλλ'
ἀεὶ ταῦτα αληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ.

περὶ δὲ διὰ τὰ ἀσύνθετα τί τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ
εἶναι καὶ τὸ αληθές καὶ τὸ ψεύδος; οὐ γὰρ
ἔστι σύνθετον, ὥστε εἶναι μὲν ὅταν συγκέηται,
μὴ εἶναι δὲ [20] ἐὰν διηρημένον ἦ, ὥσπερ τὸ
λευκὸν <τό> ξύλον ἢ τὸ ἀσύμμετρον [21] τὴν
διάμετρον: οὐδέ τὸ αληθές καὶ τὸ ψεύδος
ομοίως ἐτι ὑπάρξει καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων. ἢ ὥσπερ
οὐδέ τὸ ἀληθές ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ αὐτό, οὕτως
οὐδέ τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ μὲν αληθές ἢ
ψεύδος, τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι αληθές

it is, meantime, [concerned with] being combined
or divided. Thereby, indeed, one who expects that
what is divided is divided, and that what is
combined is combined, he [is] right; but for one
that expects the actuals otherwise, in fact, he [is]
wrong. But when do we say [something] is right or
wrong? Whenever the so-called something [is] in
one's mind. For, it is not that because we expect
you are joyful [then] you are joyful, but because
you are joyful; we consider it as being right. Now,
if, those that are always combined are non-
enforcible to division, and those that are always
divided non-enforcible to combination, and others
that [are] liable to both contraries, then *to be* is
being combined or being one, and *not to be* is not
being combined but manifold. Therefore, about
those liable things, the same expectation and the
same reasoning becomes both wrong and right, and
a liable [may] at one time [be] right, and at another
time [be] wrong. But about those, which are non-
enforcible, to be otherwise; they do not become at
one time right and at another time wrong, but they
[are] always either right or wrong.

And, now, about the non-combinatorics: what
is 'to be' or 'not to be' and right and wrong? For,
combinatory is not such that when combined it is
and when divided it is not; for just as, 'the wood
[is] white,' or 'diametrically asymmetric [is
unmeasurable],' are neither right nor wrong yet –
as in those [previous cases]. So also, 'right' is not
the same for these [cases], neither 'to be.' But, in
fact, right or wrong is: *right* [is] *grasping* and
saying

(οὐ γάρ ταυτὸ κατάφασις [25] καὶ φάσις), τὸ δ' ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν. (ἀπατηθῆναι γάρ περὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός:

ομοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς μὴ συνθετὰς οὐσίας, οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἀπατηθῆναι: καὶ πάσαι εἰσὶν ἐνεργεῖα, οὐ δυνάμει, ἐγίγνοντο γάρ ἂν καὶ ἐφθείροντο, νῦν δὲ τὸ ὄν αὐτὸ οὐ γίγνεται οὐδέ φθείρεται, [30] ἔκ τινος γάρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο: ὅσα δὲ ἐστὶν ὅπερ εἶναι τι καὶ ἐνεργεῖαι, περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπατηθῆναι ἀλλ' ἢ νοεῖν ἢ μὴ: ἀλλὰ τὸ τί ἐστὶ ζητεῖται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιαῦτά ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ):

τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὡς τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ὡς τὸ ψεύδος, ἔν μὲν ἐστὶν, εἰ σύγκειται, ἀληθές, τὸ [35] δ' εἰ μὴ σύγκειται, ψεύδος: τὸ δὲ ἔν, εἴπερ ὄν, οὕτως ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, οὐκ ἐστὶν: **1052a** [1] τὸ δὲ ἀληθές τὸ νοεῖν ταῦτα: τὸ δὲ ψεύδος οὐκ ἐστὶν, οὐδέ ἀπάτη, ἀλλὰ ἀγνοία, οὐχ οἶα ἢ τυφλότης: ἢ μὲν γάρ τυφλότης ἐστίν ὡς ἂν εἰ τὸ νοητικὸν ὅλως μὴ ἔχοι τις.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι περὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων [5] οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπάτη κατὰ τὸ ποτέ, εἴ τις υπολαμβάνει ἀκίνητα. οἷον τὸ τρίγωνον εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλειν οἶεται, οὐκ οἰήσεται ποτέ μὲν δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν ποτέ δὲ οὐ (μεταβάλλοι γάρ ἂν), ἀλλὰ τί μὲν τί δ' οὐ, οἷον ἄρτιον ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον εἶναι μὴθένα, ἢ τινὰς μὲν τινὰς δ' οὐ: ἀριθμῷ δὲ περὶ ἓνα οὐδέ [10] τοῦτο: οὐ γάρ ἐπι τινὰ μὲν τινὰ δὲ οὐ οἰήσεται, ἀλλ' ἀληθεύσει ἢ ψεύσεται ὡς ἀεὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος.

(for word-junk and word-treasure [are] not identical); *ignorance* [is] *not-grasping*. (For, one is not deceived about the *whatness* of something, unless accidentally; also, similarly, one is not deceived about those substances that are not combinatory. And [these] are all active and not force-fit; for otherwise they would be created and annihilated: but, now, Being itself [is] neither created nor annihilated; for it would be created out of something. And, as many as are under whatness and action, one is not deceived about them; but one [simply] either know [them] or not, one may seek what they are, on whether they are or are not).

But, 'to be' as right, and 'not to be' as wrong: If unity is combined, [it is] right, but if not combined, [it is] wrong. And if that unity is actual (όν), it is so, but if not, it is not so. The [element of] right is to know [about] these; there is no wrong nor deception [about them], but only ignorance, like blindness, for blindness is as if one could totally not think of something.

And, evidently, with regard to immovables – providing that one assumes immovables – there is almost never no deception. E.g., If we suppose that the triangle is unalterable, we shall not suppose that when it contains two right angles and when it does not (for it would alter); otherwise, [we may suppose] on the one hand, what, and on the other, what not, e.g., [assuming that] even number is never a prime number, or some are and some are not. But about one number never this [assumption occur], because, we do not suppose some 'are' and some 'are not;' in this case, both right and wrong have always [same value].

¹ δύναμις λέγεται ἢ μὲν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἢ μεταβολῆς ἢ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἢ ἕτερον, οἷον ἢ οἰκοδομικὴ δύναμις ἐστὶν ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, ἀλλ' ἢ ἰατρικὴ δύναμις οὐσα ὑπάρχει ἂν ἐν τῷ ἰατρουμένῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ἰατρεύομενος. ἢ μὲν οὖν ὅλως ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἢ κινήσεως λέγεται δύναμις [20] ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἢ ἕτερον, ἢ δ' ὑφ' ἐτέρου ἢ ἢ ἕτερον (καθ' ἣν γὰρ τό πάσχον πάσχει τι, ὅτε μὲν ἐὰν ὀτιοῦν, δυνατὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι παθεῖν, ὅτε δ' οὐ κατὰ πάν πάθος ἀλλ' ἂν ἐπὶ τό βέλτιον): ἐτι ἢ τοῦ καλῶς τοῦτ' ἐπιτελεῖν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν: ἐνίστε γὰρ τούς μόνον ἂν πορευθέντας ἢ εἰπόντας, μὴ [25] καλῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ ὡς προείλοντο, οὐ φαμεν δύνασθαι λέγειν ἢ βαδίζειν: ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν. ἐτι ὅσαι ἐξείς καθ' ἃς ἀπαθὴ ὅλως ἢ ἀμετάβλητα ἢ μὴ ῥαδίως ἐπὶ τό χεῖρον εὐμετακίνητα, δυνάμεις λέγονται: κλᾶται μὲν γὰρ καὶ συντρίβεται καὶ κάμπτεται καὶ ὅλως φθείρεται οὐ τῷ [30] δύνασθαι ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι καὶ ἐλλείπειν τινός: ἀπαθὴ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἂ μόλις καὶ ἡρέμα πάσχει διὰ δύναμιν καὶ τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ τῷ ἔχειν πῶς.

λεγομένης δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως τοσαυταῶς, καὶ τό δυνατὸν ἓνα μὲν τρόπον λεχθήσεται τό ἔχον κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἢ μεταβολῆς (καὶ γὰρ [35] τό στατικὸν δυνατὸν τι) ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἢ ἕτερον, ἓνα δ' ἐὰν ἔχη τι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο δύναμιν τοιαύτην, **1019β** [1] ἓνα δ' ἐὰν ἔχη μεταβάλλειν ἐφ' ὀτιοῦν δύναμιν, εἴτ' ἐπὶ τό χεῖρον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τό βέλτιον (καὶ γὰρ τό φθειρόμενον δοκεῖ δυνατὸν εἶναι φθειρεσθαι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν φθαρῆναι εἰ ἦν ἀδύνατον: νῦν δὲ ἔχει τινά [5] διάθεσιν καὶ αἰτίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοῦ τοιούτου πάθους: ὅτε μὲν δὴ τῷ ἔχειν τι δοκεῖ, ὅτε δὲ τῷ ἐστερηῆσθαι τοιούτον εἶναι: εἰ δ' ἢ στέρησις ἐστὶν ἐξίς πῶς, πάντα τῷ ἔχειν ἂν εἴη τι, [εἰ δὲ μὴ] ὥστε τῷ τε ἔχειν ἐξίς τινά καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐστὶ δυνατὸν [ὁμωνύμως] καὶ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν τούτου στέρησιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται [10] ἔχειν στέρησιν: <εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὁμωνύμως>): ἓνα δὲ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄλλο ἢ ἢ ἄλλο φθαρτικὴν. ἐτι δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἢ τῷ μόνον ἂν συμβῆναι γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι, ἢ τῷ καλῶς.

¹ Force means the principle of motion or transformation which is either *in* another, or *at* another; e.g., the [act of] building is a force which is not *in* the things built; whereas, the [practice of] medicine is a force which is *in* the one who recovers but is not *with* him or her. Overall, then, force means the principle of transformation or motion *in* another or *at* another, and/or which is *by* another [or] *with* another (for according to which we say one undergoes some changes if and only if that which is enforceable is devised skillfully; but often not during every undergoing, but when improvement is at sight). Always, the welfare of that one [is] accomplished that [is] according to a purpose; for, at times, for those would be go-and-make who [do what they] say. But, not in welfare [of one] that [has] no options – we do not say it is enforceable, meaning that heading to [somewhere]; similarly, one who undergoes [some changes]. Yet, as many undergoing [states] as we have, especially those that do not transform towards worse mobilities, are called *force-fit*. In fact, those [that are] breakable, damageable, bendable, and all those destroyable [things], are not because are enforceable; they are non-enforceable and is absent in some; and their undergoing [is] momentary and slow, for they [have] a force, or [are] enforceable, and in a definite state.

Since, the so-called *enforceability* [is used] in a number of ways, so too [is] *enforcible*. That which has the principle of motion or transformation is *in* another or *at* another – for even that which is static is *enforcible*, yet even if another force as such is over it, or even one would devise a force skillfully to change [it], whether for the worse, or for the better. (For that which has been destroyed seems to be enforceable to be destroyed, which if it were non-enforcible, it would not have been destroyed. But, as it is, it has some moods, causes, and principles to undergo these [changes]. Now, it sometimes supposes of *having it*, and [sometimes] because it is deprived of it. But if privation is somehow a state [that] it has, everything of [such state] will have *it*, yet if it does not, then it is enforceable to have a certain state and principle agreeing to have the privation of this, if it asserts having a privation – otherwise they agree.) Yet in another, [because] the other has no same force or principle which [can] destroy it. Yet again, in all these, because either they only would happen to become, or not become, or they [might be] great.

καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἔνεστιν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις: τὴν μὲν γὰρ δύνασθαί φασι [15] φθέγγεσθαι λύραν, τὴν δ' οὐδέν, ἂν ἢ μὴ εὖφωσος.

ἀδυναμία δὲ ἐστὶ στερήσις δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς οἷα εἴρηται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ τῷ πεφυκότι ἔχειν, ἢ καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν ἤδη ἔχειν: οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἂν φαῖεν ἀδύνατον εἶναι γεννᾶν παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ εὐνοῦχον. ἐτι δὲ καθ' ἑκατέραν [20] δύναμιν ἐστὶν ἀδυναμία ἀντικειμένη, τῇ τε μόνον κινήτικῃ καὶ τῇ καλῶς κινήτικῃ. καὶ ἀδύνατα δὴ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ταύτην λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον, οἷον δυνατόν τε καὶ ἀδύνατον, ἀδύνατον μὲν οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθές (οἷον τὸ τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον εἶναι [25] ἀδύνατον ὅτι ψεύδος τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον οὐ μόνον ἀληθές ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη [ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι]: τὸ ἄρα σύμμετρον οὐ μόνον ψεύδος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ψεύδος): τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τούτῳ, τὸ δυνατόν, ὅταν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον ψεύδος εἶναι, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἄνθρωπον δυνατόν: οὐ [30] γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ καθῆσθαι ψεύδος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δυνατόν ἓνα μὲν τρόπον, ὡσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ψεύδος σημαίνει, ἓνα δὲ τὸ ἀληθές [εἶναι], ἓνα δὲ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀληθές εἶναι.

κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ ἡ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ λέγεται δύναμις. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ δυνατότα οὐ κατὰ δύναμιν: [35] τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα κατὰ δύναμιν πάντα λέγεται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην [μίαν]: [1] αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα λέγεται δυνατότα τῷ τὰ μὲν ἔχειν αὐτῶν ἄλλο τι τοιαύτην δύναμιν τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν τὰ δὲ ὠδὶ ἔχειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα. ὡστε ὁ κύριος ὅρος [5] τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικῆ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο.

For, this force is in them, those soulless, as such, in the [musical] instruments; for, [there is] a saying that a lyre is enforceable to make a sound, but one which is without it, would not [make it] if it does not sound good.

And, non-enforcement is a privation of enforceability, and of such a principle, as described above, either totally, or [because] have adapted it, or already had it when [it was to] adapt it. For, it is not the same to say a child, a man, or a neutered are non-enforcible [to beget]. There is a one-to-one correspondence [between] a force and a non-enforcement; one [corresponding] merely to a motion, the [other] to the well [developed] motion. Now, as those corresponding to non-enforcement are referred to as non-enforcible, yet others [are referred] to another way, such as, enforceable and non-enforcible. Non-enforcible, is, then, that of which the contrary is *necessarily* true (e.g., the symmetry [= measurement] of a diagonal is *non-enforcible*, because this is false, of which the contrary [is] not only true, but also it is *necessarily* asymmetric. Thus, the symmetric [here is] not only false, but necessarily false). And its contrary, i.e., the *enforcible*, is when the contrary is not necessarily false; e.g., a sitting human [is] enforceable; for, of whom not to be seated [is] not necessarily false. Hence, *enforcible* in some examples means (as it was defined) that which is not necessarily false; and in some that which is true; and in others that which asserts to be true.

And, *force*, in geometry, is termed metaphorically. These [senses], though, do not refer to force, they [are] enforceable, and those that do refer to force, all are referred to [its] primary sense; and this [is] the principle of transformation *in* one or *as* one. For, although, those are said 'enforcible,' because either one has such a force over them, or one does not have it, or one has it collectively. Also, it is similar for those [that are] non-enforcible. So, the fundamental premise of the primary enforceability will be a principle of transformation *in* one or *as* one.

περί according	μὲν –	οὖν therefore	τοῦ of	πρῶτος first
ὄντος being	καὶ and	πρὸς to	ὃ which, what	πάσαι all
αἱ ἄλλαι the other	κατηγορίαι categories	τοῦ of	ὄντος Being	ἀναφέρονται led up
εἴρηται it's been said	περὶ about	τῆς οὐσίας the substance	(κατὰ (according to	γάρ for
τὸν the	τῆς οὐσίας of Being	λόγον word	λέγεται says	τᾶλλα [30] the others
ὄντα, Beings	τό the	τε –	ποσόν quantity	καὶ and
τό the	ποιόν quality	καὶ and	τᾶλλα others	τὰ the
οὕτω such	λεγόμενα: called	πάντα always	γάρ for	έξει have been
τὸν the	τῆς οὐσίας of the substance	λόγον, word	ὡσπερ just as	εἶπομεν was said
ἐν in	τοῖς the	πρώτοις first	λόγοις): discussion).	
ἐπεὶ since	δὲ and	λέγεται it's said	τό ὄν the Being	τό the
μὲν according to	τό τί what	ἢ ποιόν quality	ἢ ποσόν, quantity	τό δὲ but the
κατὰ concerning	δύναμιν force	καὶ and	ἐντελέχειαν expression	καὶ and
κατὰ concerning	τό ἔργον, the act	διορίσωμεν clarifying	καὶ also	περὶ about
δυνάμεως [35] enforceability	καὶ and	ἐντελεχείας, expression,	καὶ but	πρῶτον first

περί about	δυνάμεως enforceability	ἢ λέγεται called	μὲν accordingly	μάλιστα certainly
κυρίως, mainly	οὐ μὴν not	χρησιμωτάτη useful	γέ at any rate	ἐστι is
πρὸς toward	ὃ that	βουλόμεθα preferred	νῦν: at this time;	[1]ἐπὶ upon
πλέον beyond	γάρ for	ἐστίν is	ἡ δύναμις the force	καὶ and
ἡ ἐνέργεια the action	τῶν the	μόνον only	λεγομένων sayings	κατὰ about
κίνησιν. motion.	ἀλλ' But	εἰπόντες when said	περὶ about	ταύτης, these,
ἐν in	τοῖς the	περὶ about	τῆς ἐνεργείας the action	διορισμοῖς mentioned
δηλώσομεν clear	καὶ and	περὶ about	τῶν ἄλλων. the others	ὅτι that
μὲν while	οὕτως then	λέγεται[5] meaning	πολλαχῶς many	ἡ δύναμις the force
καὶ and	τό δύνασθαι, the enforceable	διώρισταί mentioned	ἡμῖν we	ἐν in
ἄλλοις: elsewhere	τούτων those	δ' ὅσαι whereas	μὲν nonetheless	ὁμωνύμως homonyms
λέγονται meaning	δυνάμεις force	ἀφείσθωσαν dismissed	(εἶναι (it's	γάρ for
ὁμοιότητι homonymity	τινι by	λέγονται, called	καθάπερ just as	ἐν in
γεωμετρία geometry	καὶ and	δυνατά enforcible	καὶ and	αδύνατα non-enforcible
λέγομεν call	τῷ that one	εἶναι is	πῶς some way	ἢ μὴ εἶναι) or isn't)

ὅσαι as many	δὲ concurrently	πρὸς to	τό αὐτό the same	εἶδος, mode
πάσαι each	αρχαί [10] principles	τινές εἰσι, that sort is	καὶ and	πρὸς to
πρώτην first	μίαν one	λέγονται, called	ἢ the	ἐστὶν is
αρχή principle	μεταβολῆς change	ἐν ἄλλῳ in another	ἢ or	ἢ ἄλλο. one
ἡ the	μὲν with	γάρ for	τοῦ of	παθεῖν be impacted
ἐστὶ is	δύναμις, force	ἡ the	ἐν in	αὐτῷ itself
τῷ that one	πάσχοντι patient	αρχή principle	μεταβολῆς transformation	παθητικῆς passive
ὑπ' ἄλλου by something	ἢ or	ἢ ἄλλο: qua other	ἡ the	δ' ἔξις having
ἀπαθείας insusceptibility	τῆς of the	ἐπὶ to	τὸ χειρὸν deteriorating	καὶ and
φθοράς worsening	τῆς of the	ὑπ' ἄλλου by something	ἢ or	ἢ ἄλλο qua other
ὑπ' αρχῆς [15] by a principle	μεταβλητικῆς. transformation	ἐν in	γάρ for	τούτοις these
ἔνεστι within	πᾶσι all	τοῖς the	ὅροις definition	ὁ the
τῆς πρώτης the first	δυνάμεως enforceability	λόγος. concept.	πάλιν again	δ' αὐταὶ now all
δυνάμεις forces	λέγονται said	ἢ τοῦ either of	μόνον only	ποιῆσαι exercise
ἢ τοῦ or of	παθεῖν endure	ἢ τοῦ or of	καλῶς, well	ὥστε hence

καὶ ἐν as in	τοῖς the	τούτων these	λόγοις concepts	ἐνυπάρχουσί present in
πῶς some way	οἱ the	τῶν προτέρων the previously	δυνάμεων enforceability	λόγοι. concepts
φανερὸν evidently	οὖν consequently	ὅτι ἐστὶ that is	μὲν as	ὡς μία for one
δύναμις force	[20] τοῦ of	ποιεῖν acting	καὶ and	πάσχειν experience it
(δυνατόν (enforcible	γάρ for	ἐστὶ –	καὶ and	τῷ that one
ἔχειν has	αὐτό it	δύναμιν force	τοῦ of	παθεῖν experiencing
καὶ and	τῷ that one	ἄλλο other	ὑπ' αὐτοῦ), on it),	ἐστὶ is
δὲ as	ὡς for	ἄλλη. another.	ἢ the	μὲν with
γάρ for	ἐν in	τῷ that one	πάσχοντι experience	(διὰ (through
γάρ for	τό it	ἔχειν has	τινὰ ἀρχήν, some origin	καὶ εἶναι καὶ as is also
την ὕλην the stuff	ἀρχήν commencing	τινα, some,	πάσχει experiencing	τό πάσχον, the experience
καὶ ἄλλο as one	ὑπ' ἄλλου: upon another:	τό λιπαρὸν the oily one	μὲν [25] γάρ as for	καυστὸν burning
τὸ δ' and the one	ὑπεῖκον shaky	ὠδὶ calls for	θλαστόν, break	ὁμοίως like
δὲ καὶ and as	ἐπὶ on	τῶν ἄλλων), others),	ἢ the	δ' ἐν τῷ and in the one
ποιοῦντι, producing	οἷον as in	τὸ θερμὸν the heat	καὶ ἢ and the	οικοδομική, building

ἢ either	μὲν with	ἐν in	τῷ the one	θερμαντικῷ heat	
ἢ δ' ἐν or as in	τῷ the one	οἰκοδομικῷ: builds;	διό since	ἦ truly	
συμπέφυκεν, inflection point	οὐθὲν no	πάσχει experiences	αὐτό this one	ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ: upon itself	
ἐν in	γάρ for	καὶ οὐκ and not	ἄλλο. another.	καὶ ἡ and the	
ἀδυναμία nonenforcement	καὶ and	τὸ the	ἀδύνατον non-enforcible	ἢ or	τῇ τοιαύτῃ like such
δυνάμει force	ἐναντία contrary	στέρησις lack	ἐστίν, is,	ὥστε therefore	
τοῦ αὐτοῦ of the same	καὶ κατὰ and through	τὸ αὐτό the same thing	πάσα every	δύναμις force	
ἀδυναμία. nonenforcement. – but	ἢ δὲ	στέρησις lacking	λέγεται means	πολλαχῶς: multiple	
καὶ and	γάρ for	τὸ that	μὴ ἔχον not have	καὶ and	
τὸ that	πεφυκὸς grows	ἄν while	μὴ ἔχη, doesn't have	ἢ either	
ὄλως in general	ἢ or	ὅτε when	πέφυκεν, growing	καὶ and	
ἢ ὠδὶ, or hither	οἷον as in	παντελῶς, completely,	ἢ or	κἂν and if	
ὅπως οὖν. in any way.	ἐπ' in	ἐνίων a few	δὲ, and,	ἂν if	
πεφυκότες [35] growing	ἔχειν have	μὴ ἔχη have not	βία, violation	ἐστερηθῆσθαι deprived	
ταῦτα that's what	λέγομεν. we say				

ἐπεὶ δ'	αἱ	μὲν	ἐν τοῖς	ἀψύχοις
since and	the	–	in the	soulless
ἐνυπάρχουσιν	αρχαί	τοιαῦται,	αἱ	δ'
inherent	principles	as these,	the	and
ἐν τοῖς	ἐμψύχοις	καὶ	ἐν ψυχῇ	καὶ
in the	soulish	and	in soul	and
τῆς ψυχῆς	ἐν	τῷ	λόγον	ἔχοντι,
of soul	in	the one	reason	have
[1] δῆλον	ὅτι	καὶ	τῶν δυνάμεων	αἱ
it's clear	that	and	enforceability	the
μὲν	ἔσονται	ἄλογοι	αἱ	δὲ
for	be	without reason	the	and
μετὰ	λόγου:	διὸ	πᾶσαι	αἱ τέχναι
with	reason.	therefore	all	the art
καὶ αἱ	ποιητικαὶ	ἐπιστήμαι	δυνάμεις	εἰσιν:
also the	productive	sciences	force-fit	are
αρχαί	γάρ	μεταβλητικαί	εἰσιν	ἐν ἄλλῳ
principles	for	transformation	are	in one
ἢ	ἢ ἄλλο.	καὶ	αἱ	μὲν [5]
or	the other.	and	the	for
μετὰ	λόγου	πάσαι τῶν	ἐναντίων	αἱ αὐταί,
accompany	reason	all of the	contraries	those,
αἱ	δὲ	ἄλογοι	μία	ένός,
the	but	no-reason	one	only,
οἷον	τό θερμόν	τού	θερμαίνειν	μόνον'
as in	the heat	that of	heating	alone
ἢ	δὲ	ιατρική	νόσου	καὶ ὑγείας.
the	whereas	medicine	disease	and health.
αἴτιον	δὲ ὅτι	λόγος	ἐστὶν	ἡ ἐπιστήμη,
ground	and that	reason	is	the science,

ὁ the	δὲ and	λόγος reason	ὁ αὐτὸς that one	δηλοῖ exposes
τὸ πρᾶγμα the thing	καὶ and	τὴν στέρησιν, the lacking,	πλὴν though	οὐχ not
ὡσαύτως, as itself;	καὶ ἔστιν and is	ὡς as	ἀμφοῖν of both	ἐστι is
δ' ὡς [10] and as	τού of	υπάρχοντος belonging	μᾶλλον, rather	ὥστ' thus
ανάγκη necessary	καὶ and	τὰς τοιαύτας those one	ἐπιστήμας science	εἶναι is
μὲν with	τῶν ἐναντίων, the contraries	εἶναι be	δὲ either	τοῦ of
μὲν with	καθ' αὐτάς to one	τοῦ of	δὲ or	μὴ καθ' αὐτάς: not of one;
καὶ and	γάρ for	ὁ λόγος the reason	τού of	μὲν with
καθ' αὐτὸ of one	τού of	δὲ but	τρόπον in a way	τινά some
κατὰ according to	συμβεβηκός: process:	ἀποφάσει judgment	γάρ for	καὶ and
αποφορά criticism	δηλοῖ exposes	τὸ ἐναντίον: the contrary:	ἢ γάρ the for	στέρησις [15] lacking
ἡ πρώτη the first	τὸ ἐναντίον, the contrary,	αὕτη this	δὲ and	αποφορά criticism
θατέρου. of the other.	ἐπεὶ seeing that	δὲ and	τὰ ἐναντία the contraries	οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται not having
ἐν in	τῷ αὐτῷ, the same one	ἢ δ' the and	ἐπιστήμη science	δύναμις force
τῷ λόγον of the reason	ἔχειν, has	καὶ and	ἡ ψυχὴ the soul	κινήσεως of motion

ἔχει has	αρχήν, principle,	τό the	μὲν it's true	ὑγιεινὸν hygenic
ὑγίειαν health	μόνον only	ποιεῖ produces	καὶ τό and the	θερμαντικὸν calorific
θερμότητα heat	καὶ τό and the	ψυκτικὸν frigorific	ψυχρότητα, cold,	ὁ the [reason]
δ' but	ἐπιστήμων of science	[20] ἄμφω. in both.	λόγος reason	γάρ for
ἐστίν is	ἄμοιρον of double	μὲν, indeed	οὐχ ὁμοίως not identically	δὲ, but;
καὶ and	ἐν ψυχῇ in soul	ἢ the	ἔχει has	κινήσεως of motion
αρχήν: principle,	ὥστε therefore	ἄμφω in both	ἀπὸ from	τῆς αὐτῆς the same
ἀρχῆς principle	κινήσει moves	πρὸς ταὐτὸ to it	συνάψασα: fusing	διό thereby
τὰ the	κατὰ by	λόγον reason	δυνατά enforcible	τοῖς the [things]
ἀνευ without	λόγου reason	δυνατοῖς enforcibles	ποιεῖ produces	τὰναντία: the opposites;
μῆ one	γάρ for	αρχή principle	περιέχεται, encompass	τῷ λόγῳ. of reason.
φανερὸν it's evident	δὲ and	καὶ also	ὅτι [25] that	τῇ to her [principle]
μὲν indeed	τού of him [reason]	εὖ well	δυνάμει force-fit	ακολουθεῖ follows
ἢ or	τού of him [reason]	μόνον only	ποιῆσαι exercise	ἢ or
παθεῖν endure	δύναμις, force,	ταύτη the same thing	δ' but	ἐκείνη that one [she]

οὐκ ἀεί: not always;	ἀνάγκη necessity	γάρ for	τὸν something	εὖ well
ποιοῦντα doing	καὶ also	ποιεῖν, do,	τὸν something	δὲ but
μόνον only	ποιοῦντα doing	οὐκ not	ἀνάγκη necessary	καὶ also
εὖ well	ποιεῖν. do			
εἰσὶ there're	δέ but	τινες some	οἱ those	φασιν, proclaim
οἷον such as	οἱ Μεγαρικοί, the Megarics	ὅταν when	ἐνεργῆ [30] acting	μόνον only
δύνασθαι, enforceable	ὅταν when	δὲ but	μὴ not	ἐνεργῆ acting
οὐ δύνασθαι, not enforceable,	οἷον for instance	τὸν [31] that	μὴ not	οἰκοδομοῦντα building
οὐ δύνασθαι not enforceable	οἰκοδομεῖν, to build,	ἀλλὰ but	τὸν that	οἰκοδομοῦντα building
ὅταν when	οἰκοδομή: are building	ομοίως similarly	δὲ καὶ and also	ἐπὶ in
τῶν ἄλλων. the others.	Οἷς to them	τὰ the	συμβαίνοντα happening	ἄτοπα inept
οὐ χαλεπὸν not hard	ιδεῖν. to see.	Δῆλον Evidently	γάρ for	ὅτι that
οὔτ' not even	οἰκοδόμος builder	ἔσται is	ἐὰν if not	μὴ οἰκοδομή not building
(τό (to	γάρ for	οἰκοδόμῳ builder	[35] εἶναι to be	τό to
δυνατῶ force-fit	εἶναι to be	ἐστιν is	οἰκοδομεῖν), to build),	ομοίως similarly

δὲ καὶ and also	ἐπὶ on	τῶν ἄλλων the other	τεχνῶν. arts.	Εἰ since
οὕτως so	ἀδύνατον non-enforcible	τὰς the	τοιαύτας these	ἔχειν to have
τέχνας arts	μὴ not	μαθόντα learning	ποτέ καὶ never also	λαβόντα, acquiring,
[1] καὶ and	μὴ ἔχειν not having	μὴ not	αποβαλόντα having lost	ποτέ never
(ἢ (either	γάρ –	λήθη ignoring	ἢ or	πάθει passion
τινί some	ἢ or	χρόνῳ: time	οὐ not	γάρ for
δὴ indeed	τοῦ of the [built]	γε even	πράγματος object	φθαρέντος, destruction,
ἀεὶ forever	γάρ since	ἐστίν), is),	ὅταν when	παύσεται, ceases
οὐχ ἔξει not have	τὴν τέχνην, the art,	πάλιν again	δ' εὐθύς and directly	οικοδομήσει builds
πῶς how	λαβόν; acquired?	καὶ and	τὰ ἀψυχα the soulless	δὴ indeed
ομοίως: similarly:	οὔτε not	γάρ [5] for	ψυχρὸν cold	οὔτε not
θερμὸν hot	οὔτε not	γλυκὺ sweet	οὔτε not	ὅλως in general
αισθητὸν sensible	οὐθὲν will not	ἔσται be	μὴ [if] not	αἰσθανομένων: being perceived
ὥστε therefore	τὸν the	Πρωταγόρου of Protagoras	λόγον reasoning	συμβήσεται happening
λέγειν to say	αὐτοῖς. to them.	ἀλλὰ on the other	μὴν hand	οὐδ' nothing

αἰσθησίν sensitivity	ἔξει has	οὐδέν not	ἂν if	μὴ not
αἰσθάνηται perceiving	μηδ' and not	ἐνεργῆ. acting.	Εἰ if	οὕν so
τυφλὸν blind	τό the	μὴ ἔχον not have	ὄψιν, sight,	πεφυκὸς adapted
δὲ καὶ but and	ὅτε when	πέφυκε adapts	καὶ and	ἔτι still
όν, be,	οἱ αὐτοὶ [10] those	τυφλοὶ blinds	ἔσονται will be	πολλάκις many times
τῆς ἡμέρας, of the day;	καὶ also	κωφοί. deaf.		
ἔτι moreover	εἰ if	αδύνατον non-enforcible	τό the one	ἔστερημένον lacking
δυνάμεως, enforceability,	τό the one	μὴ not	γιγνόμενον come into being	αδύνατον non-enforcible
ἔσται will be	γενέσθαι: to happen;	τό δ' the but	αδύνατον non-enforcible	γενέσθαι to happen
ὁ that one	λέγων saying	ἢ εἶναι either is	ἢ ἔσεσθαι or will be	ψεύσεται will falsify
(τό (the	γάρ for	αδύνατον non-enforcible	τούτο this one	ἔσήμαινεν), meant).
ὥστε therefore	οὗτοι these	οἱ λόγοι the reasonings	ἐξαιροῦσι exclude	καὶ both
κίνησιν motion	καὶ and	γένεσιν. production.	[15] ἀεὶ always	γάρ for
τό τε that one and	ἑστηκὸς stands firm	ἑστήξεται will stand	καὶ and	τό καθήμενον that one sits
καθεδεῖται: will sit;	οὐ γάρ not for	ἀναστήσεται ascending	ἂν if	καθέζηται: descending

αδύνατον non-enforcible	γάρ ἔσται for be	ἀναστῆναι ascend	ὁ the one	γε μὴ otherwise not
δύναται enforcible	ἀναστῆναι. ascend.	εἰ If	οὕτως thus	μὴ ἐνδέχεται not assert
ταῦτα these	λέγειν, to say	φανερὸν evidently	ὅτι that	δύναμις force
καὶ and	ἐνέργεια action	ἕτερον distinct	ἐστίν are	(ἐκεῖνοι (those ones
δ' but	οἱ λόγοι the arguments	δύναμιν force	καὶ and	ἐνέργειαν action
ταὐτὸ [20] identically one	ποιοῦσιν, make,	διό wherefore	καὶ and	οὐ μικρὸν not small
τι that thing	ζητοῦσιν seeking	ἀναιρεῖν), to exclude),	ὥστε therefore,	ἐνδέχεται it is likely
δυνατὸν enforcible	μὲν on the one hand	τι thing	εἶναι be	μὴ εἶναι not be
δέ, one the other	καὶ and	δυνατὸν enforcible	μὴ εἶναι not be	εἶναι δέ, be yet,
ὁμοίως similarly	δὲ καὶ and also	ἐπὶ in	τῶν ἄλλων the other	κατηγοριῶν categories:
δυνατὸν enforcible	βαδίζειν walk	ὄν being	μὴ βαδίζειν, not walk,	καὶ and
μὴ βαδίζειν not walk	δυνατὸν forcible	ὄν being	βαδίζειν. walk.	ἐστὶ it's
δὲ but	δυνατὸν forcible	τούτο this one	ἧ which	ἐὰν if
ὑπάρξει there is	[25] ἢ the	ἐνέργεια action	οὗ to which	λέγεται it's said
ἔχειν to have	τὴν the	δύναμιν, force,	οὐθὲν not one	ἔσται will be

ἀδύνατον. non-enforcible.	λέγω I say	δὲ and	οἷον, for example,	εἰ if
δυνατόν enforcible	καθῆσθαι sitting	καὶ and	ενδέχεται asserts	καθῆσθαι, sitting
τούτω so	ἐὰν —	ὑπάρξει there's	τό it	καθῆσθαι, sitting
οὐδέν not one	ἔσται will be	ἀδύνατον: non-enforcible;	καὶ εἰ also that	κινηθῆναι being moved
ἢ κινήσαι or moving	ἢ στῆναι or standing	ἢ στῆσαι or is stood	ἢ εἶναι or being	ἢ γίγνεσθαι or becoming
ἢ μὴ εἶναι or not being	ἢ μὴ γίγνεσθαι, or not becoming	ομοίως. similarly.	[30] ἐλήλυθε been developed	δ' ἢ but the
ἐνέργεια action	τοῦνομα, the name	ἡ the	πρὸς τὴν with the	ἐντελέχειαν expression
συντιθεμένη, well-placed	καὶ ἐπὶ and with	τὰ ἄλλα the others	ἐκ out	τῶν κινήσεων of motion
μάλιστα: particularly;	δοκεῖ considered	γάρ for	ἡ ἐνέργεια the action	μάλιστα particularly
ἡ κίνησις the motion	εἶναι, be,	διό wherefore	καὶ and	τοῖς those
μὴ not	οὔσιν existing	οὐκ not	ἀποδιδόασιν assign	τό the
κινεῖσθαι, movement	ἄλλας other	δέ but	τινας some	κατηγορίας, categories.
οἷον as	διανοητά of intellect	καὶ and	ἐπιθυμητά desires	εἶναι are
τὰ the ones	μὴ not	ὄντα, [35] being	κινούμενα of motion	δὲ οὐ, and not
τούτο this	δὲ and	ὅτι because	οὐκ not	ὄντα being

ἐνεργεῖα action	ἔσσονται they'd be	ἐνεργεῖα. action.	[1] τῶν of the	γὰρ for
μὴ not	ὄντων being	ἕνια some	δυνάμει force-fit	ἐστίν: be;
οὐκ not	ἐστι is	δέ, but,	ὅτι because	οὐκ not
ἐντελεχία expression	ἐστίν. is.			
εἰ δέ if now	ἐστι is	τό such	εἰρημένον interpreting	τό the
δυνατόν enforcible	ἢ or	ακολουθεῖ, goes along with	φανερὸν it's clear	ὅτι οὐκ that not
ενδέχεται asserts	ἀληθές truly	εἶναι be	τό that	εἰπεῖν to say
ὅτι that	δυνατόν enforcible	μὲν [5] indeed	τοδί, such and such	οὐκ ἔσται not will be
δέ, but,	ὥστε then,	τὰ the things	ἀδύνατα non-enforcible	εἶναι to be
ταύτη this which	διαφεύγειν: left out.	λέγω δέ I mean rather	οἷον as	εἶ assuming
τις a certain thing	φαίη mean	δυνατόν enforcible	τὴν the	διάμετρον diagonal
μετρηθῆναι to measure	οὐ not	μέντοι though	μετρηθήσεσθαι be measured	– ὁ – that one
μὴ not	λογιζόμενος calculated	τό the one	ἀδύνατον non-enforcible	εἶναι – be –
ὅτι because	οὐθὲν not one	κωλύει hinders	δυνατόν enforcible	τι thing
ὄν being	εἶναι be	ἢ or	γενέσθαι becoming	μὴ εἶναι not be

μηδ' not ever	ἔσεσθαι. to be.	ἀλλ' on the contrary	εκείνο that one	ανάγκη necessity
ἐκ [10] τῶν out of the	κειμένων, laid down	εἰ καὶ if that	ὑποθοίμεθα teach	εἶναι be
ἢ or	γεγονέναι become	ὁ the one	οὐκ ἔστι not is	μὲν in fact
δυνατόν enforcible	δέ, but,	ὅτι that	οὐθὲν not one	ἔσται is
ἀδύνατον: non-enforcible;	συμβήσεται happening	δέ and	γε, yet,	τό that one
γάρ for	μετρεῖσθαι measuring	ἀδύνατον. non-enforcible.	οὐ not	γάρ you see
δῆ exactly	ἐστι is	ταὐτὸ identical	τό ψεῦδος the false	καὶ τό and the
ἀδύνατον: non-enforcible;	τό that	γάρ for	σε you	ἑστάναι standing
νῦν now	ψεῦδος false	μὲν, –	οὐκ not	ἀδύνατον non-enforcible
δέ. but.	ἀμα At the same time	δὲ that is	δῆλον it's clear	καὶ also
ὅτι, that,	εἰ [15] if	τού out of	A A	ὄντος being
ανάγκη necessary	τό B the B	εἶναι, be,	καὶ also	δυνατού enforcible
ὄντος indeed	εἶναι is	τού A καὶ of A also	τό B the B	ανάγκη εἶναι must be
δυνατόν: enforcible;	εἰ γὰρ μὴ if for not	ανάγκη must	δυνατόν possible	εἶναι, be,
οὐθὲν nothing	κωλύει hinders	μὴ not	εἶναι be	δυνατόν enforcible

εἶναι. be.	ἔστω δὴ τό let it now the	A δυνατόν. A enforceable.	οὐκοῦν certainly not	ὅτε as long as
τὸ A the A	δυνατὸν enforceable	εἶη is	εἶναι, be,	εἰ while
τεθειή established	τό A, the A,	οὐθὲν nothing	ἀδύνατον non-enforceable	εἶναι be
συνέβαιεν: happen;	τό δέ γε the but yet	B [20] εἶναι. B be.	ανάγκη must	ἄλλ' though
ἦν was	ἀδύνατον. non-enforceable.	ἔστω taking	δὴ now	ἀδύνατον. non-enforceable.
εἰ δὴ if now	ἀδύνατον non-enforceable	ανάγκη must	εἶναι be	τό B, ἀνάγκη the B, must
καὶ τό A also the A	εἶναι. ἀλλ' be. But	ἦν ἄρα was as	τὸ πρῶτον the former	ἀδύνατον: non-enforceable;
καὶ also	τὸ δεύτερον the latter	ἄρα. as.	ἂν ἄρα if therefore	ἦ τό A truly the A
δυνατόν, enforceable,	καὶ also	τό B the B	ἔσται will be	δυνατόν, enforceable;
εἴπερ For as	οὕτως so	εἶχον they're related	ὥστε therefore	τοῦ A of A
ὄντος being	ανάγκη must	εἶναι be	τό B. the B.	ἐὰν δὴ If now
οὕτως so	εχόντων being related	[25] τῶν A the A	B μὴ ἦ B not or	δυνατόν enforceable
τό B the B	οὕτως, so,	οὐδέ then not	τὰ A B the A B	ἔξει ὡς has as
ετέθη: been explained;	καὶ and	εἰ τοῦ A if of A	δυνατοῦ enforceable	ὄντος being
ανάγκη must	τό B the B	δυνατόν enforceable	εἶναι, be,	εἰ ἐστὶ τό A if is the A

ανάγκη must	εἶναι be	καὶ τό Β. also the B.	τὸ γὰρ the that	δυνατὸν enforcible
εἶναι be	ἐξ ἀνάγκης out of necessity	τὸ Β the B	εἶναι be	εἰ τὸ Α if the A
δυνατὸν, enforcible,	τοῦτο this	σημαίνει, means:	ἐὰν if	ἧ truly
τό Α καὶ the A and	ὅτε καὶ when and	ὡς ἦν as was	δυνατὸν enforcible	[30] εἶναι, be,
κάκεινο that one [B]	τότε καὶ then and	οὕτως in that way	εἶναι be	ἀναγκαῖον. necessary.
ἅπασῶν totality	δὲ but	τῶν of	δυνάμεων enforceability	οὐσῶν existing
τῶν of	μὲν either	συγγενῶν inborn	οἷον τῶν as of	αἰσθήσεων, sensations,
τῶν δὲ of or	ἔθει acquired	οἷον being	τῆς τοῦ that of	αὐλεῖν, playing flute,
τῶν δὲ of or	μαθήσει studies	οἷον being	τῆς that	τῶν τεχνῶν, of arts,
τὰς the	μὲν in fact	ἀνάγκη must	προενεργήσαντας pre-practiced	ἔχειν, have,
ὅσαι as many as	ἔθει acquired	καὶ and	λόγω, reported,	τὰς the ones
δὲ μὴ but not	τοιαύτας of these	[35] καὶ and	τὰς the ones	ἐπὶ τοῦ upon of
πάσχειν passive	οὐκ ἀνάγκη. not must	[1] ἐπεὶ seeing that	δὲ now	τό δυνατὸν the enforcible
τί thing	δυνατὸν enforcible	καὶ and	ποτέ when	καὶ πῶς and how
καὶ ὅσα and much	ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη but necessity	προσεῖναι be present	ἐν in	τῷ διορισμῷ, the boundaries,

καὶ not only	τὰ μὲν the ones –	κατὰ according to	λόγον reason	δύναται enforcible
κινεῖν to bring about	καὶ but also	αἱ δυνάμεις the force	αυτῶν of them	μετὰ in accompany
λόγου, with reason.	τὰ the ones	δὲ additionally	άλογα unreasonable	καὶ αἱ and the
δυνάμεις forces	άλογοι, unreasoning.	κάκεινας in those	μὲν indeed	ανάγκη must
ἐν ἐμψύχῳ in ensouled	[5] εἶναι be	ταύτας with these	δὲ and	ἐν ἀμφοῖν, in both.
τὰς the ones	μὲν then	τοιαύτας such as these	δυνάμεις force	ανάγκη, necessary
ὅταν whenever	ὡς as	δύναται enforcible	τό ποιητικὸν the one producing	καὶ and
τό παθητικὸν the one passive	πλησιάζωσι, in proximity,	τό μὲν it then	ποιεῖν to produce	τό δὲ it but
πάσχειν, to experience	ἐκείνας that one	δ' οὐκ but not	ανάγκη: necessary.	αὗται these
μὲν γὰρ – for	πᾶσαι each	μία one	ένός is	ποιητική, product,
ἐκεῖναι those ones	δὲ whereas	τῶν ἐναντίων, of opposite.	ὥστε so	άμα when
ποιήσει produce	τὰ ἐναντία: the opposites	τούτο this one	δὲ [10] –	ἀδύνατον. violatable.
ανάγκη must	άρα thus	έτερον other	τι thing	εἶναι be
τό κύριον: the dominant;	λέγω I mean	δὲ τούτο – this	ὀρεξίν ἢ desire or	προαίρεσίν. preference.
ὁποτέρου whichever of	γὰρ ἂν for if	ὀρέγεται desiring	κυρίως, dominantly,	τούτο that one

ποιήσει produces	όταν when	ώς such	δύναται enforcible	υπάρχει there's
καί and	πλησιάζει in proximity	τῷ παθητικῷ: of receptive one.	ώστε for this reason	τό δυνατόν it enforcible
κατά according to	λόγον reason	άπαν all	ανάγκη, necessary	όταν whenever
ορέγεται desiring	οἷ ἔχει which has	τήν δύναμιν the force	καί and	ώς ἔχει, as such has,
[15] τούτο it	ποιεῖν: to produce.	ἔχει it has	δέ at the same time	παρόντος being present
τού the	παθητικού receptive	καί and	ώδι in this case	έχοντος capable
ποιεῖν: to produce;	εἰ δέ μή, if but not,	ποιεῖν οὐ to produce not	δυνήσεται enforceable.	(τό γάρ (the one for
μηθενός none	τῶν έξω of out	κωλύοντος hinder	προσδιορίζεσθαι be determined	οὐθέν nothing
έτι no longer	δεῖ: binds;	τήν the	γάρ because	δύναμιν force
ἔχει it has	ώς so long as	έστι is	δύναμις force	τού of
ποιεῖν, to produce.	έστι is	δ' οὐ but not	πάντως but perhaps	άλλ' but only
εχόντων close associate	πώς, ἐν οἷς how in those	ἀφορισθήσεται bounded	καί τὰ and the ones	έξω of out
κωλύοντα: [20] hindered	αφαιρείται it removes	γάρ ταύτα for these	τῶν ἐν τῷ from in the	διορισμῶ boundaries
προσόντων of qualifications	ἔνια): some.)	διό Because	οὐδ' not even	ἐάν if
άμα at the same time	βούληται wish	ἢ ἐπιθυμῆ or desire	ποιεῖν to produce	δύο ἢ two or

τὰ ἐναντία, the opposites	οὐ ποιήσει: not produces;	οὐ γάρ not for	οὕτως in this way	έχει αὐτῶν has of them
τὴν δύναμιν the force	οὐδ' ἐστὶ τοῦ ἅμα nor if of simultaneously		ποιεῖν to produce	ἡ δύναμις, the force
ἐπεὶ after all	ὧν ἐστίν being is	οὕτως in such	ποιήσει.[25] produces.	ἐπεὶ δὲ since but
περὶ on	τῆς the one	κατὰ in relation to	κίνησιν motion	λεγομένης saying
δυνάμεως enforceability	εἴρηται, it's been said	περὶ with regard to	ενεργείας action	διορίσωμεν clarifying:
τί what	τέ ἐστὶν both is	ἡ ἐνέργεια the action	καὶ and	ποῖόν what kind
τι. what.	καὶ γάρ and for	τό the one	δυνατόν enforcible	ἅμα at the same time
δῆλον clear	ἔσται will be	διαιροῦσιν, apportioning	ὅτι that	οὐ μόνον not only
τούτο this	λέγομεν we say	δυνατόν enforcible	ὁ the one	πέφυκε adapts
κινεῖν to move	ἄλλο other	ἢ κινεῖσθαι or is moved	ὑπ' ἄλλου by other	ἢ απλῶς or simply
ἢ τὸν τρόπον or in a way	τινά, its,	ἀλλὰ but	[30] καὶ also	ἑτέρως, differently
διό because	ζητούντες inquiring	καὶ περὶ and about	τούτων these	διήλθομεν. we reviewed.
ἐστὶ is	δὴ indeed	ἐνέργεια action	τό the	ὑπάρχειν existence
τό it	πᾶγμα thing	μὴ οὕτως not so	ὡσπερ just as	λέγομεν we say
δυνάμει: force,	λέγομεν we say	δὲ but	δυνάμει force-fit	οἷον ἐν being in

τῷ ξύλῳ the wood	Ἑρμῆν Hermes	καὶ ἐν and in	τῇ the	ὅλη whole
τὴν the	ἡμίσειαν, half	ὅτι because	ἀφαιρεθείη removed	ἂν, if,
καὶ and	ἐπιστήμονα expert	καὶ τὸν μὴ also the not	θεωροῦντα, observant	ἂν if
δυνατός enforcible	ἧ θεωρῆσαι: is to observe	[35] τό δὲ it but	ἐνεργεία. action.	δήλον it's clear
δ' but	ἐπὶ τῶν upon them	καθ' ἕκαστα according to each	τῇ of the	επαγωγή induction
ὃ which	βουλόμεθα we want	λέγειν, to say,	καὶ οὐ and not	δεῖ need
παντός all	ὄρον definition	ζητεῖν seek	ἀλλὰ but	καὶ τό – the
ἀνάλογον analogy	συνορᾶν, to comprehend	ὅτι ὡς τό that as that one	οικοδομοῦν building	πρὸς τό toward the
οἰκοδομικόν, building;	[1] καὶ also	τό ἐγρηγορὸς the awoken one	πρὸς τό toward the one	καθεῦδον, sleeping;
καὶ also	τό ὁρῶν the one sees	πρὸς τό toward the one	μῦον closed eyes	μὲν in fact
ὄψιν δὲ seeing but	έχον, have;	καὶ τό and the one	ἀποκεκριμένον separated	ἐκ τῆς ὕλης of the materials
πρὸς toward	τὴν ὕλην, the material;	καὶ τό and the one	ἀπειργασμένον complete	πρὸς τό toward the
ἀνέργαστον. incomplete.	ταύτης of these	δὲ τῆς but the	διαφορᾶς differences	[5] θατέρῳ separate
μορίῳ part	έστω be	ἢ ἐνέργεια the action	ἀφωρισμένη aparted	θατέρῳ separate
δὲ τό and the	δυνατόν. enforcible.	λέγεται said	δὲ but	ἐνεργεία action

οὐ πάντα not all	ομοίως of the same	ἀλλ' ἢ but for	τῷ the	ἀνάλογον, analogy,
ὡς as	τούτο this	ἐν τούτῳ in that	ἢ πρὸς or toward	τοῦτο, the other.
τόδ' this	ἐν in	τῷδε that	ἢ πρὸς or toward	τόδε: that.
τὰ those	μὲν γάρ indeed –	ὡς as such	κίνησις motion	πρὸς toward
δύναμιν force	τὰ δ' those things	ὡς as such	οὐσία substance	πρὸς toward
τινα some	ύλην. material.			
ἄλλως δὲ in other words	καὶ τό – the	ἄπειρον unboundary	[10] καὶ τό and the	κενόν, vacuum
καὶ ὅσα and other	τοιαῦτα, like these	λέγεται are said	δυνάμει force-fit	καὶ and
ἐνεργεία active	ἢ πολλοῖς or many	τῶν ὄντων, of actualities,	οἷον as in	τῷ of
ὀρῶντι observer	καὶ and	βαδίζοντι walker	καὶ and	ὀρωμένῳ. observable.
ταῦτα these	μὲν γάρ indeed –	ἐνδέχεται are possible	καὶ –	απλῶς simply
ἀληθεύεσθαι been verified	ποτε without	(τό (it	μὲν γάρ either for	ὀρώμενον observable
ὅτι because	ὀρᾶται, observes	τό δὲ it or	ὅτι because	ὀρᾶσθαι to observe
δυνατόν): enforcible);	τό δ' the one but	ἄπειρον unbounded	οὐχ not	οὕτω in that
δυνάμει force-fit	ἐστίν is	ὡς [15] as	ἐνεργεία active	ἐσόμενον will be

χωριστόν, divisible,	ἀλλὰ only	γνώσει. in knowledge.	τό γάρ that –	μη ὑπολείπειν no remaining
τὴν διαίρεσιν of division	ἀποδίδωσι yields	τό εἶναι that is	δυνάμει enforcible	ταύτην to this
τὴν ἐνέργειαν, the action	τό δὲ that one but	χωρίζεσθαι οὐ. separate not.		
ἐπεὶ δὲ In as much as	τῶν πράξεων of exercises	ὧν ἐστὶ of it is (are)	πέρας limit	οὐδεμία not any
τέλος goal	ἀλλὰ but	τῶν περί companions to	τό τέλος, the goal,	οἷον like
τό –	ισχναίνειν to slim	ἢ ἰσχνασία the diet	[20] αὐτό, –	αὐτά δὲ those but
ὅταν when	ισχναίνειν dieting	οὕτως so	ἐστίν is	ἐν κινήσει, in motion,
μη ὑπάρχοντα there aren't	ὧν of it	ἐνεκα object	ἢ κίνησις, the motion	οὐκ ἐστὶ not is
ταῦτα those	πρᾶξις exercise	ἢ οὐ or not	τελεία ultimate goal	γε at least
(οὐ γάρ τέλος): (not for goal):	ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνη but that one	ἣ which	εὐπάρχει includes	τό τέλος the goal
καὶ and	ἢ πρᾶξις. the exercise.	οἷον like	ὁρᾶ seeing	ἀμα but
καὶ ἐώρακε, also seen	καὶ φρονεῖ also be minded	καὶ πεφρόνηκε, – been minded	καὶ νοεῖ and think	καὶ νενόηκεν, also thought,
ἀλλ' but	οὐ μανθάνει not learn	καὶ μεμάθηκεν and learned	[25] οὐδ' or not	ὑγιάζεται καὶ be healthy &
ὑγίασται: becomi' healthy	εὖ ζῆ καὶ live well &	εὖ ἔζηκεν ve lived well	ἀμα, however	καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ – be happy
καὶ and	εὐδαιμόνηκεν. been happy.	εἰ δὲ μή, if yet not,	ἔδει had to	ἄν ποτε if ever

παύεσθαι ceased	ὡπερ as	ὅταν when	ισχναίνη, dieting,	νῦν now
δ' οὐ, and not	ἀλλὰ ζῆ but live	καὶ ἔζηκεν. and 've lived	τούτων out of those	δὴ δεῖ indeed have to
τὰς the one	μὲν –	κινήσεις movement	λέγειν, called	τὰς δ' the other
ενεργείας. activity.	πάσα γὰρ every for	κίνησις motion	ατελής, unended,	ισχνασία dieting
μάθησις learning	βάδισις walking	οικοδόμησις: building;	[30] αὐταὶ these	δὴ indeed
κινήσεις, movements	καὶ ατελείς and unended	γε. with that.	οὐ γὰρ ἅμα not for but	βαδίζει καὶ walking and
βεβάδικεν, has walked	οὐδ' and not	οικοδομεῖ καὶ building and	ᾠκοδόμηκεν, has built	οὐδὲ and not
γίγνεται καὶ is becoming and	γέγονεν ἢ has become or	κινεῖται being moved	καὶ κεκίνηται, & been moved	ἀλλ' ἕτερον, but distinct
καὶ κινεῖ καὶ & in motion &	κεκίνηκεν: was in motion	ἑώρακε seen	δὲ καὶ but also	ὁρᾷ seeing
ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, but that one,	καὶ νοεῖ and think	καὶ νενόηκεν. also thought.	τὴν μὲν the one –	οὖν then
τοιαύτην former	ἐνέργειαν action	[35] λέγω, say	ἐκείνην δὲ the latter –	κίνησιν. motion.
τὸ μὲν the thing but	οὖν then	ἐνεργεία action	τί τέ what both	ἔστι is
καὶ and	ποῖον, what kind	ἐκ τούτων καὶ of these and	τῶν τοιούτων of similars	δήλον it's clear
ἡμῖν us	ἔστω. be.	πότε δὲ when but	δυνάμει enforcible	ἔστιν is
ἕκαστον each	καὶ πότε οὐ, and when not	διοριστέον: setting limit	οὐ γὰρ not for	ὅποτεοῦν. at any time.

[1] οἷον ἡ γῆ as the earth	ἄρ' ἐστὶ whether is	δυνάμει enforcible	ἄνθρωπος; mankind?	ἢ οὐ, or not?
ἀλλὰ μάλλον at least, perhaps	ὅταν when	ἤδη already	γένηται became	σπέρμα, spore,
καὶ οὐδέ and not	τότε then	ἴσως; perhaps.	ὡσπερ just as	οὖν therefore
οὐδ' and not	ὑπὸ by	ιατρικῆς medicine	ἅπαν everything	ἂν if
ὑγιασθεῖη healed	οὐδ' and not	ἀπὸ from	τύχης, chance,	ἀλλ' on the contrary
ἐστὶ τι ὃ is that which	δυνατόν enforcible	ἐστὶ, is,	καὶ and	τοῦτ' that one
ἐστὶν [5] is	υγιαίνον healed	δυνάμει. enforcible.	ὅρος definition	δὲ τοῦ And of the
μὲν ἀπὸ in fact from	διανοίας speculation	ἐντελεχείᾳ expression	γιγνομένου grow	ἐκ τοῦ out of the
δυνάμει force	ὄντος, and is,	ὅταν when	βουληθέντος willed	γίγνηται become
μηθενὸς no one	κωλύοντος hinder	τῶν of	εκτός, outside,	ἐκεῖ that one
δ' ἐν τῷ – in the	ὑγιαζομένῳ, recovering	ὅταν when	μηθὲν nothing	κωλύη hinder
τῶν of	ἐν αὐτῷ: in him;	ομοίως δὲ similarly	δυνάμει ability	καὶ οἰκία: – house
εἰ μηθὲν if nothing	κωλύει hinders	τῶν of	ἐν τούτῳ in it	καὶ and
τῇ [10] ὕλῃ the material	τοῦ of	γίγνεσθαι becomes	οἰκίαν, house,	οὐδ' nothing
ἔστιν ὃ is which	δεῖ need	προσγενέσθαι added	ἢ ἀπογενέσθαι or subtracted	ἢ μεταβαλεῖν, or changed,

τούτο this one	δυνάμει can [be]	οικία: a house;	καὶ ἐπὶ also in	τῶν ἄλλων the others
ὡσαύτως as these	ὄσων many	ἐξῶθεν externally	ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς the principle of	γενέσεως. becoming.
καὶ ὄσων and many	δὴ the	ἐν αὐτῷ in this	τῷ of	ἔχοντι, have
ὅσα as many	μηθενὸς none	τῶν of the	ἐξῶθεν externally	ἐμποδιζοντος blocking
ἔσται will be	δι' αὐτοῦ: by means of it	οἶον like	τό σπέρμα the spore	οὔπω not yet
(δεῖ (needs	γάρ [15] for	ἐν ἄλλῳ in other	πεσεῖν καὶ to undergo and	μεταβάλλειν), to change).
ὅταν when	δ' ἤδη but already	διὰ τῆς by means of the	αὐτοῦ that one	ἀρχῆς principle
ἢ τοιούτον, is as such	ἤδη already	τούτο this	δυνάμει: force-fit;	ἐκεῖνο δὲ in former but
ετέρας corresponding	ἀρχῆς of principle	δεῖται, in need,	ὡσπερ just as	ἡ γῆ the earth
οὔπω not yet	ἀνδριάς statue	δυνάμει force-fit	(μεταβαλοῦσα (changing	γάρ ἔσται but will be
χαλκός). bronze).	ἔοικε so it seems	δὲ ὃ – that which	λέγομεν we call	εἶναι οὐ is not
τόδε on this	ἀλλ' but	ἐκεῖνινον – that	οἶον like	τό the
κιβώτιον box	οὐ ξύλον not wood	ἀλλὰ but	ξύλινον, wooden	[20] οὐδέ nor
τό ξύλον the wood	γῆ earth	ἀλλὰ but	γῆϊνον, earthen,	πάλιν again
ἡ γῆ the earth	εἰ οὕτως if taken	μη ἄλλο not other	ἀλλὰ but	ἐκεῖνινον – that

ἀεί always	εκείνο that one	δυνάμει force-fit	απλώς as such	τό the
ὑστερόν latter one	ἐστίν. is.	οἶον as	τὸ κιβώτιον the box	οὐ γήϊνον not earthen
οὐδὲ γῆ nor Earth	ἀλλὰ but	ξύλινον: wooden;	τοῦτο this one	γάρ for
δυνάμει force-fit	κιβώτιον a box	καὶ ὕλη and material	κιβωτίου of box	αὕτη, this one,
απλώς such	μὲν —	τού of [it]	απλώς such	τουδὶ this
δὲ and	τοδί this	τό ξύλον. the wood.		
εἰ δέ if but	τί ἐστι it is	πρῶτον the primary	[25] ὃ which	μηκέτι no longer
κατ' according to	ἄλλο other	λέγεται called	ἐκεῖννον, that	τούτο this one
πρώτη primary	ὕλη: material.	οἶον as	εἰ ἡ γῆ if the earth	ἀερίνη, of air
ὁ δ' that and	αἴρ air	μὴ πῦρ not fire	ἀλλὰ however	πύρινος, of fire,
τό πῦρ the fire	ὕλη material	πρώτη primary	οὐ τόδε not this	τι οὐσα. it actuality.
τούτω to it	γάρ for	διαφέρει τό differ that	καθ' οὗ according to it	καὶ τό and that
ὑποκείμενον, underlying it	τῷ saying which	εἶναι is	τόδε τι what-this	ἢ or
μὴ εἶναι: not is;	οἶον like,	τοῖς the	πάθεισι modifications	τό ὑποκείμενον underlying
ἄνθρωπος mankind	καὶ [30] both	σῶμα καὶ body and	ψυχῇ, soul,	πάθος passion

δὲ but	τό μουσικόν the musician	καὶ λευκόν and joyful	(λέγεται (called	δὲ τῆς but of the
μουσικῆς music	ἐγγενομένης is born	ἐκεῖνο that one	οὐ μουσική not music	ἀλλὰ but
μουσικόν, musician	καὶ οὐ and not	λευκότης joyiness	ὁ ἄνθρωπος the mankind	ἀλλὰ but
λευκόν, joyful,	οὐδέ not even	βάδις walk	ἢ κίνησις or motion	ἀλλὰ but
βαδίζον walking	ἢ κινούμενον, or moving,	ὡς τό as the	ἐκεῖνιν): that).	ὅσα μὲν as accordingly
οὖν as mentioned	οὕτω, it follows that	τό ἔσχατον the last one	ουσία: substance;	ὅσα δὲ just as and
μὴ [35] not	οὕτως it follows	ἀλλ' but	εἶδος mode	τι καὶ what and
τόδε τι τό what-this the	κατηγορούμενον, predicate	τό ἔσχατον the last one	ύλη καὶ material and	ουσία essence
υλική. of material.	καὶ and	ορθῶς rightly	δὴ exactly	συμβαίνει means
τό ἐκεῖνιν the that	λέγεσθαι is called	κατά according to	τὴν ύλην of material	καὶ and
τὰ πάθη: the passives	[1] ἄμφω γάρ both for	ἀόριστα. aorists.	πότε when	μὲν now
οὖν in fact	λεκτέον be called	δυνάμει force-fit	καὶ πότε οὐ, and when not,	εἴρηται. inserted.
ἐπεὶ δὲ after now	τό πρότερον the prior	διώριστα set limit to	ποσαχῶς different ways	λέγεται, it's said
[5]φανερὸν it's obvious	ὅτι that	πρότερον prior	ἐνέργεια action	δυνάμεως enforceability
ἐστίν. is.	λέγω δὲ I say and	δυνάμεως enforceability	οὐ μόνον not just	τῆς ὀρισμένης the limitation

ἣ λέγεται which said	αρχή principle	μεταβλητική transformation	ἐν ἄλλῳ in other	ἢ ἢ ἄλλο, or that another
ἀλλ' but	ὄλως generally	πάσης every	αρχῆς principle	κινητικῆς of motion
ἢ στατικής. or of rest.	καὶ γάρ also for	ἡ φύσις the nature	ἐν ταύτῳ in that	γίνεται: comes in being
ἐν ταύτῳ into being	γάρ –	γένοι comes	τῇ δυνάμει: the force;	αρχή principle
γάρ for	κινητική, motion	ἀλλ' but	[10] οὐκ not	ἐν ἄλλῳ in other
ἀλλ' but	ἐν αὐτῷ in it	ἢ αὐτό. by it.	πάσης of every	δὴ now
τῆς τοιαύτης of these	προτέρα prior	ἐστίν is	ἡ ἐνέργεια the action	καὶ λόγῳ both reason
καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ: and substance;	χρόνῳ in time	δ' ἐστὶ μὲν ὥς, but is – so,	ἐστὶ δὲ is –	ὥς οὐ. so not.
τῷ λόγῳ to reason	μὲν οὖν ὅτι – while that	προτέρα, prior	δήλον evident	(τῷ γὰρ (of for
ἐνδέχασθαι it's capable	ἐνεργῆσαι of acting	δυνατόν enforcible	ἐστὶ τό is the	πρώτῳ first
δυνατόν, enforcible,	οἷον like	λέγω I say	οικοδομικόν building-maker	τό δυνάμενον force-fit
οικοδομεῖν, to build	[15] καὶ and	ὀρατικόν sighted one	τό ὀρᾶν, to see	καὶ ὀρατὸν and observer
τὸ δυνατόν enforcible	ὀρᾶσθαι: to observe.	ὁ δ' the and	αὐτός same	λόγος reason
καὶ ἐπὶ also upon	τῶν ἄλλων, the others	ὥστ' such that	ανάγκη necessary	τὸν λόγον the reason
προϋπάρχειν to pre-exist	καὶ and	τὴν γνώσιν the knowledge	τῆς γνώσεως): of knowledge).	δὲ and

χρόνω time	πρότερον prior	ὧδε: as follows:	τό τῷ the in the	εἶδει mode
τό αὐτό this one	ενεργούν act	πρότερον, prior,	αριθμῶ numbers	δ' οὐ. but not.
λέγω δὲ I say and	τούτο ὅτι this that	τούδε thus	μὲν τοῦ – concerning	ανθρώπου mankind
τοῦ [20] whose	ἤδη already	ὄντος being	κατ' ἐνέργειαν acc. to action	καὶ τοῦ σίτου and concer. seed
καὶ τοῦ and concerning	ὁρῶντος seeing	πρότερον prior	τῷ χρόνῳ in time	ἡ ὕλη καὶ the material and
τό σπέρμα the spore	καὶ τό ὁρατικόν, and the sighted	ἃ δυνάμει which force-fit	μὲν ἐστίν but is	ἄνθρωπος mankind
καὶ σίτος and seed	καὶ ὁρῶν, and was seeing	ἐνεργεία active	δ' οὐπω: but not yet.	ἀλλὰ however
τούτων concer. those	πρότερα prior	τῷ χρόνῳ in time	ἕτερα other	ὄντα beings
ἐνεργεία active	ἐξ ὧν of which	ταῦτα these	ἐγένετο: come into being	ἀεὶ γάρ always for
ἐκ τοῦ out of	δυνάμει force	ὄντος [25] being	γίγνεται comes	τό ἐνεργεία that action
ὄν which	ὑπὸ through	ἐνεργεία active	ὄντος, been,	οἷον e.g.,
ἄνθρωπος human	ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, from mankind	μουσικός musician	ὑπὸ μουσικού, by music-know	ἀεὶ always
κινουῦντός mover	τινος some	πρώτου: prime	τό δὲ κινούν that and mover	ἐνεργεία active
ἤδη already	ἐστίν. is.			
εἴρηται interpreted	δὲ ἐν τοῖς – in the	περὶ τῆς οὐσίας on the substance	λόγοις reasoning	ὅτι πᾶν that everything

τό γιγνόμενον that becomes	γίγνεται comes	ἔκ τινος of some	τι καὶ thing and	ὑπὸ τινος, through some,
καὶ τοῦτο and that one	τῷ εἶδει the something	τό αὐτό. with itself.	διό καὶ wherefore and	δοκεῖ [30] seems
ἀδύνατον non-enforcible	εἶναι is	οἰκοδόμον builder	εἶναι μὴ is not	οἰκοδομήσαντα built before
μηθὲν nor	ἢ κιθαριστὴν the harpist	μηθὲν never	κιθαρίσαντα: played a harp;	ὁ γάρ the one for
μανθάνων learns	κιθαρίζειν to play harp	κιθαρίζων by harping	μανθάνει learning	κιθαρίζειν, to harp,
ομοίως similarly	δὲ and	καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. also other ones.	ὅθεν consequently	ὁ σοφιστικὸς the sophists
ἐλεγγος refutation	ἐγίνετο there were	ὅτι οὐκ ἔχων that not know	τις that	τὴν ἐπιστήμην the science
ποιήσει produces	οὐ ἢ ἐπιστήμη: not the science;	ὁ γάρ the one for	μανθάνων learner	οὐκ ἔχει. not know.
[35] ἀλλὰ on the contrary	διὰ τό through that of	τοῦ γιγνομένου coming in bein.	γεγενῆσθαι it becomes	τι καὶ what and
τοῦ of the	ὅλως all	κινουμένου moved	κεκινήσθαι is moved	τι what
(δῆλον (it's clear	δ' ἐν but in	τοῖς περὶ the on	κινήσεως motion	τούτο) (this)
[1] καὶ τὸν and the	μανθάνοντα learners	ἀνάγκη necessity	ἔχειν to know	τι what
τῆς ἐπιστήμης of science	ἴσως. in parallel.	ἀλλ' but	οὖν now	καὶ also
ταύτη this one	γε δῆλον at a. rate clear	ὅτι ἢ that the	ἐνέργεια καὶ action and	οὕτω it follows
προτέρα prior	τῆς δυνάμεως enforceability	κατὰ according to	γένεσιν becoming	καὶ χρόνον. and time.

ἀλλὰ but	μὴν naturally	καὶ οὐσίᾳ also in substance	γε, <i>in fact</i>	πρῶτον prior
μὲν ὅτι – because	τὰ those	τῇ γενέσει in becoming	[5] ὑστερα posterior	τῷ εἶδει the mode
καὶ τῇ also [in] the	οὐσίᾳ substance	πρότερα prior	(οἷον (e.g.,	ἀνὴρ adult
παιδὸς καὶ to child or	ἄνθρωπος human	σπέρματος: to spore;	τό one	μὲν γάρ indeed for
ἤδη ἔχει already has	τό εἶδος the mode	τό δ' οὐ), other but not);	καὶ ὅτι and because	ἅπαν everything
ἐπ' ἀρχὴν toward principle	βαδίζει proceeds	τό γιγνόμενον coming in. being	καὶ τέλος and aim	(ἀρχὴ (a principle
γάρ τό οὗ for to that	ἐνεκα, with regard to	τοῦ τέλους δὲ of the aim but	ἐνεκα with regard to	ἡ γένεσις), the origin).
τέλος aim	δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια, and the action	καὶ τούτου and of this	χάριν reason	ἡ δύναμις [10] the force
λαμβάνεται. takes hold of.	οὐ γάρ not for	ἵνα ὄψιν so that sight	ἔχουσιν have	ὁρῶσι see
τὰ ζῶα the animals	ἀλλ' ὅπως but –	ὁρῶσιν to see	ὄψιν sight	ἔχουσιν, they have,
ομοίως similarly	δὲ καὶ and also	οἰκοδομικὴν building-ability	ἵνα [12] in order to	οἰκοδομῶσι build
καὶ τὴν and the	θεωρητικὴν theorize-ability	ἵνα in order to	θεωρῶσιν: theorize;	ἀλλ' οὐ but not
θεωροῦσιν theorize	ἵνα in order to	θεωρητικὴν theorize-ability	ἔχουσιν, have,	εἰ μὴ οἱ if not those
μελετῶντες: being educated	οὗτοι δὲ they but	οὐχί not	θεωροῦσιν theorize	ἀλλ' ἢ but only
ὠδὶ, follow,	† ἢ ὅτι † or because	οὐδέν not	δέονται pursue	θεωρεῖν†. to speculate†.

[15] ἔτι In addition	ἡ ὕλη the matter	ἔστι is	δυνάμει power	ὅτι that
ἔλθοι is arrived at	ἄν until	εἰς τό εἶδος; into the mode;	ὅταν when	δέ γε but indeed
ἐνεργεῖα active	ἦ, τότε is, only then	ἐν τῷ in the	εἶδει mode	ἐστίν. is.
ομοίως the same	δὲ καὶ and also	ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, in the others	καὶ ὧν and those that	κίνησις motion
τό τέλος, the aim.	διό wherefore	ὡσπερ just as	οἱ those	διδάσκοντες who teach
ἐνεργοῦντα put in action	ἐπιδείξαντες exhibiting	οἴονται expecting	τό τέλος the aim	ἀποδεδωκέναί, have delivered
καὶ ἡ and the	φύσις nature	ομοίως. the same.	εἰ γάρ μὴ if for not	οὕτω as such
γίγνεται, happen,	ὁ[20]Παύσωνος the Pauson	ἔσται is	Ἑρμῆς; Hermes;	ἀδηλος it's uncertain
γάρ καὶ for also	ἡ ἐπιστήμη the science	εἰ ἔσω whether within	ἢ ἔξω, or without	ὡσπερ just as
κακεῖνος. in those.	τό γάρ the for	ἔργον acting	τέλος, aim,	ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια the and action
τό ἔργον, the acting,	διό καὶ wherefore and	τοῦνομα the name	ἐνέργεια action	λέγεται meant
κατά according to	τό ἔργον the act	καὶ συντείνει and leads	πρὸς τὴν to the	ἐντελέχειαν. expression.
ἐπεὶ δ' seeing that now	ἔστι is	τῶν μὲν in [some] –	ἔσχατον <i>final</i>	ἡ χρήσις the use
(οἶον (e.g.,	ὄψεως of sight	ἡ ὄρασις, the seeing,	καὶ and	οὐθὲν [25] nothing
γίγνεται is produced	παρὰ alongside	ταύτην this [seeing]	ἕτερον else	ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως), from the sight),

ἀπ' ἐνίων from some	δὲ and	γίγνεται is produced	τι what	(οἷον (e.g.,
ἀπὸ τῆς from the	οικοδομικῆς construction	οικία house	παρὰ τὴν alongside the	οικοδόμησις), building),
ὅμως yet	οὐθὲν nothing	ἥττον less	ἐνθα where	μὲν –
τέλος, aim,	ἐνθα where	δὲ but	μᾶλλον rather	τέλος aim
τῆς of the	δυνάμεώς force	ἐστίν: ἡ γάρ is; the for	οικοδόμησις buildable things	ἐν τῷ in the
οικοδομουμένῳ, things-built	καὶ ἅμα and once	γίγνεται developed	καὶ ἐστίν and is	τῇ οἰκίᾳ. the house.
[30] ὅσων μὲν many with	οὔν as I was saying	ἕτερόν τι the other what	ἐστὶ παρὰ is alongside	τὴν χρῆσιν the use
τό γινόμενον, the outcome,	τούτων μὲν those –	ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν the action in	τῷ ποιουμένῳ the produced	ἐστίν is
(οἷον ἢ τε (e.g., either -	οικοδόμησις buildable things	ἐν τῷ in the	οικοδομουμένῳ things-built	καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις or the textiles
ἐν τῷ in the	ὑφανομένῳ, things woven,	ομοίως as	δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ and also among	τῶν ἄλλων, the others
καὶ ὅλως and in all	ἡ κίνησις ἐν the motion in	τῷ κινουμένῳ): the moving);	ὅσων many	δὲ μὴ ἐστίν but not is
ἄλλο τι other what	ἔργον [35] act	παρὰ alongside	τὴν ἐνέργειαν, the action,	ἐν αὐτοῖς within it
ὑπάρχει exists	ἡ ἐνέργεια the action	(οἷον ἢ (e.g., the	ὄρασις observation	ἐν τῷ in the
ὁρῶντι observer	καὶ ἡ and the	θεωρία theorizing	ἐν τῷ in the	θεωροῦντι theorist
καὶ ἡ ζωὴ and the life	ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, in the soul	διό on that account	καὶ ἡ and the	ευδαιμονία: living well

[1] ζωή γάρ life for	ποιά which about	τίς that one	ἐστίν). ὥστε is). Therefore	φανερὸν ὅτι it's clear that
ἡ οὐσία the substance	καὶ τὸ εἶδος and the form	ἐνέργειά active	ἐστίν. is.	κατὰ According
τε δὴ – now	τούτῳ to this	τὸν λόγον the reason	φανερὸν it's clear	ὅτι that
πρότερον prior	τῇ οὐσίᾳ the substance	ἐνέργεια action	δυνάμει, force	καὶ ὡς περ and just as
εἶπομεν, said,	τοῦ χρόνου of the time	[5] ἀεί always	προλαμβάνει catches up	ἐνέργεια action
ἑτέρα one	πρὸς ἑτέρας to other	ἕως τῆς until the	τοῦ of	ἀεί continually
κινουῦντός mover	πρώτῳ. prime.	ἀλλὰ but	μὴν καὶ truly –	κυριωτέρως: most of all,
τὰ those	μὲν γάρ indeed for	ἄϊδια eternals	πρότερα prior	τῇ οὐσίᾳ to the substance
τῶν φθαρτῶν, of perishing	ἐστὶ δ' is and	οὐθέν nothing	δυνάμει force-for	ἄϊδιον. eternally.
λόγος the ground	δὲ ὅδε: for this:	πάσα δύναμις every force	ἅμα τῆς anytime of the	αντιφάσεώς opposite one
ἐστίν: τὸ is; the one	μὲν γάρ indeed for	μὴ δυνατόν not force	ὑπάρχειν exist	οὐκ [10] ἂν not if
ὑπάρξειεν existed	οὐθέντι, nothing,	τὸ δυνατόν enforcible	δὲ πᾶν – everything	ενδέχεται liable
μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. not act.	τό ἄρα that so	δυνατόν enforcible	εἶναι is	ενδέχεται liable
καὶ εἶναι both is	καὶ μὴ εἶναι: and not is;	τὸ αὐτὸ the same	ἄρα accordingly	δυνατόν enforcible
καὶ εἶναι both is	καὶ μὴ εἶναι. and not is.	τὸ δὲ that which –	δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι enforcible not be	ενδέχεται liable

μη είναι: not be;	τό δέ that which and	ενδεχόμενον liability	μη είναι not be	φθαρτόν, mortal,
ἢ ἀπλῶς either solely	ἢ τοῦτο or in which	αὐτό ὃ itself which	λέγεται [15] said	ἐνδέχασθαι liable
μη είναι, not be;	ἢ κατά τόπον or territorial	ἢ κατά or by	τό ποσόν the amount	ἢ ποιόν: or [by] whom;
ἀπλῶς δέ solely or	τό κατ' according to	οὐσίαν. substance.	οὐθὲν ἄρα nothing so	τῶν of the
ἀφθαρτων immortal	ἀπλῶς locally	δυνάμει enforcible	ἐστίν is	ἀπλῶς locally
(κατά τι (somewhat	δὲ but	οὐδέν nothing	κωλύει, hinders,	οἷον such as
ποιόν ἢ πού): what or where);	ἐνεργεία active	ἄρα πάντα: so everything.	οὐδέ neither any	τῶν out
ἐξ ἀνάγκης of necessity	όντων beings	(καίτοι (in spite of	ταῦτα πρότα: those priors;	εἰ γάρ if because
ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, these not were	οὐθὲν nothing	ἂν ἦν): [20] would be).	οὐδέ neither	δὴ truly
κίνησις, εἴ τίς motion, if the	ἐστίν is	ἄϊδιος: eternal;	οὐδ' nor	εἴ τι if anything
κινούμενον moving	ἄϊδιον, eternally,	οὐκ ἐστὶν κατὰ not is according	δύναμιν force	κινούμενον move
ἀλλ' ἢ ποθεν but to whence	ποί whither	(τούτου (thereof	δ' ὑλην and material	οὐδέν neither
κωλύει hinders	ὑπάρχειν), to exist).	διό in addition	ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ always act	ἥλιος καὶ sun and
ἄστρα καὶ stars and	ὅλος all	ὁ οὐρανός, of heaven,	καὶ οὐ and no	φοβερόν awful
μη ποτε στή, not ever be,	ὃ φοβούνται that are scared	οἱ περὶ those about	φύσεως. constraints,	οὐδέ nor

κάμνει exhusted	τούτο this	δρώντα: going around.	οὐ [25] γάρ not for	περί τὴν δύναμιν about the force
τῆς of the	αντιφάσεως opposite one	αὐτοῖς, upon them	οἷον τοῖς e.g., the	φθαρτοῖς, mortals
ἢ κίνησις, the motion,	ὥστε to	ἐπίπονον weary	εἶναι is	τὴν συνέχειαν the continuity
τῆς κινήσεως: of the motion;	ἢ γὰρ οὐσία the for substance	ὕλη καὶ matter and	δύναμις force	οὐσα, being,
οὐκ ἐνέργεια, not action	αἰτία τούτου. cause of this	μιμείται δὲ resembl and	τὰ ἀφθαρτα the immottrals	καὶ τὰ ἐν also those in
μεταβολή transformation	ὄντα, beings,	οἷον γῆ e.g., earth	καὶ πῦρ. and fire.	καὶ γάρ – for
ταῦτα these [latter]	ἀεὶ always	ἐνεργεῖ: act;	[30] καθ' down along	αὐτά them
γάρ καὶ for and	ἐν αὐτοῖς in themselves	ἔχει have	τὴν κίνησιν. the motion	αἱ δὲ the but
ἄλλαι other	δυνάμεις, forces,	ἐξ ὧν out of which	διώριστα, mentioned,	πάσαι each one
τῆς of the	ἀντιφάσεώς opposite ones	εἰσιν: is;	τό γάρ that one for	δυνάμενον force
ὠδὶ necessitate	κινεῖν motion	δύναται καὶ force also	μὴ ὠδὶ, not necessitate	ὅσα γε as to indeed
κατὰ λόγον: reasonably.	αἱ δ' the ones but	ἄλογοι unreasonable	τῷ mean time	παρεῖναι present
καὶ μὴ τῆς and not of the	αντιφάσεως opposite one	ἔσονται be	αἱ αὐταί. these ones.	εἰ ἄρα if thus
τινές some	εἰσὶ is	φύσεις [35] procedural	τοιαῦται as such	ἢ οὐσίαι or substances
οἷας of some sort	λέγουσιν described as	οἱ ἐν the –	τοῖς λόγοις so-called	τὰς ιδέας, the Ideas,

πολύ many	μάλλον perhaps	ἐπιστήμον sciences	ἄν would	τι εἴη something be
ἢ αὐτό than itself	ἐπιστήμη καὶ science and	κινούμενον mobility	ἢ κίνησις: than motion;	[1] ταῦτα γάρ these for
ἐνέργειαι actions	μάλλον, perhaps	ἐκείναι counterparts	δὲ than	δυνάμεις forces
τούτων. of them.	ὅτι μὲν as indeed	οὖν πρότερον then prior	ἢ ἐνέργεια the action	καὶ δυνάμεως than of forces
καὶ πάσης and every	αρχῆς principle	μεταβλητικῆς, of transformation	φανερὸν. it's clear.	ὅτι δὲ καὶ that and both
βελτίων καὶ improving &	τιμωτέρα more elementary	τῆς σπουδαίας of greatest	[5] δυνάμεως of forces	ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἐκ the action of
τῶνδε δήλον. next declaration.	ὅσα γάρ as many as for	κατὰ τό under the	δύνασθαι enforceable	λέγεται, referred to
ταυτόν ἐστι that one is	δυνατόν enforcible	τάναντία, the contraries;	οἷον τὸ e.g.,	δύνασθαι enforceable
λεγόμενον referred to	ὑγιαίνειν be healthy	ταυτόν ἐστι the same is	καὶ τὸ also to	νοσεῖν, being ill
καὶ ἄμα: and vice versa;	ἢ αὐτὴ γάρ the same 'cause	δύναμις τοῦ force under the	ὑγιαίνειν καὶ health and	κάμνειν, καὶ illness: also
ἡρεμεῖν καὶ rest and	κινεῖσθαι, καὶ motion and	οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ to build and	καταβάλλειν, to break down	[10] καὶ and
οἰκοδομεῖσθαι being built	καὶ καταπίπτειν. and forfeited.	τό μὲν that one while	οὖν as I was saying	δύνασθαι enforceable
τάναντία contraries	ἄμα in the same thing	ὑπάρχει: τὰ exists those	δ' but	ἐναντία contraries
ἄμα at the same time	ἄδύνατον, non-enforcible;	καὶ τὰς and of the	ενεργείας δὲ active and	ἄμα at the same time
ἄδύνατον non-enforcible	ὑπάρχειν exists	(οἷον (e.g.,	ὑγιαίνειν being healthy	καὶ κάμνειν), and being ill).

ὥστ' so	ανάγκη it's necessary	τούτων of the one	θάτερον the other	εἶναι be
τάγαθόν, stay put,	τό δέ the but	δύνασθαι enforceable	ομοίως may [be]	ἀμφοτέρων in both
ἢ οὐδέτερον: or neither,	[15] ἢ ἄρα the so that	ἐνέργεια action	βελτίων. [may] improve.	
ανάγκη it's necessary	δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ but – in	τῶν κακῶν the ones failing	τὸ τέλος the aim	καὶ τὴν and the
ἐνέργειαν action	εἶναι be	χείρον τῆς more dire of the	δυνάμεως: enforceability;	τό γάρ the one for
δυνάμενον enforceability	ταὐτὸ that one	ἄμφω of both	τὰναντία. contraries.	δήλον it's clear
ἄρα at the same time	ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι that not is	τό κακόν the failing one	παρὰ τὰ apart from	πράγματα: actuals;
ὑστερον posterior	γάρ τῇ for by	φύσει nature	τό κακόν the failure	τῆς δυνάμεως. of enforceability.
οὐκ not	ἄρα at the same time	οὐδ' and not	ἐν τοῖς in them	ἐξ ἀρχῆς of beginning
[20] καὶ τοῖς or of the	αἰδίοις eternal	οὐθέν anything	ἐστίν is	οὔτε neither
κακόν failure	οὔτε nor	αμάρτημα error	οὔτε and no	διεφθαρμένον destruction
(καὶ γάρ (– for	ἢ διαφθορά the destruction	τῶν κακῶν of failing	ἐστίν). is).	ευρίσκεται are found
δὲ καὶ τὰ – and those	διαγράμματα diagrams	ἐνεργεία: activity	διαιροῦντες by division	γάρ for
εὐρίσκουσιν. are found.	εἰ δ' ἦν if but were	διηρημένα, divided,	φανερὰ clear	ἂν ἦν: would be;
νῦν δ' now but	ενυπάρχει there they are	δυνάμει. enforcible.	διὰ τί for what	δύο ὀρθαὶ two right angles

τό τρίγωνον; to a triangle?	ὅτι αἰ [25] because the	περί μίαν around one	στιγμὴν point	γωνίαι angles
ἴσαι equals	δύο ὀρθαῖς. two right angles.	εἰ οὖν if then	ἀνήκτο ἢ elevated that one	παρὰ τὴν to the side of the
πλευράν, side,	ιδόντι imagining	ἂν ἦν would be	εὐθύς at once	δήλον clear
διὰ τί. for what.	ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ in a semicircle	ορθή right angle	καθόλου really ... at all	διὰ τί; for what?
ἐὰν ἴσαι where equals	τρεις, three [lines]	ἢ τε the one both	βάσις base	δύο καὶ ἡ two and the one
ἐκ μέσου of middle	ἐπισταθεῖσα placed upon	ορθή, right angle,	ιδόντι imagining	δήλον clear
τῷ to the	εκείνο that one who	εἰδότε. knows.	ὥστε so	φανερὸν ὅτι it's clear that
τὰ those	δυνάμει enforcible	ὄντα beings	εἰς [30] into	ἐνέργειαν action
αγόμενα tried	εὐρίσκεται: are found;	αἴτιον for the reason	δὲ ὅτι ἢ – that the	νόησις thought-process
ἐνέργεια: action.	ὥστ' therefore	ἐξ ενεργείας out of action	ἡ δύναμις, the force,	καὶ διὰ τοῦτο and through it
ποιοῦντες produced	γιγνώσκουσιν knowledge	(ὕστερον γάρ (posterior for	γενέσει becomes	ἡ ἐνέργεια action
ἢ κατ' or according to	αριθμόν). number).			
ἐπεὶ δὲ now come	τό ὄν the being	καὶ τό μὴ ὄν and the not being	τό μὲν partly	κατὰ [35] τὰ according to
σχήματα τῶν figures of the	κατηγοριῶν, predicates	τό δὲ and partly	κατὰ according to	δύναμιν force
ἢ ἐνέργειαν or action	τούτων of these	ἢ τὰναντία, or opposites,	[1] τό δὲ – and yet	κυριώτατα particularly

ὄν be	ἀληθές correct	ἢ ψεύδος, or wrong.	τούτο δ' this and	ἐπὶ τῶν on the
πραγμάτων actuals	ἐστὶ τῶ is of being	συγκεῖσθαι ἢ combined or	διηρησθαι, divided.	ὥστε thereby
ἀληθεύει μὲν of truth indeed	ὁ τὸ for whom that	διηρημένον which is divided	οἰόμενος expecting	διηρησθαι is divided
καὶ τὸ and that which	συγκεῖμενον is combined	συγκεῖσθαι, be combined,	ἔψευσται of error	δὲ ὁ but one that
ἐναντίως opposing	[5] ἔχων have	ἢ τὰ in fact those	πράγματα, actuals.	πότ' but when
ἐστὶν is	ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶ or not is	τὸ ἀληθές that correct	λεγόμενον we say	ἢ ψεύδος; or wrong?
τούτο γάρ whenever that	σκεπτόν in one's mind	τί λέγομεν. thing we say.	οὐ γάρ not because	διὰ τὸ through the one
ἡμᾶς we	οἴεσθαι expect	ἀληθῶς right	σε λευκὸν you joyful	εἶναι be
εἴ supposing that	σύ λευκός, you joyful,	ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ but through that	σέ εἶναι you are	λευκὸν joyful
ὕμεις οἱ we that way	φάντες consider	τούτο this	ἀληθεύομεν. being true.	εἰ δὴ τὰ if now those
μὲν ἀεί – always	σύγκειται καὶ combined and	ἀδύνατα non-enforcible	διαίρεθῆναι, division	[10] τὰ those
δ' ἀεί but always	διήρηται καὶ divided and	ἀδύνατα non-enforcible	συντεθῆναι, combination,	τὰ those
δ' ἐνδέχεται and liable	τὰναντία, both opposites,	τὸ μὲν that then	εἶναί be	ἐστὶ τὸ is that
συγκεῖσθαι combined	καὶ ἓν and one	εἶναι, be,	τὸ δὲ that and	μὴ εἶναι not be
τὸ μὴ that not	συγκεῖσθαι combined	ἀλλὰ but	πλείω manifold	εἶναι: be.

περί μὲν about –	οὖν τὰ then the things	ενδεχόμενα liable	ἢ αὐτὴ the same	γίγνεται becomes
ψευδῆς wrong	καὶ ἀληθῆς and right	δόξα καὶ expectation and	ὁ λόγος the reason	ὁ αὐτός, the same,
καὶ ἐνδέχεται and a liable	ὅτε [15] μὲν at one time	ἀληθεύειν to be right	ὅτε δὲ at another time	ψεύδεται: to be wrong;
περί δὲ τὰ about but those	ἀδύνατα non-enforcible	ἄλλως otherwise	ἔχειν have	οὐ γίγνεται not become
ὅτε μὲν at one time	ἀληθές right	ὅτε δὲ and at another	ψεύδος, wrong,	ἀλλ' ἀεὶ but always
ταῦτα these	ἀληθὴ καὶ right and	ψευδῆ. wrong.	περί δὲ δὴ about but now	τὰ ἀσύνθετα non-combinatorics
τί τό εἶναι what – be	ἢ μὴ εἶναι or not be	καὶ τό ἀληθές and – right	καὶ τό ψεύδος; and – wrong?	οὐ γάρ ἐστι not for is
σύνθετον, combinatory	ὥστε such that	εἶναι μὲν be once	ὅταν when	συγκέεται, combined
μὴ εἶναι not be	δὲ [20] ἐὰν other when	διηρημένον divided	ἢ, ὥσπερ is, such as	τό λευκόν the white
τό ξύλον the wood	ἢ τό or that one	ἀσύμμετρον [21] asymmetric	τὴν διάμετρον: with diameter	οὐδὲ neither
τό ἀληθές – right	καὶ τό ψεύδος nor – wrong	ομοίως as	ἐτι ὑπάρξει yet exist	καὶ ἐπ' as on
ἐκείνων. those [before].	ἢ ὥσπερ or just as	οὐδὲ not either	τὸ ἀληθές the right	ἐπὶ τούτων on these
τό αὐτό, the same,	οὕτως so	οὐδέ neither	τό εἶναι, the be.	ἀλλ' ἐστὶ but is
τό μὲν the then	ἀληθές right	ἢ ψεύδος, or wrong:	τό μὲν the –	θιγεῖν καὶ grasping and
φάναι saying	ἀληθές right	(οὐ γάρ (not for	ταὐτὸ identical	κατάφασις word-junk

[25] και and	φάσις), word-treasure),	τό δ' the and	ἀγνοεῖν ignorance	μη θιγγάνειν not grasping
(ἀπατηθῆναι (be deceived	γάρ for	περί τό about that which	τί ἐστιν οὐκ whatness is not	ἐστιν is
ἄλλ' ἢ otherwise that	κατά according to	συμβεβηκός: accident;	ομοίως similarly	δὲ καὶ and also
περί τὰς about those	μη συνθετὰς not combinatory	ουσίας, substances	οὐ γάρ ἐστιν not for is	ἀπατηθῆναι: be deceived.
καὶ πάσαι and all	εἰσὶν are	ἐνεργεῖα, οὐ active, not	δυνάμει, force-fit	ἐγίνοντο be created
γάρ ἂν καὶ for would and	ἐφθείροντο, be annihilated	νῦν δὲ now otherwise	τό ὄν αὐτό Being itself	οὐ γίνεταί not created
οὐδέ nor	φθείρεται, annihilated	[30] ἔκ τινος out of something	γάρ ἂν for would	ἐγίνετο: be created.
ὅσα δὴ as many as and	ἐστιν is	ὅπερ which a matter	εἶναι τι is whatness	καὶ ἐνεργεῖαι, and action,
περί ταῦτα about them	οὐκ ἐστιν not is	ἀπατηθῆναι be deceived	ἄλλ' ἢ but either	νοεῖν know
ἢ μὴ: or not.	ἀλλὰ τό τί but the whatness	ἐστι ζητεῖται is seek	περί αὐτῶν, about them,	εἰ τοιαῦτά whether they
ἐστιν are	ἢ μὴ): or not).	τό δὲ εἶναι that but be	ὡς when	τὸ ἀληθές, the right
καὶ and	τό μὴ εἶναι that one not be	τό ὡς that when	τό ψεῦδος, the wrong:	ἐν μὲν ἐστιν, unity – is
εἰ σύγκειται, if combined	ἀληθές, right	τό [35] δ' that one but	εἰ μὴ σύγκειται, if not combined	ψεῦδος: wrong.
τό δὲ ἕν, that and unity,	εἴπερ ὄν, if actual,	οὕτως so	ἐστίν, it is	εἰ δὲ μὴ if but not
οὕτως, so	οὐκ ἐστιν: not is.	[1] τὸ δὲ the –	ἀληθές right	τό νοεῖν to know

ταύτα: these;	τό δὲ the –	ψεύδος wrong	οὐκ ἔστιν, not is,	οὐδέ nor
ἀπάτη, deception,	ἀλλὰ ἀγνοια, but ignorance,	οὐχ οἷα not some sort of	ἢ τυφλότης: the blindness	ἢ μὲν γάρ that indeed for
τυφλότης blindness	ἐστὶν ὡς is like	ἂν εἰ as if	τό νοητικὸν the thought	ὄλως totally
μὴ ἔχει not have	τις. something.	φανερὸν evidently	δὲ καὶ ὅτι and also that	περὶ τῶν with regard to
ακινήτων [5] immovables	οὐκ ἔστιν not is	ἀπάτη deception	κατὰ τό ποτέ, almost never,	εἴ τις if these
υπολαμβάνει one assumes	ακίνητα. immovables	οἶον e.g.,	τό τρίγωνον the triangle	εἰ μὴ if not
μεταβάλλειν changing	οἶεται, we suppose	οὐκ οἰήσεται not suppose	ποτέ μὲν when	δύο ὀρθὰς two right angles
ἔχειν ποτέ have when	δὲ οὐ and not	(μεταβάλλοι (alter	γάρ ἂν), for would);	ἀλλὰ one one hand
τί what	μὲν on the other hand	τί δ' οὐ, οἶον what – but, e.g.	ἄρτιον even	αριθμὸν number
πρώτον prime	εἶναι μηθένα, is never,	ἢ τινάς or some	μὲν τινάς – some	δ' οὐ: and not.
αριθμὸν δὲ number but	περὶ about	ένα οὐδέ one never	[10] τοῦτο: this,	οὐ γὰρ ἔτι not for ever
τινά μὲν some –	τινά δὲ some and	οὐ οἰήσεται, not suppose,	ἀλλ' ἀληθεύσει either right	ἢ ψεύσεται or wrong
ὡς ἀεί as always	οὕτως in this way	έχοντος. they have.		
δύναμις force	λέγεται means	ἢ μὲν ἀρχή the – principle	κινήσεως ἢ of motion or	μεταβολῆς transformation
ἢ ἐν that one in	ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἢ another or is	ἐτερον, οἶον at another, e.g.,	ἢ οἰκοδομική the building	δύναμις force

ἔστιν ἢ is or	οὐχ ὑπάρχει not exist	ἐν τῷ in the	οικοδομουμένων, things-built	ἄλλ’ however
ἡ ἱατρικὴ the medicinal	δύναμις οὕσα force be	ὑπάρχοι existing	ἂν ἐν τῷ will in the	ἱατρουμένῳ, patient
ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἦ but not is	ἱατρουόμενος. with the patient.	ἢ μὲν οὖν the – thus	ὅλως overall	ἀρχὴ principle
μεταβολῆς transformation	ἢ κινήσεως or motion	λέγεται mean	δύναμις force	[20] ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ in other which
ἢ ἕτερον, is at another	ἢ δ’ or and	ὑφ’ ἑτέρου by another	ἢ ἢ which is	ἕτερον with another
(καθ’ ἣν (during which	γὰρ τὸ πάσχον for the sufferer	πάσχει τι, suffers that	ὅτε μὲν ἐὰν if and if only	ὀτιοῦν, devised skillfully
δυνατὸν enforcible	αὐτό that one	φαμεν said	εἶναι παθεῖν, be suffering;	ὅτε δ’ οὐ often but not
κατὰ πᾶν during every	πάθος undergoing	ἀλλ’ ἂν but should be	ἐπὶ τό near the	βέλτιον): improvement).
ἔτι ἢ always that one	τού whose	καλῶς welfare	τοῦτ’ of it	ἐπιτελεῖν accomplished
ἢ κατὰ which according	προαίρεσιν: to a goal;	ἐνίοτε γάρ at times for	τούς for whom	μόνον ἂν only would be
πορευθέντας go-and-make	ἢ εἰπόντας, who say	μὴ [25] καλῶς not good	δὲ ἢ μὴ but which not	ὡς προεῖλοντο, as options
οὔφαμεν not say	δύνασθαι enforceable	λέγειν ἢ meaning that	βαδίζειν: heading to	ομοίως similarly
δὲ καὶ – also	ἐπὶ on account of	τού πάσχειν. who undergoes.	ἔτι yet	ὅσαι ἐξείς as many as have
καθ’ ἃς according to	απαθὴ undergoing	ὅλως ἢ especially that	αμετάβλητα untransformable	ἢ μὴ ῥαδίως which not easily
ἐπὶ τό χειρόν toward the worst	ευμετακίνητα, mobile ones,	δυνάμεις force-fit	λέγονται: called.	κλᾶται breakables

μὲν γάρ καὶ indeed for also	συντρίβεται damagables	καὶ κάμπτεται and bendables	καὶ ὅλως and all	φθείρεται destroyables
οὐ τῷ [30] not of the	δύνασθαι enforceable	ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ but of the not	δύνασθαι enforceable	καὶ ἐλλείπειν and of absence
τινός: some;	απαθὴ δὲ undergoing and	τῶν τοιούτων of them	ἃ μόνις that momentary	καὶ ἡρέμα and slowly
πάσχει undergoes	διὰ δυνάμιν καὶ by force and	τῷ δύνασθαι of enforceable	καὶ τῷ ἔχειν and of having	πῶς. somehow.
λεγομένης δὲ so-called since	τῆς the	δυνάμειως enforceability	τοσαυταχῶς, in various ways	καὶ τό also the
δυνατὸν enforcible	ἓνα μὲν τρόπον one – way	λεχθήσεται is called	τό ἔχον that which has	κινήσεως of motion
ἀρχὴν ἢ principle or	μεταβολῆς transformation	(καὶ γάρ [35] (and for	τό στατικὸν the static one	δυνατὸν enforcible
τι) whatness)	ἐν ἑτέρῳ in another	ἢ ἣ which is	ἕτερον, at another,	ἓνα δ' ἐὰν one yet if
ἔχει τι has it	αὐτοῦ of it	ἄλλο δυνάμιν another force	τοιαύτην, as such,	[1] ἓνα δ' ἐὰν one and would
ἔχει μεταβάλλειν has to change	ἐφ' ὀτιοῦν on devising wise	δυνάμιν, force,	εἴτ' ἐπὶ either for	τό χεῖρον worsening
εἴτ' ἐπὶ or for	τό βέλτιον improvement.	(καὶ γάρ τό (– for that one	φθειρόμενον been destroyed	δοκεῖ seems
δυνατὸν εἶναι enforcible is	φθείρεσθαι, be destroyed	ἢ οὐκ ἂν which not 'd be	φθαρεῖν destroyed	εἰ ἦν if were
ἀδύνατον: non-enforcible.	νῦν as it stands	δὲ ἔχει τινά [5] but has some	διάθεσιν moods	καὶ αἰτίαν – causes
καὶ ἀρχὴν and principles	τού τοιούτου of them	πάθους: undergoing.	ὅτε μὲν sometimes –	δὴ τῷ now of
ἔχειν having	τι δοκεῖ, it supposes	ὅτε δὲ because –	τῷ of	ἐστερηθῆσθαι is deprived

τοιούτον of this	εἶναι: be;	εἰ δ' ἢ if but the	στέρησίς privation	ἐστίν is
ἐξίς πως, state somehow,	πάντα τῷ everything of	ἔχειν have	ἂν εἴη τι, will be it,	εἰ δὲ μὴ if yet not
ὥστε τῷ then of the	τε ἔχειν – having	ἐξίν τινά καὶ state certain and	ἀρχὴν ἐστίν principle is	δυνατόν enforcible
ὁμωνύμως agreeing	καὶ τῷ and of	ἔχειν τὴν having the	τούτου of this	στέρησιν, privation,
εἰ ἐνδέχεται if asserts	[10] ἔχειν having	στέρησιν: privation;	εἰ δὲ μὴ, if – not	ὁμωνύμως) agree.)
ένα δὲ τῷ one yet of	μὴ ἔχειν not having	αὐτοῦ same	δύναμιν force	ἢ ἀρχὴν or principle
ἄλλο ἢ other –	ἢ ἄλλο which other	φθαρκτικήν. destroy.	ἐτι δὲ yet again	ταῦτα πάντα all these
ἢ τῷ either of	μόνον only	ἂν would	συμβῆναι happen	γενέσθαι becoming
ἢ μὴ or not	γενέσθαι, becoming	ἢ τῷ καλῶς. or of great.	καὶ γὰρ ἐν – for in	τοῖς ἀψύχοις those soulless
ἔνεστιν is	ἢ τοιαύτη the as these	δύναμις, force	οἷον ἐν τοῖς e.g., in the	ὀργάνοις: instruments;
τὴν that one	μὲν γάρ – for	δύνασθαί enforceable	φασὶ [15] saying	φθέγγεσθαι to make sound
λύραν, a lyre	τὴν the one	δ' οὐδέν, but without	ἂν ἦ would be	μὴ εὐφωτος. not good sound.
ἀδυναμία non-enforcement	δὲ and	ἐστὶ στέρησις is privation	δυνάμεως enforceability	καὶ τῆς and of the
τοιαύτης as [soulless ...]	αρχῆς principle	οἷα of some sort	εἴρηται, as been said	ἢ ὅλως either totally
ἢ τῷ or of	πεφυκότι adapted	ἔχειν, have	ἢ καὶ ὅτε or – when	πέφυκεν adapted

ἤδη ἔχειν: already have.	οὐ γάρ not for	ομοίως similarly	ἂν φαῖεν if said	ἀδύνατον non-enforcible
εἶναι γεννάν is begetting	παῖδα children	καὶ ἄνδρα – men	καὶ εὐνοῦχον. and a neutered.	ἔτι δὲ yet again
καθ’ corresponding to	εκατέραν [20] two by two	δύναμιν ἔστιν force there's	ἀδυναμία non-enforcement	ἀντικειμένη, object,
τῇ τε μόνον to the – only	κινητική καὶ motion and	τῇ καλῶς to the well	κινητική. καὶ motion. And	ἀδύνατα non-enforcible
δὴ τὰ now those	μὲν κατὰ as corresponding	τὴν ἀδυναμίαν non-enforcement	ταύτην to it	λέγεται, it's referred to
τὰ δὲ those but	ἄλλον to different	τρόπον, way	οἷον δυνατόν e.g., enforcible	τε καὶ and also
ἀδύνατον, non-enforcible.	ἀδύνατον non-enforcible	μὲν οὖν τό then whose the	ἐναντίον contrary	ἐξ ἀνάγκης of necessity
αληθές right	(οἷον τό τὴν (e.g., the to	διάμετρον diameter	σύμμετρον symmetric	εἶναι [25] is
ἀδύνατον non-enforcible	ὅτι ψεύδος because false	τό τοιοῦτον this [statement]	οὖν τό ἐναντίον whose contrary	οὐ μόνον not only
αληθές true,	ἀλλὰ καὶ but also	ἀνάγκη it's necessary	ἀσύμμετρον asymmetric	εἶναι: τό be. The
ἀρα therefore	σύμμετρον symmetric	οὐ μόνον ψεύδος not only false	ἀλλὰ καὶ but also	ἐξ ἀνάγκης necessarily
ψεύδος): false).	τό δ’ the and	ἐναντίον contrary	τούτω, of this	τὸ δυνατόν, enforcible
ὅταν μὴ when not	ἀναγκαῖον necessary	ἢ τό ἐναντίον is the contrary	ψεύδος εἶναι, false is;	οἷον τό e.g., the
καθῆσθαι sitting	ἄνθρωπον human	δυνατόν: enforcible	οὐ [30] γάρ whose for	ἐξ ἀνάγκης necessarily
τό μὴ καθῆσθαι the not seated	ψεύδος. false.	τὸ μὲν οὖν the – hence	δυνατόν enforcible	ἓνα μὲν τρόπον, some – type

ὡςπερ εἴρηται, as defined,	τό μὴ that not	ἐξ ἀνάγκης necessarily	ψεύδος σημαίνει, false means,	ένα δὲ τό some and the
ἀληθές εἶναι, true is;	ένα δὲ τό other and the	ἐνδεχόμενον liability	ἀληθές εἶναι. true be.	
κατὰ μεταφορὰν metaphorically	δὲ ἢ and the	ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ in geometry	λέγεται called	δύναμις. force.
ταῦτα these	μὲν οὖν though then	τὰ δυνατά enforcible	οὐ κατὰ not according to	δύναμιν: force
[35] τὰ δὲ those and	λεγόμενα refer	κατὰ to	δύναμιν force	πάντα all
λέγεται referred	πρὸς to	τὴν πρώτην the primary	μίαν: one [= sense];	[1] αὕτη δ' this and
ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ is principle	μεταβολῆς transformation	ἐν ἄλλῳ within one	ἢ ἢ ἄλλο. or as other.	τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα those for other
λέγεται reasoned	δυνατά τῷ enforcible of	τὰ μὲν those either	έχειν have	αυτῶν ἄλλο on them other
τι τοιαύτην that such as this	δύναμιν force	τὰ δὲ those or	μὴ έχειν not have	τὰ δὲ those and
ὡδὶ collectively	έχειν. have.	ομοίως similarly	δὲ καὶ for also	τὰ ἀδύνατα. non-enforcible
ὥστε ὁ so, the	κύριος fundamental	ὁρος premise	[5] τῆς πρώτης of the primary	δυνάμεως enforceability
ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ will be principle	μεταβλητικὴ transformation	ἐν ἄλλῳ within one	ἢ ἢ ἄλλο. or as other.	