Mult–i–Theme Articles by Click


Mult–i–Theme Articles by Click 



A. More Than 100 Years Later: A Schopenhauerian Revision of Breuer's Anna O.

B. More Than 100 Years Later: Breaking Down the Ideas.


Emending the Risk of Calling any Ancient Soft Writing Materials as Parchment: A Revision of Basic Terms

A New Translation for Entelechy with Further Analysis (with an interlinear translation)

More Than 100 Years Later: Breaking Down the Ideas


Previously, I asked the reader to read More Than 100 Years Later: A Schopenhauerian Revision of Breuer’s Anna O.[1] with patience concept-wise; but, now, time has ruled its god-like power on the reader’s patience and my circumstances with the result that I offer this paper with some delay. The delay is not a matter of intention, though.

Line by line, word for word, Schopenhauer’s traces appear here too, with the addition of some lines that I have translated them with poetic format in shape. Overall, I have tried to remain his faithful κλητος υιος. Assuming that A. has been read carefully, familiarity with some physiological terms is recommended,[2] perhaps before proceeding to read.

Following, I share a few lines[3], which simply take those university (philosophy) professors to task that harm our new generation in their independent thinking. It is in this way that I shall begin the main subject of the paper: feelings.

Possibly, the reader may have had a teacher or a professor with tremendous impact on their life (e.g., the American theoretical physicist, Richard Phillips Feynman (1918 – 1988), or the German Mathematician, Christian Felix Klein (1849 – 1925)). Nevertheless, those men and women are (such isolated exceptions and) so rare, as those whose heart is on the right side. So, it remains, as a rule, true that the educational system appoints one to the professorship that is orderly and appropriate to what the system wants with less or no care for what the truth is. Such a disregard for the truth, of course, comes with its direct catastrophic impact on the student. Students raised to accept a concept as it is and (under fear of losing grade) dare not say what they further think why or whence it is so, they are doomed to be a borrowed-thinker.

For instance, in 1989, British Midland flight 092 crashed near Kegworth, in England. The chain of events that led to this heart-wrenching accident began with a problem in the left engine, ignitied and then shook the entire aircraft. After a while the captain announced that he had shut down the right engine. Among those who survived the crash, K. D., a twenty-year old male student, recalled seeing sparks coming out 
[1] Throughout this paper, I refer to it as A.
[2] I have extensively used the following book, to which I am greatly indebted, and I recommend the reader to read it (or a similar book in the discipline): Per Brodal. “The Central Nervous System: Structure and Function” (4th Ed.). Oxford University Press (2010).
[3] See also 

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA           USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051             All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

of the left-hand side of the plane and was surprised why the captain had turned off the right engine. When he was asked why he had not informed the crew, he said, “I thought it’s strange why he turned off the good engine, when it is so so obvious that it’s the left engine on fire”, he continued, “I remember thinking; he still knows what he’s doing because he is the professional.”[1]

Another example comes from my personal experience. During an Intermediate Seminar course[2], a paper by Fred Feldman was being discussed. I shall not dive into details about the paper[3], since it is not the point of the present discussion. I shall only highlight a few lines from the paper, the lecturer’s note, my argument (raised in the class) and the interruption of it by a classmate and her comment.

In his paper, Feldman, going on and on and talking about intrinsic- in twenty-three pages. (He only uses four times the term extrinsic (with variations).) For example, [4]

“Thus, Epicurus might have concluded that my death cannot be extrinsically bad for me. However, D3 does not calculate extrinsic value by focusing exclusively on intrinsic goods and evils that would befall the person as a result of the state of affairs.” (p. 218). “… If taken to mean that a state of affairs is intrinsically bad for a person only if he can experience it, then … the premise may be true – but it is not relevant to the claim that death is bad for the one who dies, since it is most reasonable to take this as the claim that death is extrinsically bad for the one who dies. If the claim is understood in this more plausible way as the claim that a state of affairs can be extrinsically bad for a person only if he can experience it, then, as I have attempted to show, the premise is false.” (p. 219: footnote 14).

He also uses the term non-intrinsic one time:

“D3 is designed to calculate an important sort of non-intrinsic value.” (p. 218).
[1] The quoted statements are taken from the online video: British Midland Flight 92 (Kegworth) Air Disaster.
[2] Philosophy 207G: The Meaning of Life (Fall 2017) University of Massachusetts Boston: Lecturer Valentina M. Urbanek. 
[3] If the reader is interested, they can find it in The Philosophical Review (Vol. C, No. 2, April 1991, pp. 205 – 227): Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death, by F. Feldman.
[4] The boldface-typed words in Feldman’s citations are by me.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA            USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051             All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Here is the Lecturer’s note (on what Feldman would answer to puzzle one, i.e., How can a state of affairs be bad for me if I can’t experience it?):

“A state of affairs can only be intrinsically bad for me if I experience it, but a state of affairs that I don’t experience can be bad for me extrinsically, if things make my welfare worse than it would have been if those things hadn’t happened.”

Despite careless usage of the terms intrinsic and extrinsic, in the above citations, I must mention another statement from Feldman’s paper: “I have provisionally agreed that nothing intrinsically good or bad can happen to a person at times when he does not exist.” (p. 220).

In the 129th episode, the Wig Master, of the NBC’s comedy Seinfeld, Jerry Seinfeld attempts to return a jacket only “out of spite.” Now that I spent money and time on this humbug, i.e., that of the lecture and Feldman’s paper, I also tried to return their charlatanism (on the subject) by arguing in the following way. “I can repeat the same thing on the term extrinsic. Imagine certain amount of water held back and then released from a barrier, then the same water is forced through a hose, and finally the same water going through a fountain sprayed into the air. So, I can [“provisionally”] say that nothing intrinsically can happen when something exists, despite the extrinsic changes …."

At this point, and a minute to end the class, a student trying to counter-argue my statement hurriedly interrupted me and said, “But, he says it in the paper.”

Setting aside the lecturer’s silence[1] (even during the next class) on the fact that my argument with its figures of speech appear nowhere in Feldman’s paper, we clearly observe that the student, cannot help but to believe that Feldman, the lecturer, and the like must be right, because she thinks that their authority in charge “is the professional.”

The harm that these university professors do on students is the prime task “the central theme of the professors … of the present time” said Schopenhauer more than one hundred years ago. Instead of guiding the student to develop an analytic and creative thinking, they make them surrender to the power of “the professional.”


[1] See further similar behavior, by the lecturer, in another footnote in §5.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA       USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051      All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

The prime task of the professorship, which has violated, whether by word or by sword, the power of independent thinking in students, can also hurt the truth. For example, whether in 1832, and by Gottfried R. Treviranus[1], or in 2017 by Thomas Twyman[2], with a teaching position in Boston Graduate School of Psychoanalysis, we must always read or hear statements such as “felt as objective” attributed to the external objects. Being among the pioneers of his subject, Treviranus  may be excused for attributing subjective to what is objective. But, nothing can save the latter “professional,” especially when you hear him saying, “you [dare] question your professor?” A chimp-colony rule by which the bigger one must be obeyed!

These sort of university professors are blinded to the fact that “feeling,” which is essentially subjective, differs from “perception,” which is a product of second cognitive processes and thus refers to that which is objective. And it is this differentiation that proved the need for writing A. And now, on feelings:

“In consciousness, the I is dark;

So, the body of the shining sun is dark;

Brain that senses all, itself has no senses;

So, the optic nerve has no vision, where it enters; …

I know is focused outward; …

I feel tries to see inward.”


Complexity of the Subject

Taking the conventional definition of cognition,

“In general terms, cognition is the process involved in knowing, or the act of knowing, which in its completeness includes perception and judgment. Cognition includes every mental process that can be described as an experience of knowing as distinguished from an experience of feeling or of willing. It includes, in short, all processes of consciousness by which knowledge is built up, including perceiving, recognizing, conceiving, and reasoning.” (Sofroniou 2013, p. 25).
[1] Treviranus, G. R. “Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen Leben” (Vol. 2: Part I). Druck und Verlag von Johann Georg Heyse. Bremen (1832). On p. 49 he wrote, “A form of life is, nonetheless, conceivable where the effect of the external on the internal results in mere feelings of attraction or distraction, and then of desires. As is the vegetation. In the higher form of animal life, the external is something felt as objective.” (The citation also appears in A. Schopenhauer, “Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung“ (Vol. 2). Grossherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe: Erschienen im Inselverlag zu Leipzig (dissertation 1813: reprinted 1960) p. 1041.
[2] See A. for a brief discussion on perception and feeling, as he sees them, which are amazingly similar to Treviranus’. This is what he said, ‘the external is something felt, not perceived.’ Also, later, in this paper, I give further explanation.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA                   USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051               All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

I introduced, in A., three distinct cognitive processes. There, the exposition of first cognitive processes began with the mechanisms of sensory receptors, of which one is subjectively aware. I also distinguished subjective sensory experience (produced by functions of the receptors, within the nervous system, as opposed to objective perception) from subjective feeling of the physiological functions of the body. The red color of a car that one experiences is a subjective sensory experience of the person who sees it. Now if the color reminds one of a pain experienced earlier (e.g., an accident by a red car), then that pain is a subjective feeling of an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience.

Physiological functions consist of multifactor structures. For instance, whereas one receptor produces a feeling of tingling pain, another may result in feeling of warmth. It is hard to find that one particular receptor has evoked a sensory experience, which makes it even harder to connect a conscious sensory experience with its causative receptor(s). To make the matter worse, only humans, whose conscious experiences are ascribed to several different signals from various receptors, can report a subjective experience; together with the difficulty of reconciling anatomical researches with physiological studies.

In general, the brain strives to translate a manifold of signals together with their context in order to arrive at a unified[1] work (e.g., the generalities [Allgemeinheiten], with which poets content themselves); it resembles the stomach which combines all foods into a uniform life-process [Lebensprocesses]. The food that one feels delicious, for instance, is a unified product of several receptors (such as taste, olfactory, mechanical, and thermal receptors). In the same way, in the action of taking the food and opening the mouth, an immense neuronal population, which are necessary for initiating the purposeful act, are collectively involved. Or, whereas signals to the penis and the clitoris have a different origin (they depend on parasympathetic system) than those concerning ejaculation (which depends on sympathetic system), yet both erection and ejaculation rely on precise timing, which is coordinated by a complex network in the spinal cord, whose task is controlled by hypothalamus, of which hypothalamic cell fibers are supervised by areas of the amygdala, and the cerebral cortex (e.g., the choice of one who may or may not want to have sex).
[1] “This focal point of the entire brain activity is that which was termed, by Kant, the synthetic unity of apperception” (Schopenhauer 1813/1960, p. 1019).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA                 USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051                All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Furthermore, reactions such as crying, or laughing are the behavioral objectification of some subjective feelings or emotions. To complicate matters, early childhood experiences and social factors (e.g., social attachment) work in favor of the subjectivity component. Besides, the opaque and undescriptive nature of feelings covers itself behind the mask of good or bad, pleasurable or un-pleasurable, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, among similar subjective descriptions.

What has been said so far points to the fact that we are confronting one of the most complex “concepts” to analyze. In a layman statement, when a “feeling” arises in consciousness, it is nothing but an illusion (va'hm).  It is an illusion because second cognitive processes cannot find its cause, and third cognitive processes are crippled[1]; it just, like a mirror image [ebenbild], justifies an action by means of the language (Wittgenstein’s language-game[2]).



That all animals possess second cognitive process (of cause-effect transition) must have been arrived at, by now. The knowledge obtained in this manner is immediate and simple, because sensory receptors are prominently coincidence detectors, i.e., they are sensitive to those simultaneously-occurring (associative) events that have causal relations. By seeing a moving object, we immediately conclude that there must be a simultaneously-occurring force as its cause. The search for causal relationship – which is commonly called “a reason behind” – leads to what is referred to as “why.”

When a priori association, which is the only way, has been reached, that is, one can never go beyond a causal relationship or a relation cannot further be postulated [gefordert], then, one hypothesizes [annehmen] a force of nature, in which a blind energy is at work. In the hypothesis, the space component is missing – i.e., according to second cognitive processes, of which spatial summation of stimuli must occur at different places of nerve terminals makes the hypothesis not to be a perception – the only awareness of this blind energy-force is obtained through the in-time succession of sensory impressions – i.e., in accordance with third cognitive processes, in which temporal summation of stimuli follow one another in rapid succession in one terminal; in this case, only a conceptual awareness can be formed.
[1] In this paragraph the term “concepts” appears in quotation marks, because feeling is not a perception and consequently cannot be a proper concept. Throughout this paper the reader observes that feeling and acting are taken, in a general sense, identical, which has assisted my investigation on the matter under consideration.
[2] See A. §5.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA               USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051               All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

One immediate example of the energy-force is through the apprehension of one’s own body with its visible movements. For example, when one walks, any small but sudden external changes can disturb one’s programmed pattern of walking, but stretch reflexes rapidly adjust the pattern. Now, if this person is asked about all these, he or she, being unaware of all those changes, adjustment, and even the pattern, feels that one walks on one’s own will, the energy-force, that one does not see (i.e., it is not a representation) but feels it (i.e., yet, it appears in physiological functions).

Yet, to the uncaused energy-force, the succession of information (i.e., one phenomenon of nature is succeeded by another one) and the law of necessity [Gesetz der Nothwendigkeit] apply. According to the law of necessity, between energy-force and action there is a strict causal chain. So, by way of communicability of motion [Mittheilbarkeit der Bewegung] (e.g., bodily movements), energy’s fundamental effort [Grundbestrebung] is phenomenologically manifested. For instance, in order to digest, stomach (which can be objectively perceived) is manifested; similarly, foot to go, hand to grasp, genitals to beget, and brain to know. By presenting itself in the nervous system, energy-force takes the forms of knowledge (i.e., time, space, causality) and efficiently acts (operates).

Energy, which literally means erga in function, can be immediately hypothesized by our bodily movements, through our strivings [Strebungen] in the surrounding environment. We then conclude that it (i.e., energy’s metaphysical term, erga, the platonic Ideas correspondence to things-in-themselves or simply the Schopenhauerian will) must be in everything, animation as well as inanimation; of which the difference lies in how it is aroused [hervorgerufen] in them, while “in-itself” it lies outside causality [Karma] and admits no degrees. It is monotonous, i.e., it only excites [erregt] or inhibits [hemmen]. For example, when the reticular formation noticeably reduces its stimulation, the animal becomes unconscious. But when it sends out high frequency signals, attention increases, and the organism is in full alert; a condition which corresponds to what is called arousal.[1]

[1] The inhibiting mode of the reticular formation is called synchronization (of the electroencephalograph), and its excitation is termed desynchronization.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051      All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Economically speaking, the goal of the fundamental effort is to (self-) preserve [Selbsterhaltung] the organism (e.g., the osmic stability of the brain by energy-dependent ion pumping). But, we saw that all manifestations (gradations) of the fundamental effort can be reduced to excitation and inhibition, which now, depending on the occasion [Anlaß], they can be modified (e.g., from a weak inclination to a strong passion). For instance, in an exciting paper, Alastair Compston (2006) has formulated multiple sclerosis as a genetically determined disease that only appears when it is occasioned by an inflammatory insult, without which the neurodegeneration does not occur. Here, disease, which occurs as a bodily crisis, has been occasioned to basically as a curative process restore bodily equilibrium. Passions (e.g., anger, sadness, and joy) are merely occasioned by sensations; the two differ significantly. Sensory receptors, as agents or simple conductors, between us and external objects only show our relations with the external impressions, which have actually prompted those relations; internal organs are settings [siège] for passions (Bichat 1805, pp. 49 – 50).

In inanimate nature, energy gives its operative efficacy [Wirksamkeit] to a cause; even in the simplest form of action, neutralized by reaction. We find operations of such causes in many examples of mechanics, physics, and the like. When it comes to the animate life the whole operation changes. While cause, stimulus, and motives still remain under the law of necessity, Newton’s third law (action equals reaction) radically shrinks, because, stimulus and motive, both of which have complex operative efficacy, response largely to small perturbations. Stimulus takes cause to a higher level (e.g., a polyp), but when the circumstances become complex, so do neuronal activities; the multiplex nervous system implies an increase in the number of drives and needs [Bedürfnisse] in the animal, with proportional increase of the objects satisfying those needs. The needs, some of which of erotic nature, are constantly introduced, in the shape of driving needs [Triebbedürfnisse] to compensate for animal’s constant experiencing tensions (Freud 2014, pp. 297, 313) and to reach its now complicated [πολυτελεστερα] tasks.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051          All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

From order to order, from vegetation to animals, with or without consciousness, began the admission of stimulation, leaving off causation. The ever-ascending, the always-developing, orders, now, are to delay the stimuli, for the sake of ever-increasing manifold of needs and over-crowded neuronal connections. The cost of such complexity is only affordable by the wealthy motive, which necessitates consciousness – explained further below. For example, under difficult circumstances, one’s talents enhance, and a lover’s memory deepens. Or, due to environmental conditions, in which dogs and cats live, organs treating olfactory signals have developed more than in humans, who, in comparison, rely less on this particular sense. A rat can lick its food numerous times without rest, because olivary neurons fire as many as required. And, the rhythmic activity of our reticulospinal neurons has evolved in pace with our walking movements. (I come back to this discussion when I write about the effects of motivation on learning.)

While modes of operative efficacy can always be distinguished, we may see them operating side by side. For example, respiration can be elicited directly by the involuntary stimuli of nuclei of the brain stem, or be acted out, with just the same necessity, by voluntary operations (e.g., parented breathing during labor, or giving up breathing and ending one’s life like Diogenes), thus by motives.

The above example of breathing captures the main points of this section saying that anatomical separation of parts, based on structure and functionality, sometimes is not as sharp as one may imagine; that is, we deal with a gradation of structures and functionalities. For example, blink reflex and secretion of tears have sensory receptors that are stimulated by external impressions; but at the same time an actress can cry during an audition by her own sheer volition. A behavior that appear in this way is a result of a train of neural activities through neuronal groups and fiber connections of different levels of gradation. For instance, one may not interpret a pain as responses of tissue damage but, the pain graded to a higher level, may be referred to as a sign of a necessity in changing one’s lifestyle. One of my uncles, for instance, intentionally burned a little part of his hand that would remind him that he should never ever do a favor to anyone.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051        All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071


Coupling and Networking

The universal method of any explanation and the most general form of all representations or phenomena, Metron, the principle of relations, by now enough pressed on, weighs in with the observation that coupling, a wiring pattern, of neurons (whether with each other or with bodily organs) determines the way internal signals (information) are communicated. A neuron and properties of a synapsis only intermediate as functional units, it is only by way of coupling that neurons begin to cooperate and fulfil a task or avoid one. To attract female bowerbirds, for instance, the male must construct a unique chateau, decorated with colorful objects, braided and jeweled. Not only that, he must perform one-of-a-kind dance moves. A wrong stone arranged, an incorrect straw put, a slip in dance, or even a momentary rush cost him a seasonal waiting list to perhaps someday he may mate, if lucky enough. A male who succeeds has gained a fortune, an interneuron coupled (intercalated) within instinctual pathways that makes him to stand out from other competing males and impress his mate. When one says, “I learned my lesson,” it means that there is a good chance that (as a result of an experience) a new synaptic coupling has emerged that helps one to avoid a similar painful or wrong experience.

Coupling occurs under the influence of what is called “elective affinity” [Wahlverwandtschaft], which implies both closeness and fusion. The black boxes of a plane, crashed into a sea, must be submerged and kept in close relation [Verwandtschaft] with salt water, before being examined. Because, in this way, boxes’ chemical affinity [Verwandtschaft] for fusion [Mischung] and oxidation, now being occupied by salt water, remains unused. In the same way, true friendship is always a fusion of selfishness (ερως) and sympathy (αγαπη). Two images formed on the retina can be fused into one, by convergence of signals, whenever the gaze is fixed. And, the works of a genius is a de-fusion of intention and reflexion. In a wider sense, sadism and masochism are considered as a fusion of plain libidinal and sheer destructive urges [Strebungen] – the rate of fusion is however variable. For instance, sudden increase of sexual aggression alters a lover to a sex-murderer; whereas, its sharp decline makes one shy or impotent (cf. Freud 1940, pp. 13, 18).

Dispersion of parts in infinite space without limiting each other and their variation in endless time without interfering with each other is as inapplicable as the existence of one thing in infinite space and endless time. Coupling (in accordance with which we understand how different parts and functions of an organism are related to each other) is the first necessary connection of parts and their functions, on the one hand, and, on the other, is the first state [Zustand] of the “elective affinity.”

A state is dynamic and  completely at unconscious level; “as a dark driving energy-force” [als finstere treibende Kraft]. Physiologically, state depends on “the probability of discharging the number of excitation” (Freud 1940, p. 31) to conserve [Erhaltung] the internal economy of the animal, in whom stimuli (and motives) always necessarily condition it.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051     All right reserved: Reg. No.  TXu 2-118-071

In the conservation of organism, we can find this economic aspect everywhere. For instance, equal dispersion of ions is necessary for cells to conserve osmotic equilibrium. Or, to conserve normal synaptic transmission, the transmitter is balanced by receptor activity. The basic role of hypothalamus, for example, is to make sure that autonomic and endocrine operations conserve bodily homeostasis (such as, digestion, bodily fluid balances, and temperature control). Also, as long as the systolic blood pressure is between 60 and 160 millimeter of mercury, the brain conserves continual blood flow; and along this conservation, astrocytic processes around brain capillaries are responsible to conserve the features of the blood-brain barrier. The cardiac output, as another example, must constantly be regulated to conserve the bodily blood flow to the organs. Bodily postures and upright position (from sitting to standing on a downhill incline) are examples of conservation by means of the motor nervous system, with the important role of vision in the process. And when fatigue occurs other motor units are recruited to conserve the needed force. Not to mention that during all these bodily movements, the ability to conserve focused attention, or rapidly shift it, remains constant (i.e., it does not reduce its operation). Or, we find that separate axons are grouped in accordance with their thickness as they enter the spinal cord, but this separation is conserved all the way to higher levels. Even the feeling of pain, which has evolutionary importance, should be conserved for bodily homeostasis and defense mechanism – one important factor for this conservation is called stress reaction (discussed further below) which is a coordination between endocrine, autonomic, and somatic responses. It is not the decline of cognitive processes with aging that has surprised the researches but the maintenance (conservation) of those processes despite the aging component. We read, for example, “The puzzle for cognitive neuroscientists is not so much in explaining age-related decline, but rather in understanding the high level of cognitive success that can be maintained by older adults in the face of such significant neurobiological change”[1] (Park & Reuter-Lorenz 2009, p. 183; cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 204ff). The economic aspect of conservation and maintenance goes beyond individual, and extends to the preservation of  generation – which is discussed more extensively below. For example, prolactin must stimulate the growth of the mammary glands so that the milk production is constantly preserved.
[1] Italics by me.\

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051         All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Metron determines experience as the law of (causation, stimulation, and) motive, which as mentioned earlier, it (stimulus or motive) conditions a state. Now, as a state earmarks the one succeeding it (with this process continuing ad infinitum, because of karma or the absolutely strict chain of causality) groups of intercalated connections go beyond (simple) couplings; we confront a new (second) state of “elective affinity,” a network (of couplings) which is organized to interconnect signals, for the sake of a more complicated function (e.g., how to solve a problem), always under the guidance of “elective affinity.” Based on complex structure of networks, any attempt to compare different functions with networking nature must be conducted with care and caution.

A few examples on the subject under consideration may help. Behavior of a vertebrate animal, with fairly plain and small brain (e.g., a tiny lizard) is mainly controlled by fixed stimulus-response relationships or couplings. When an object visually attracts such animals, a standard goal-oriented movement raises thereafter. Between the receptors and the effectors, a few neurons interact and consequently the animal responds and adjust to its environmental changes. Its behavior can be classified mainly as reflexive, mechanical and instinctive; and basically, not subordinated to learning, in its general sense. As we move to higher gradation, we find animals such as small mammals (e.g., a mouse) that their small brain is relatively dedicated to decoding the environmental objects, through specific networks, and use of the decoded information for immediate sensorimotor transformations. In primates, relative to their body weights, the brain has noticeably evolved with fairly large size and weight. In accordance with this, the fairly large brain, interfering with stimuli, changes the responses (now a motive) according to distributed networks of its past experiences.

The specific networking structures are of different forms. The first simple form is looping structures. Loops appear in early phases in the development of embryology of nerve tissues (e.g., axon loops between neurons of the mantle and marginal zones). Some neuronal networks form clusters of islands; while others make compartments of matrices. In the last two forms, some connections work as gating mechanism (to affirm one signal, while suppressing another one), and others only stop ongoing movements. A good example of these structures can be seen in the striatum, which is the main source of the basal ganglia.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA       USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051          All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Anatomically, the nervous system, which connects the receptors and the effectors, within itself may influence neurons (by divergence), or receive synaptic contacts from neurons (by convergence). Divergence and convergence make networking possible. Networking then enables information from one place to propagate to many places, or from many places to act on one common pathway. Such a distributed system of networking causes a need to change itself (displacement, verschiebung), take the place of another need (replacement, Ersetzen)[1], produce a whole new connection of neurons, and/or make other parts sharpen[2] (e.g., one who losses eyes, but will gain a sharp auditory ability). These mechanisms have deep roots in evolution. For instance, the so-called olfactory brain, in the evolution of the brain, has gradually lost its main role in higher vertebrates and its structures primarily have joined other parts. In infants, some primitive reflexes (such as sucking and grasping) slowly weaken and voluntary controls (with networks) take precedence, especially over their reflex-arcs. (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. xi-xii, 120, 266, 289 – 330).


Controlling Mechanisms

Whether response of a fixed relationship (based on couplings) or performance of a complex skill (based on networks), the receptive sensory neurons, according to my earlier exposition, must be occasioned by external impressions and extract information from environment. For, “One’s own body, primarily its surface, is a place from which outer and inner perceptions [Wahrnehmungen] proceed.” (Freud 2014, p. 34). Once the signal (information) is occasioned, it may confront an important process, which (consciously or unconsciously) adjust and correct the information. The mechanism involved in this process is called sensory feedback, by which, for instance, the centers for movement, whether during an action or after its operation, constantly receive information from sensory signals to update their movements. Or, visual information is constantly needed for muscles to adjust their movements in regard to joints and the skin.

Whether during the regulation of inner milieu (e.g., managing the involuntary muscular movements), or in the course of regulating the surrounding environment (mainly by signals from the surface of the body, the cortical homunculus; e.g., dealing with the voluntary muscular activities for conscious adaptation), any mismatch between the sensory feedback and its target muscular commands (e.g., as seen in bizarre “sensations” by amputees, especially in positions of their body image of the extremity) can affect the entire brain (e.g., chronic pains were alleviated by use of mirrors and adjustment of abnormal body image in amputees). (The main role of the brain, in its widest sense, is to integrate signals.) In this way, it deals with a body part or a behavior as a whole. For small parts or when only precise moves are needed, other sort of feedbacks, such as proprioceptive one, are used; in such cases other parts of the higher areas – without the involvement of the cortical brain – may suffice. Because of sensory feedback, learning a new skill (e.g., playing a piano) becomes time consuming, especially in the beginning of the practice, especially in cases with which the cortical parts make internal connections.
[1] Also called the process of substitution.
[2] Sometimes it is called the process of compensation.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051         All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Sometimes a feedback may stabilize the operations of nervous system by means of simple reciprocal connections; many neurological diseases have their symptoms rooted in the failure of this kind of feedback. Other times, a feedback is to ensure that one part has succeeded in its task.

For example, a nucleus (and its genetic codes) via feedback mechanism is informed of its targeting cells (e.g., protein synthesis is active or not). Or, the dynamic feedback connections between thalamus and the cortex contribute (by motivational encouragement) to one’s understanding of learning progress with successful results. Studies already have shown that, during early phases of sleep, the cortical feedback influences the firing patterns of various parts of the thalamus (Felleman & Van Essen 1991, p. 11). Or, the hypothalamus has a feedback control function with regard to the higher parts that interpret the emotional situation.

There are feedbacks which make loops (e.g., loops between the spinal cord and the reticular formation) in their systems. To maintain a constant body weight, for instance, feedback loops control the body fat with the amount of food taken by the organism.

Often, the contributing part involved in a feedback (which mainly diverge information to modify context of sensory processes) is not clear; in this case the mechanism at work is called feedforward, which basically converge the signals to analyze sensory information such as color and motion of an object.

Whether feedback or feedforward, the controlling mechanism achieved in this way makes the processes of system dynamic (e.g., effects of drugs in the brain). Both feedback control process (FbCP) and feedforward control process (FfCP) are controlling processes with evolutionary values for the animal. For example, in constant challenge of balance in upright position by a newborn baby, control processes receive signals from the efference motor copies and whenever there is a mismatch between a sent command and its feedback then assessment and adjustment take place, until, for instance, he or she has master walking (and later for example surfing, diving, and so forth).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051         All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

When a choice [Wahl] is presented (e.g., should the heart beat faster or slower?) controlling processes determine the possibility of making the decision based on the necessity [notwendig] of the choice/task. When an animal is chased down, for instance, its controlling processes have provided it with the benefit of “hide if you are not to be seen.” The necessary relation between a need and occasion is the building block of controlling processes. The wild life animals living around our cities have the need to enter our territories, searching for foods, yet the occasional danger has taught them to control their behavior and stay away. Or, no opportunity (or occasion) flees the eyes of an ambitious person to get what he or she wants (needs). One who is cheap never forgets the loss of a wealth. And perhaps who would forget an insult (to one’s honor)?

One important outcome of controlling processes is predicting (i.e., comparing the expected outcomes and actual results); that is, a sensory input shall arise if such and such behavior is produced. Comparing an expected behavior with actual outcomes is one of the preliminary requirements for third cognitive processes.[1] During controlling processes, new couplings (and sometimes networks) are made, especially by conditional learnings, which contribute to enhancing skills through experience (this view was discussed above in the example of bowerbirds).


Order Processes

To study physiological functions, with some degree of certainty, I trace them back to two processes, out of which a state carries its task. I call the first of these processes (whose expositions appear throughout this paper) Lower Order Processes (LOPs).[2] During LOPs, 
[1] See A. §4.
[2] In a fascinating paper, S. M. Sherman (2005) has introduced the visual thalamic nuclei as switches (relays) with different orders (first-order and higher order) that are related to behavioral state, such as attention. It is noteworthy to say that Sherman’s paper is fit to prove my thesis on the distinction between lower vs. higher order processes in physiological processes of animals. His view, approaching the subject purely from neurology, and my metaphysical approach are two complementary parts of one literature.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA          USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051       All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

couplings are continuously active; otherwise, how neuronal activity could be sustained (e.g., during sleep), when there are no sensory input signals? The source of this activity goes back as early as embryonic development, in which groups of coupled neurons become automatically operational (i.e., sending signals without being activated from outside[1]). When one performs arithmetic reckoning in one’s head, after the stimulus (e.g., seeing 27 x 17) has disappeared, the information needs to be kept in mind for a while (called working memory) (cf. Baddeley 2003). Such tasks of continuous firing of signals (despite the presence of the stimuli), are possible because of LOPs, for, these signals rely heavily on the operation of couplings and are fundamental in working memory for task-oriented behavior (e.g., planning of responses under iGLS (described below) as in a looping space between hippocampus and the frontal cortex) (cf. Lynch 2004, p. 89).

The enteroceptive signals (e.g., signals arising from the internal organs) are active within LOPs. These signals are spontaneous, and their actions occur unconsciously, yet they may be confused by voluntary signals. Facial expressions that are sudden and disclose our true intentions (e.g., a smile at a funeral; grinding our teeth with anger; putting our hands on our head when our favorite team loses and putting them high in the air when they win) are examples of the LOPs at work. Calling LOPs the organic life, Bichat (1805) amazingly writes, “… it is on the organic life to carry the impressions of the passions …. The most striking proof for this (claim) is human gestures, which are emotional expressions of sentiment, and not of understanding [second cognitive processes]. The hand is raised towards head when we want to express intellectual phenomena relating to memory, imagination, perception, judgment and so forth; and the hand is directed toward heart, stomach, or intestines, when we wish to express love, joy, sadness, or hatred.” (p. 54).

[1] Without adding further remarks, I must continue going deeper into the exposition of inner bodily processes. We saw above that subject’s first awareness occurred after the muscular irritability (functiones naturales) and tried to justify (functiones animales) it thereafter. But before that functiones naturales, we have a series of neuro-chemical processes (functiones vitales), which act on their own, i.e., they possess a peculiar life, a vita propria – such as the spermatozoa carrying on their head the instruction and “adaptive power” (i.e., the power of selecting and adapting to proximate ends, Coleridge 2009, p. 180) of living organisms. Here, in vita propria, we confront the most original and essential working of the Ergon “in the internal mechanism of the organism and in its cultivation.” (The reader is advised to continue the subject beginning with the works of Gregor Mendel and others on the subject of modern genetics.) For instance, studies show that ejaculated spermatozoa may live for some time after the body has already entirely passed away. Or, we read that epithelial tissues can live outside the body and be transplanted into organs of animals of the same. These few examples may not be far from the truth that “Perhaps weeks may pass before the life in the last cell ceases” (Simmons 1900, pp. 1282 – 1283).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA           USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051         All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

The unconscious action following upon stimuli is mechanical. Physiologically, it is for the conservative equilibrium of the organism [Individuums] and collectively for the adaptive preservation of the species [Geschlechts]. LOPs, with considerable efforts, aim at the aforementioned conservation and preservation: “omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui.” The term effort implies that during a process, the organism confronts resistance [Widerstand] – which is why, for instance, during deep sleep, called REM sleep, pathways from the brain stem to the spinal cord with some efforts exhibit their lowest activity and resist all movements. And how many times people have woken up from a nightmare and showed, even momentarily, a feeling of relief [Zufriedenheit], because a resistance was lifted?

It was mentioned above that in order to compensate for the increasing complex environment coordinated compound of neural systems have evolved. That is to say, couplings, following the principle of Metron, soon extend their limited relations to form highly complicated networks. For example, a simple reflex (e.g., the response of an unconditioned reflex, such as closing the eyes after a jet of air hitting the eyelids, or a response to stimulated taste receptors) may advance to conditioned response, involving the cerebral cortex (e.g., when a bell rings, the animal shows an eye blink, or it increases secretion of gastric fluid at the sight of food). I call this next higher processes with  complex networking system, Higher Order Processes (HOPs).

A few couplings, functioning in LOPs, suffice for inner milieu of the organism, because everything happens with much the same way in its own zone [Bereich]. Toward external environment, however, a very complicated procedure [Veranstaltung] or HOPs are needed. On their own, LOPs remain unconscious, with the characteristic of having stimuli not causes at their disposal. The characteristic is an evolutionary factor that evolves even further, as discussed earlier, to something merely intellectual (motives), thus HOPs. I give an example here, but more expositions on motives will be given shortly. To see how “intellectual” our motives can be, we just need to recall that whereas the sight of a pray stimulates non-human animals as a food to be hunted, humans are, with full consciousness, motivated to hunt and use it as a decor in their houses.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051     All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Before further advancement, a preliminary table of the two processes (and their features) may help the reader:

Lower- and higher- order processes

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA          USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051          All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

To illustrate the processes of different orders for oneself, one may consider pain. For example, pain arising as a result of LOPs (e.g., appendicitis) is more diffuse and harder to precisely be localized, it has slower pulsation, with discomfort, nausea-like, feeling of fainting, lowered blood pressure and cold sweat. Pain arising from HOPs (e.g., skin burn) engages specific networks and are more noticeable without sometimes showing any traces of pain. As a combination of these processes, lung, kidneys, or liver cancers may begin with clear tissue damage but without any noticeable pain whatsoever.

HOPs and LOPs, like charitable organizations, by means of couplings and networks, modulate into the sphere of life-functions of the organism, to build peace; that is, to internally direct and externally govern the organism’s relations with the internal life and the external world. Both interplay in us; the thoughts and images of HOPs (like a person with eyes) move the LOPs (being like a blind person), excited primarily by objects, which are in return representations of HOPs. HOPs typically act upon LOPs. For instance, due to loss of a husband, a female’s hypothalamus alters endocrine and the autonomic systems, resulting in the appearance of menstruation in her. Or, a newbie mom who thinks about her baby (HOPs), may show signs of trickling milk from her nipple (LOPs). That LOPs (i.e., basically unconscious bodily expressions, in which couplings should suffice) differ from HOPs (i.e., mainly voluntary actions, which at any rate rely on networks) can be shown in people who suffer from Parkinson’s disease; they lack spontaneous facial expressions (LOPs), while are able to voluntarily smile in a social setting (HOPs).

In case we want to prevent these bodily, spontaneous (facial) expressions, we suppress them by means of HOPs. The role of inhibition (which is a product of inhibitory synapses in the nervous system) can be seen in the inhibitory act on reflexes of eye movements that are necessary to fix the visual scene when the head rotates; this is a simple mechanism of LOPs, during which networks of HOPs may interfere and be at work to exclude irrelevant signals such as a background tree, a passing car, etc. Or, one may voluntarily suppress the emptying reflexes of the bladder or the rectum. Until an appropriate response is selected through HOPs, a halt of movements (through LOPs) can be seen in a squirrel who suddenly meets a snake. Whether at the chromosome level or microanatomical differences, the differences of sexes in humans (e.g., their differences in hypothalamus) have been studied in various disciplines and literatures. One example related to this paragraph is that while testosterone in males boosts masculine behavior and inhibits feminine ones (apparently a result of LOPs), however, at a higher level, both sexes can suppress or sublimate sexual drives (cf. Freud 1940, pp. 10, 19).[1]


[1] In a larger scale, collective suppression is also at work. For instance, the Jewish nation has been suppressed simply based on practicing their religion. People suppress needs and wants for whatsoever reasons they may have. People under inescapable suppression have formulated a coming savior or a requiter. David Hume’s essays (On Suicide and On the Immortality of the Soul) were suppressed by both religion and the state. (I recall that in an argument with the lecturer, who was mentioned in Preface, I provided her with a physical copy of a page from Hume’s On the Immortality of the Soul, where he considers the possibility of the Metempsychosis. Interestingly, the lecturer left the page on the podium in the class. And, despite my frequent request to see for herself, she did not even touch the paper. The astute reader, by reading my present paper, should be able to guess why such an inhibitory act froze her entirely! Further remarks is given in §11.)

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051      All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071


A Field Theory

Coupling and networking are the underlying characteristics [Grundcharakter] of LOPs and HOPs, respectively. To explain the underlying nature, a summary of what we have read so far may help. The start of the “elective affinity” – concerning this paper – is at the moment that the present state of the organism is (internally or externally) occasioned. Thereafter, the fundamental effort of energy-force, which has operative efficacy, begins its processes. Since, separation of parts, based on structure and functionality, seems pretty helpless, the concept of gradation (and thus order processes, OPs) was formulated. The underlying nature of these OPs can have two forms: coupling, and networking.

In the narrowest and most primitive sense, the role of lower order processes, by means of couplings, and for the preservation of the organism, is to excite or inhibit the next state. Excitation and inhibition themselves are actions and thus are under the law of necessity; that is, they follow a causal chain. Thus, the organism, a coupling, or an entire process may come under scrutiny by an (internal or external) occasion; that is, they may face a controlling mechanism and some modifications may occur.

But, once energy-force gave up its primordial unity and began to manifest (in time and space; i.e., as matter and thus in action), there started the possibility of multiplicity [der Möglichkeit der Vielheit]. In other words, as environment became complex, so did the organism, i.e., the animal and its needs. The complexity thus gave birth to higher order processes with its underlying characteristic of networking. Operative efficacy of stimuli changed to motives and thus a brain was needed to unify the quite complex circumstances.

To systematically describe the complexity of physiological functions, in psychology, 1920s to 1940s have witnessed incredible minds, such as Kurt Koffka (1886 – 1941), Wolfgang Köhler (1887 – 1967), Kurt Lewin (1890 – 1947), among others. According to their systematic approach, behavioral environment (Koffka 1936), the total field (Kohler 1947), controls the processes that lead to behavior. Taking the view that behavior is a function of environmental changes and individual’s mental processes (Lewin 1936), Lewin gives the infinitesimal changes of a process further thought such that the changes condition alterations of direction and magnitude of psychical forces (1935, pp. 32 – 33).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA       USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051      All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

The upshot of all these is that the manifold relationships of all parts admit of dynamical explanation. That is, a system of behavioral (both emotional and cognitive) determinants can be devised in form of a field theory, as described in the rest of this paper. In a wider sense, “the field and the behaviour of a body are correlative” (Koffka 1936, p. 42).

In a field theory, the difference between temporal discreteness of LOPs (e.g., some functions of the cerebellum) and spectral categories of HOPs points to the fact that stimuli of the former are more signal-based, whereas, motives of the latter are behavioral-based (cf. Sutter in Malmierca & Irving 2005, p. 254). The difference between the two OPs also indicates that neurons that are active within a field have overlapping and wide tuning curves, such that single stimulus within LOPs can activate and often overlap with masses of neurons in HOPs (cf. Schneider 1969, p. 900).

LOPs are evolutionarily older than HOPs, and we should not underestimate their superiority. Perhaps functions of HOPs do the work, but it does not mean that the involved LOPs completely submit to HOPs commands; LOPs always, like a Sultan who enters with his proof or disproof, (inhibition or disinhibition) do the main functions (and actions) that are necessary to complete their tasks. In a meticulous study on hamsters, G. Schneider (1969) observed that “once the newer cortical visual structures have evolved, to subserve at least conditional responding to shapes and patterns, the older tectal structure still functions as an area where neural impulses converge to affect orienting movements.” (p. 900).[1] Schneider’s anatomical distinction between spatial localization of the lower order (e.g., where art thou?) and object identification of the higher order (e.g., who art thou?) gives preliminary evidence to the fact that different order processes have evolved and intervene, within a field, to guide actions, with no necessary superiority of the later developed parts. For example, single lineal damage to the auditory cortex (a part works under HOPs) makes an animal to have difficulty in locating sounds coming from the opposite side of the damage. But, they are able to move their head and eyes correctly, proving that the nuclei of the lower levels of auditory pathways function and sound location and corresponding reflexes (LOPs) work properly. The most primitive of the senses and the most important in the old phases of evolution, the sense of smell possesses its own “olfactory brain;” of which the entire cerebrum was dedicated to serve olfactory information. If after various evolutionary stages and the emergence of the new parts, HOPs took the upper hand from the phylogenetically old ones, it is because first, as it was mentioned earlier, this is so only in higher vertebrates and second, its structures of the old parts have basically joined other areas (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 250, 266).
[1] Italics by me.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA          USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051         All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071


Roles of Order Processes

Functionality of LOPs may be disturbed [Stören] in the presence of HOPs. One reason may be the loss of evolutionary importance of one information over another one. The role of pheromones, for instance, in social communication is high among rodents but in primates it plays a considerably minor role. As inferred by Swaney and Keverne (2009): “… the evolution of trichromacy as well as huge increases in social complexity have minimised the role of pheromones in the lives of primates, leading to the total inactivation of the vomeronasal system in catarrhine primates while the brain increased in size and behaviour became emancipated from hormonal regulation” (p. 239).

Sometimes the animal may face many tasks and HOPs interfere or delay the timing, thus affecting LOPs. For example, the motoneurons (e.g., as in several lumbar segments L2-L4) receive information from all over the central nervous system – i.e., from both stretch reflexes of lower lumbar to higher order cortical synapses. Now, when a physician taps under one’s knee, as a result, the leg may respond to a motoneuron in L4, but the patient may voluntarily interfere in moving the leg; not to mention that even anxiety as well as learning (or adaptation of the stretch reflex) can affect this reflex or delay its timing. One corticospinal neuron in the elementary motor area (i.e., a higher-lower connection), responsible for muscle contraction, for instance, can interfere and excite or inhibit actions on some motoneurons, depending on the quantity and whereabout of synaptic contacts.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA      USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051         All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

The delay or disturbance of LOPs by HOPs is only simulated. Through external objects, different signals reaching the parts responsible in HOPs may result in conflict [Widerstreit] of motives, which thereafter they hinder LOPs, causing indecisiveness [Unschlüssigkeit]. But, cognitive processes themselves are the result of distributed, interconnected networks, and thus are expressions of HOPs. So, what really affects LOPs must be looked for in sensory signals affected by external impressions, which affects motives, in accordance with which their particular conscious knowledge begins. (Internal impressions affect stimuli, in accordance with which reflex acts.) For example, in conscious exercising of a hand squeeze ball, the command is issued through HOPs (e.g., functions of the elementary motor cortex), thereafter, if the ball needs some adjustment, the control processes contribute to improve the exercise, which result in some delay in task performance. Freud (1940) has also observed the disturbance of the unconscious processes of lower order by external changes and demands, working only under the apparent influence of HOPs. For instance, once a boy confronts an external impression that stimulates the fear of castration, unable to withstand this first trauma, he may indulge into phantasies or develop hatred (resultant works of HOPs). As a result, all conflicting [widerstreitenden] bodily feelings, remaining at unconscious level, hold their disturbing [stören] power to just affect boy’s later development (pp. 52 – 53).

LOPs own what is called principle of uncertainty. One who has a very sensitive egoism is always “on the edge,” which in turn it introduces anxiety, resulting in firing of signals that cause a state of uncertainty. When one probe into our personal life, we become uncertain about our basic phases of the flow of experience (Schwitzgebel 2011, p. xi). Were it left to LOPs to work alone, human consciousness  of a sensory experience – if it could exist – would forever remain uncertain. Furthermore, studies show that almost everywhere in the nervous system, whether the spinal cord or the brain, only “relevant” signals are allowed to proceed; also, context-dependent signals and changing (as opposed to constant and self-produced) signals have priority. But, where is the origin of this censorship? Is there one “agency” responsible, or there are many? What happens to the quality of sensations (e.g., warm, cold, etc.); especially when they already are categorized as subjective, whether a feeling or a representation? Is the received partial information, the “true” information? Questions like these take us to an interesting route, whose landscape consists of interconnections within nervous system that can be classified, explaining how signals proceed and why not all of them are consciously felt or perceived, leaving some information to be processed at subconscious level, while others are merely unconsciously processed. (Answers to these questions are spread through the rest of the paper.)

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA       USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051         All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

The uncertainty principle is known a priori through excitation and inhibition. And, since, the processes of lower order work as excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms, they are expected everywhere (even at the individual single-cell level), controlling movements of the organs and actions of the body. “Juxtacellular stimulation allows for the controlled stimulation of a single cell, allowing one to probe specific types of excitatory or inhibitory neurons individually” say Nielsen & Callaway (2008, p. 11). Yet, different stimulations (motivations) result in different behavioral effects, which in return they confront feedbacks and modifications.

Controlling mechanisms and weighing (selecting and suppressing) of sensory information have evolutionary roots and can be favorable to the life of the organism (e.g., the control of neuronal homeostasis), because, they prioritize the most appropriate signals. For instance, a controlling mechanism must be at work, otherwise a small increase in the glutamate concentration in the brain can cause a large increase of effect in the extracellular concentration that can be toxic for the brain cells; an evidence of disobeying Newton’s third law by stimuli.

Evolutionarily, some parts of the nervous system have developed characteristics that give them dominance over other parts. Interrupting rate of transmission at postsynaptic potentials, for example, has shown that minimal Cl– ions flowing into the neuronal cell can short-circuit the depolarization; that is, it causes inhibition at the neighboring excitatory synapse (Brodal 2010, p. 44). Such a short-distance controlling path gives a part a dominance, or a central role, over other parts that have not developed it. In 1937, J. W. Papez rightly attempted to allocate the micro-circuitry role to a larger context (known as the circuit of Papez), according to which interconnections of group of neurons (beginning from hippocampus to the hypothalamus, the anterior thalamic nuclei, and the gyrus cinguli, and back to the hippocampus) form a coherent mechanism for emotional expressions (p. 743). In a similar fashion, Grillner et al. (2000), allocating neuronal microcircuits to behavioral patterns, have formulated a model that describes how changes in ion channels can lead to excite networks at behavioral level. For example, the networking systems[1] in the brainstem-spinal cord, through which motor patterns are generated depend on a dialogue between properties of cells and the networking arrangement of the neuronal connections (Grillner et al. 2000, pp. 233-234).
[1] The term “system” can be confusing. For instance, Brodal (2010, p. 301) says, “So many parts of the brain contribute in different ways to motor control, however, that lumping them together in a “system” confuses more than it clarifies.”

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051        All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

The term dialogue, like Krishna Misra’s dialogue (Taylor 1893), refers to complex interaction of parts with various functionalities. The dialogue has one more similarity with Vedantic cosmology. That is, both divide the one whole into microcosm (LOPs) and macrocosm (HOPs). Microcosm is the infinitesimal portion of the macrocosm, representing its potentiality (perpetual couplings) in the smallest cell-part; microcosm is the prototype of the macrocosm. Therefore, functions (e.g., circuitry, feedback and so on) of networking operation explain how higher processes interact with lower ones.

A study by W. Wang (2008, pp. 23 – 24), for example, has shown that how the role of dynamic effects of feedback on visual system, with the same circuitry role of brain mechanism, is higher than any of its generic shape and form of it. The study though falls short of descriptive exposition on saying how this dynamic role can be related to circuit systems. According to Metron theory, I can deduce that in a point-to-point transmission of energy and charges (information) the source is directed or guided, that is, it follows transmission line theories. It is also predictable that at least one part in the process must work as cavity resonator – hippocampus with its neuro-architectonics, walls, and early evolutionary development is a possible part to look into it. For instance, for an information to be consolidated (i.e., lasting synaptic changes to occur) in the higher parts of the brain, the power to these parts must be supplied continuously such that the information (signals) oscillates around a set point. Hippocampus, the resonant cavity, supports the needed oscillations; this supporting role is interpreted as the “dialogue between the hippocampus and other parts of the cortex” (Brodal 2010, p. 480). It has also been shown that the hippocampus has two-way cortical connections, suggesting an intimate cooperation between them. Hippocampus’ direct and indirect connections with the amygdala furthermore confirms that emotions must have crucial effect on higher parts (and thus on learning). The triangle of the amygdala-hippocampus-cortex, then, carry a constant synaptic activity called long-term potentiation, which is related to learning (synaptic plasticity), attention and memory (Lynch 2004, p. 87).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051        All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071


Inter-Gradation Loop Spaces

To avoid giving the mere impression that HOPs are entirely conscious, I proceed further on the line between physiological and psychological functions. HOPs may sometimes occur at subconscious level[1]. At this level, important processes of selection and suppression are at work. One example (that everyone may have experienced) is the subconscious treatment of auditory information by evoking the related reflex responses, whose sensory pathways, in the spine as well as the brain, are treated as “irrelevant” or “unwanted,” whereas, “relevant” signals are enhanced.

The said line is an interesting road, crowded with preferential caravans at work. For instance, context- or activity-dependent information may get amplified or minimized. Receptors are most attracted to stimuli that change, not to signals that are constant. Self-produced sensory information is inhibited, while unexpected external signals are enhanced. More operations are happening in this caravan-road. Sensory signals are discriminated or distorted, and the brain does not produce a “true” objective representation of the external world. Parts of the brain may provide one with goal-oriented movements (e.g., grasping an object), while size, shape or orientation of the object remain unconscious – a virtual grasp of a real object, one might say. An interesting study of cases with similar symptoms (such as visual agnosia) has been researched by Goodale and Milner (1992, p. 22).

Among various networks of HOPs, one of them is quite important and essential. It is called a default-mode network of the cortex. This network increases activity of the default-mode when one does not need to focus on a particular task, such as automatic thought processes with minimal cognitive activities (e.g., solving a moral dilemma). The network’s activities are decreased when one is conducting a goal-oriented task (e.g., solving a version of the Stroop color-word interference activity). The activation of the default-mode network is commonly known as “brain is relaxed” (cf. Harrison et al. 2008). The study by Ben Harrison et al. (2008) has one more advantage to what I called (A. §4) meta-examination (whose discovery was credited to the Austrian physician J. Breuer 1842 – 1925). Such an introspecting task, meta-examination, is possible when one is relaxed, and self-oriented. Enough, at this point, of this amazing research by Harrison et al.
[1] For the sake of simplicity, I have hesitated to name Middle Order Processes (MOPs), which are active at subconscious level. For example, when one tickle oneself it does not cause him or her itching or laughing. It seems that experience has provided us with subconscious awareness (a work of modules, in the cerebellum, on networks of the cerebral cortex) to expect somatosensory signals. Evolutionarily, unexpected signals, which are unpredictable to sensory cortex, should not be suppressed.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA           USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051          All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

HOPs may on occasion need to be aroused and apply attention to a task which is of utmost importance and has clearly surfaced to consciousness. Such salient information is proceeded, nevertheless, in two different ways. One is when the animal is happy with the present task and is adapted to it by means of mainly specific networks (e.g., those of the locus coeruleus). The mode of neuronal activity that is involved in this type of behavior is called phasic, during which focus is optimized for the ongoing task. Unexpected stimuli (e.g., a statement by a comedian) and/or unusual context (e.g., an unexpected act of a comedian) influence arousal-focused attention, which occasion for the other mode (tonic). Tonic firing shifts animal’s behavior and attention toward a new and more rewarding task; more networks (e.g., those from the coeruleus neurons, the cingulate and the orbitofrontal of prefrontal cortex) are engaged, while other networks (e.g., that of the gyrus cinguli) check for errors and compare the behavior with the expected results. (cf. Aston-Jones & Cohen 2005).

“Suffering, hanged on a want of proportion;

Did I get what I expected?

A want having in knowledge, all its portion;

Abolished by insight, if only it is respected.”

The simplest act of an animal (e.g., response of a blink reflex) is the result of a relation; thus, works Metron! So, is there any other important relation left before the consideration of field and animal behavior is given? Previously, I classified processes of selection and suppression (process of weighing) as series of activities by which some of the information changes at subconscious level. For instance, in the absence of HOPs, the spinal cord still selects signals and produce rhythmic alternating leg motions by means of central rhythmic generators, which are “complicated spinal networks of interneurons with excitatory and inhibitory interconnections …” (Brodal 2010, p. 313). At this subconscious level, there is another mechanism, the inter-gradation loop spaces (iGLS), whose (parallel) processing connections of neuronal fibers intercalate LOPs to HOPs, thus, securing detecting operation, required for optimal functionality of HOPs (i.e., when an action should stop or switch to another one) in a circuitry form. We can find examples of iGLS in the basal ganglia, and those within the cerebellum.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051        All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Geometrically, area with iGLS are more organized than parts responsible for other processes. Therefore, we find more meshes (i.e., networks that can function independently) in the former, but inter-dependent networks in the latter. In addition to parallel processing, the iGLS combine (convergence process) various kinds of information and supply both LOPs and HOPs with some answers. The role of iGLS, within OPs (both higher and lower order processes), is only intermediary; iGLS neither issue the command nor program it. Insight has no room in them; mere trial and error and repetition are welcomed there. The circuitry nature of  iGLS helps the animal to plan for a new action, by means of putting together single data or using the stored ones (especially those of working memory, as described earlier). Such circuitry mechanism implies that not only physiological  functions are interconnected, but also any study of human behavior must take its subject in a total context of functional categories (i.e., sensory, motor, and cognitive).  They (iGLS) also participate in habitual learning, in attention-required events, in the selection of a specific action or behavior, in comparing signals from HOPs with those of LOPs, and in detecting errors of different order processes. Additionally, they work as emotional control switches.

It is on iGLS to carry out both all-or-none (e.g., informing the animal of an error in movement, while learning a new task) and graded (e.g., how to hold a nail between fingers) signals; and they intervene any time the animal confronts a choice. The nature of confronted signals is sensuous perception, but in humans they may have elicited from the third cognitive processes; i.e., they may be abstract concepts. The evaluation or giving priority to an information which proceeds from HOPs consists, in non-human animals, always of perceptible information, the execution or switching of which occur in iGLS. The innocence we attribute to animals (or children in that regard) is because the signals running through iGLS are from second cognitive processes. (There must be corresponding body parts, such as eyes, that, according to the universal adaptation (later on, it will be described below), they attribute to that innocence.) In (adult) humans, the same procedure occurs, with the difference that evaluated information, besides perception, can be abstract in nature, thus making the execution a matter of deliberation. The entrance of signals from third cognitive processes into iGLS withdraws human actions from that innocence and with it appear deliberative conducts.

The inter-gradation loop spaces are responsible for unexpected or salient signals, which are of high intensity. What is at stake here is that based on past experience, the new motivated (intense) behavior (e.g., stimuli inducing reward-driven behavior) is linked with the old one. Whether rewarding or harmful, the signals, sent by the unexpected event, participate in animal’s associative learning[1]. Nevertheless, as it was mentioned earlier, an animal reacts to that information which is linked with a motivated memory (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 324ff, 336-338, 343, 350, 353, and Lynch 2004).
[1] See above, the discussion on simultaneously-occurring events. The higher order process of association is the physiological base for second cognitive processes.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051       All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071


Synthesis and the I

In whatever way the nervous system operates – from an eyeblink reflex or automatic reaction to a conditioned response of gastric secretion by ringing a bell, or to a long-term conscious operation of writing an essay – its sensory information must be “interpreted” by the system’s receptors, and act on certain effectors (muscles or glands) to convey its “needs.” But, from the stimuli of various sources, the nerves carry impulses (called action potentials) which are of the same nature along the axons, so how is it that the receptors induce different conscious sensations and the cortical brain brings them together (i.e., by continual integration) into a unitary perceptual representation?

In the interconnected networks, the “agency,” involved in sending the conscious command (for voluntary movements), begins its function with what is called “readiness potential” (i.e., a gently increasing negative wave, appearing in both hemispheres of the brain of someone who has been asked to perform a simple task); thereafter, it continues its networking communication with several other networks (in motor cortical areas) which consequently increase their neuronal activity (e.g., one practices a new skill). Now, when a skill is practiced, a copy of it, called efference copy, is sent back to parts engaged in HOPs, in which these parts gradually use their copies to update body scheme and the sense of agency. Furthermore, once an activity is practiced enough, as in routine life, the practiced task can be performed at the subconscious level with little engagement of the parts involved in HOPs[1] (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 313-314).

Now, as we saw before, when the number of “needs” increase, HOPs (e.g., convergence, and integration processes) begin to modulate and control areas in the lower levels. For instance, controlling blood pressure and body temperature by autonomic system alone (i.e., a result of LOPs) is poor and its coordination with higher centers such as hypothalamus and amygdala is required. The manifold information of the receptors and their united conscious representation implies that at some level a central analysis processor, the “I,” must exist.

[1] See below under the term habituation.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051           All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

The I does not mean that there exists “one” (final integrative) area in the nervous system that all aspects of an information is processed there. The constant integration (a synthesis of information)[1] is anatomically more bottom-up, i.e., from the first receptors to the cerebral cortex, from dissected signals to a uniform information. One example is our conscious experience of taste. While, in one setting, we experience countless expressions of taste, we unconsciously discriminate and code a population of sensory units into patterns. The responsible process in this population coding, as signals approach higher levels, is the synthesis or integration process (one process of HOPs) (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex of different sensory modalities) which provides the animal with a subjective experience (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 238, 274, 441).

The sense of agency and body scheme (and body image) are the product of a synthesis (Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception) that I have just generally distinguished its two components, of which I is their inflection point. (Its specific distinction appears further below.)


Totality and Centrality Behind Body-Mind Connection

In A., I held off a part of the physiological functions and explained only its purely cognitive part. But, here, so far, it has already clearly emerged that these functions may be experienced subjectively bodily, called feelings. So, as animals start to act, though different in degrees, they have a twofold realization: perception (a result of second cognitive processes) and feeling (a product of higher order processes). From these, perception is objective with subjective sensory experience, but feeling remains always subjective. The mediatory role of subjective sensory experience for perception makes cognitive processes secondary; whereas, direct connection of subjective bodily experience gives feelings a primary role within the animal’s subjective life. The necessary information for the former cannot be obtained by merely internal impressions; that is, by one’s own body without any outward movements. The signals for feelings, on the other hand, may be obtained directly by internal impressions. Since, feelings are related to internal impression, their primary part and their direct relation give us a special relation [besondere Beziehung] or a special Metron, by means of its realization one knows of oneself as individual. It is this individuality, or in a general sense, one’s own body (i.e., body scheme and body image) that enables an animal to distinguish itself from other animals (and objects). A body that can now be both perceived (due to its movements or its distinction from other bodies and objects) and felt.
[1] The higher order process of integration is the physiological base for third cognitive processes.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA          USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051            All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Through body image a conscious understanding of the structure (e.g., form and size) of the body is provided. Body scheme provides an unconscious sense of body parts in space. Body scheme is fundamental for actions and it constantly updates its information as one moves.[1]  Both body image and body scheme are unstable. For instance, stroke, schizophrenia, and other disorderly functions may cause one not to realize a body part or to assign its movement to someone else (cf. Brodal 2010, p. 264-265).

Through synthesis, the I, which itself is a product of the brain, is directly related to the body and indirectly to the bodily motions (i.e., spatial and temporal relation), which is explained below more comprehensively. Tasks, mainly acted out by the cortical brain, are the result of distributed networks. For instance, a distributed cortical network – not a single part– processes the vestibular signals, and the gaze fixation. Also, distributed network of the higher-level parts (e.g., the prefrontal cortex, the thalamus, and the basal ganglia with parietal cortex) manages to control visually guided behavior and spatial orientation.

In studying (human) movements, entanglement between behavioral (both emotional and cognitive) determinants is important. For instance, eyes and the body movements are entangled to the position and movements of the head. In other words, processes of different parts engage signals (e.g., signals from the vestibular system) that – unlike other sensory signals – are not physically functional on their own and do not elicit a conscious “vestibular” sense-perception.

To understand entanglement and fusion of behavioral determinants one may consider the word “grasp” in English, which has a double meaning of “hold something physically firm,” and “hold something mentally firm,” which is based on cogent and astute observation. Ignorance, agnoia (as the negation of gnosis, knowledge) in Greek has the practical implication that something has not been grasped. Knowledge, gnosis, primarily puts emphasis on the act; that is, it always needs an objective genitive, which point to the act of knowledge (grasping) not knowledge as such. “This act embraces every organ and mode of knowledge, e.g., by seeing, hearing, investigation, or experience, and of people as well as things” (Bromiley 1985, p.106).
[1] Similarly, the interior pathway of the visual system provides an explicit and conscious understanding of an object; while, its posterior pathway deals with implicit and unconscious sense of the characteristic parts of an object, and how it moves in space.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA          USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051           All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

The concept of entanglement helps to introduce another term because of the way some networking structures form themselves. Networking structure of processes, encountered so far, complete their complex tasks in parts (e.g., control of body posture, or that of eye movement) but, they are rounded [gerundet] into a totality (e.g., as in reticular formation) that now can emotionally affect the organism as a whole (e.g., the reticular formation by acting on respiration and circulation, to the control of awareness and attention, and regulation of sleep).

Group of disorders exists because interconnected networks are involved; but, only when totality of networks is taken into consideration a disorder can be termed.[1] For example, the effects of hormones (e.g., thyroid hormones) on the brain (e.g., apathy and fatigue) once disregarded it may lead to the misperception that the individual suffers from a “mental” disorder. Similarly, the absence of physical is not necessarily a “fact” to misdiagnose one (as in somatoform disorder). With the same token, causal relationships, or the risk and vulnerability, of developing gastric ulcers, coronary disease, asthma, and diabetes, can be increased by psychic stress.

Totality is phylogenetically old, but it operates by integration of signals (such as processes within the afferent connections of the hypothalamus, or its efferent connections to the reticular formation), and by coordination (such as processes between the connections of autonomic, endocrine and somatic responses). By means of integration (one physiological correlative of “elective affinity”), these signals, together with those of other networks (e.g., networks that are related to controlling movement, and to attention, emotions, and pain)[2] fuse together different sensory information of the immediate (body) and of the indirect or extrapersonal world as one totality. Body “ownership” or a “sense of agency”, the coherent I, is primarily the product of these total manifold networks, which also form the ground for internal models of processes responsible for a particular action (e.g., holding a pen). The important factor for body ownership or self-recognition is self-generated movement.

In studying a behavior (e.g., the movement of the eyes during a particular task), the separation of different networks (e.g., the control of both saccadic and pursuit movements) is only arbitrary, because different regions (e.g., the cerebellum and the cerebral cortex) participate in carrying out the behavior. So, having considered a behavior in totality, the feature that distinguishes the involved networks can be termed
[1] See below for further explanation, and why a field theory is important in studying psychological disorders.
[2] Additionally, two extrastriatal visual areas are responsible for identifying and assessing human body parts. Fusiform body area is specialized to identify the whole human body. Extrastriatal body area is responsible to visually recognize body parts.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051          All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

centrality; i.e., it receives stimulation of all sensory receptors, on the one hand, and executes commands to the cerebral cortex, on the other. As an example of centrality, one may take the hypothalamus, into which enter signals from higher level of the brain, taste and smell, together with information from the gastrointestinal tract, the blood pressure, and skin temperature. Also, signals about ambient light, as well as emotional information participate into hypothalamus’ networks. Then, all these signals in the hypothalamus function as “centers” of cell groups. Whether one’s feeding behavior increases or decreases food intake and body weight, the behavior itself depends on the centrality of its structure in hypothalamic areas and their coordination with other levels (cf. Brodal, pp. 373, 378, 380-382, 440-441, 443, 449, 452).

The underlying nature of centrality is known as homeostat, i.e., “a system maintaining a steady state by internal processes,” whose different functionalities define different homeostats (e.g., lipostat that controls body fat) (Brodal 2010, p. 452). Centrality takes advantage of iGLS, FbCP, and FfCP to guarantee its aims is achieved. This latter functionality makes centrality a control mechanism within totality (of mental and body processes).

In such manner, totality, with its varied activities, through different target organs (e.g., the reticular formation which is linked with thalamus, hypothalamus, cerebral cortex, and limbic structures) helps to explain the link between mental and bodily processes. The thought of meeting an ex or the recollection of a public humiliation may cause a calm mind to feel tense, producing sweat, and increasing heart rate. Or, how many times we had difficulty to fall asleep when an agonizing thought hovers over in our mind. And, conversely, when one practices yoga (to calm the muscle tones) one feels a reduction in mental tension, with considerable changes in respiration, blood pressure, heart rate, sweat secretion and bowel movements. Similar, but simpler, the link can even be seen deeper between the nervous system and immune system and how they mutually influence each other.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051        All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071


Totality and Consciousness

The separation of conscious and voluntary is less clear-cut than once thought. For example, gaze fixation on an object may not be voluntary, though it depends on the subject being conscious. The concept of totality is a step toward understanding what consciousness is. Totality has basically two modes: arousal and suppression. During arousal mode, a production of alertness of motor system with the attentive components of sensory receptors is evoked (e.g., as in sexual arousal, or in chain reaction of a stressful stimulus). Suppression mode, which controls arousal, is active in repression of needs, which is important in researches on learning and dreams, especially during the early life (cf. Freud 1940, such as pp. 19, 24). For instance, Freud in the same work writes, “Dream-related memory [Traumgedächtnis] quite often reproduces early impressions of the dreamer’s childhood, of which we most certainly claim that they have not only been forgotten, but also become unconscious by means of repression” (p. 29).[1]

Totality, nevertheless, works as a dimmer switch in activating related parts and thus varying the level of their performance, and that of consciousness. Now, for consciousness to appear two characteristics must be present. One underlying characteristic is its sense of unity, which consequently requires a central point of unity. That is, in a healthy organism, all signals and information, processed by various mental and bodily functions, are unified into one I.

The health of an organism is a salient feature for the formation of unity. For instance, when a stroke occurs, we witness that the unity is compromised (e.g., a stroke patient may deny his paralyzed body part as his own part). And because the seat of the consciousness is the brain, we can call this part of the I the theoretic ego, the scaffold [Träger] of the total consciousness, in which all rays of needs, moods, motives, inner images and thoughts come into focus. The rays themselves, i.e., the next important characteristic, constitute the content of consciousness, which contributes to the unitary I. The rays then are the dynamic ego, the energy-force of theoretic ego, which is the focal point of the rays.

Theoretic ego and its correlative (second cognitive)[2] processes and dynamic ego and its correlative (bodily)[3] processes have been studied under brain-to-body mass ratio. The weight ratio in mammals whose ratio is small (e.g., rodents) dedicates a considerable amount of their brain to sensorimotor changes without requiring other networks. The ratio has evolutionarily noticeably increased in primates; in humans it is twice as large as that of the chimpanzees. As we move up through the hierarchy of mammals (from rodents to humans), we find less fixed networks (mainly couplings of vital reflexes) between sensory receptors and behavior. Some stimuli, depending on their content and prior signals of the dynamic ego may participate (after the process of convergence) in various networks, in different points of theoretic ego; that is, the animal can compare representations (especially abstract concepts in humans) and exhibit purposeful behavior. Such complex involvement of networks makes it hard to understand human behavior, and their excess weight-ratio [Uebergewicht] of the brain over the body turns to be the predominant active part. Besides, as it was mentioned earlier, signals from third cognitive processes entering into iGLS, withdraw human actions from innocence (of children and animals) and throw them into the abyss of deliberative conducts.
[1] Italics by me.
[2] In mammals, mainly in humans, because of high activity of the process of integration, third cognitive processes are also involved. Freud (2014), calling theoretic ego simply ego, points to the special pressure that second cognitive processes (i.e., perception) have on the ego: “We have shown above that the ego is under the particular influence pf perception [Pept.-Cs] …” (p. 44).
[3] As well as emotional processes.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA          USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051          All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Whether the animal is conscious of a feeling or not, animals (with varying degrees) do have feelings; because feelings play the primary role in all animals. Now, in those animals that brain-to-body mass ratio is low, the primary part must be more active. They have a high feeling-ability; although they live (or are soaked) immensely in the present, and a conscious feeling is momentary and fleeting.

Consciousness, in its most general sense, is comprised of a known vis-à-vis a knower, whose light can be seen only by means of an object (i.e., the known component). In the formation of all knowledge, the known is first and integral, i.e., it is the prototype; whereas, the knower is the pattern. Sense of the present, whose description is given below, is sufficient when the two components of consciousness meet. In other words, memory of the past and worries of the future (which are the products of the reason or TCPs) are only subsidiary for the formation of consciousness. For example, people with dementia suffer from noticeable impairment of reason and personality, but their consciousness comes to no harm (Brodal2010, p. 143).

Since, I have distinguished between perception and feeling, their consciousness, allegorically speaking, their focal points, must also be distinguished. That is, processes for the formation of a conscious percept do not necessarily pass through the same networks to form a feeling. In visual agnosia, for instance, while the integration (i.e., a process of higher order) is impaired, the association (a second cognitive process) functions; whereas, in optic ataxia, association of events is damaged, but integration of signals works (Goodale & Milner 1992, pp. 21- 22). Or, in terms of a layman, when one says, “I feel” the I is somewhere deep “down.” But, one lays back, filled with pride and pleasing with oneself, somewhere high “up,” one says, “I know.”

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051       All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

For a perception to be formed, association of events is the least that is required, not to mention the integration of sensations, whose signals are subjected to extensive networking processes. But a group of couplings or fixed networks can produce a feeling. For instance, a single axon of sensory unit in Meissner corpuscle, once being stimulated, can result in a feeling of soft touch. But, a conscious perception of how hard the responsible muscle has been contracted requires at least two different networking sources: one is the total firing of the neurons in the motor cortex and the other is the proprioceptors in tissues that are contracted by that muscle. Or, reports confirm of the presence of consciousness of a percept without a conscious feeling of pain in rats, whose periaqueductal gray matter in the mesencephalic area has been stimulated (Brodal 2010, pp. 171, 180, 208). In fact, when cognitive processes intervene in consciousness, they may mask a genuine conscious feeling. A sincere smile, for instance, is very different and independent from that of a conscious purposeful smile. “That one may smile, and smile, and be a villain” – Hamlet 1: 5 (Bartlett 1882, p. 877).

Because feeling may be formed based on a few couplings, Newton’s third law becomes nearly clearer in certain feelings (e.g., conscious experience of emotions), and for this reason I distinguish between feeling and feeling reaction; but, how do they differ? Once, organism’s default steady state is disturbed (e.g., one is under the pressure of fear) it affects its homeostasis. That how the animal may react to this disturbed state may vary from one animal to another, because, the consciousness of these feelings appears at the level of reaction not during its preceding processes (e.g., the consciousness of an allergic reaction when it has evoked itching). The distinction has already helped different disciplines. For instance, in measuring an emotional reaction researchers measure the reaction time to a stimulus. Arguably, in humans, gender differences in reactions (e.g., aggression reaction) are rather obvious than other aspects of their life-processes.

Fearing, loving, hoping, striving, and in short, all affections are only reactions, because they have already past the necessary process of fusion of their opposing components, i.e., the known-knower. At these higher levels, at least a (short) circuitry mechanism is required for a consciousness of certain reactions and expressions of some (whether emotional or behavioral) feelings (e.g., fear and stress reactions). The default system for vigilant awareness, for instance, in agreement with totality as described above, must have a circuit that as a central part – perhaps the reticular formation – which adjusts the mode of awareness, or the level of consciousness, from watchfulness to sleep.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051       All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Furthermore, in studying the way an animal reacts – i.e., studying feelings (e.g., stress) and reaction feelings (e.g., stress reaction) – their sources must be taken into consideration. For instance, if the source of a stress is inside the body both stress and its reaction are somatic, but if the source is outside the body, then they are psychic. Furthermore, it has been shown that somatic stress is mainly uniform among different people; psychic stress, on the other hand, varies among individuals. The nature of psychic stress (i.e., how one perceives or interprets a situation) depends on many factors (e.g., past experiences and stress-related learning). One important psychic stress factor is the feeling of loss of control, especially when its source is unpredictable (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 456 – 457).

Mental stress (such as a major operation) can be regulated by some personality traits, e.g., optimism and positive expectation. The key element in this phenomenon is the expectation, i.e., the positive income after experiencing the stressful situation. If the outcome is constant disappointments with no positive result, then, the immunity can be compromised, indicating that inevitable negative situations, by constant recurrence seem to be permanent and thus less adaptive (Segerstrom 2005, p. 196).[1] Adding genetic vulnerability factors (in both psychological domain and molecular activity) to the situational victory over personal expectation we see why different people cope differently with stressful state of affairs. Within certain limits, though, stress may have survival value and be beneficial to organism’s development and adaptation (e.g., one is taking an exam or performs a public show). In primates, with lengthy time interval of reproduction, stressors help females to delay pregnancy to allow it happening whenever the survival of the embryo in the uterus is at its optimal success (Knobil 1988, p. 2667).

Structurally, stress reaction is the result of the hypothalamic effects[2] on hormonal changes, especially the autonomic nervous system, which is in circuitry relation with cortical layer by means of hippocampus; the whole system plays a crucial role in emotions, learning and memory.[3]
[1] More about this concept appear later under a description on fatigue.
[2] The coordinating role of the hypothalamus, a “superior center,” over productions such as palpitations, dryness of the mouth, fainting, blushing, paling, and sweating, especially autonomic effects (e.g., rapid heart rate and breathing, with distinct facial and posture expressions), is well known. It is agreed that the hypothalamus is the most active part of the brain engaged in the expression of emotions (called emotional reactions).
[3] For further views on the subject see A. Kamal et al. “Stress Affects Synaptic Plasticity and Basal Synaptic Transmission in the Rat Hippocampus In Vitro.” (In R. Wang et al. (2008) pp. 37-41). Also, Brodal 2010, p. 455 – 457. And M. Lynch (2004) pp. 87-136.
[2] Arthur Schopenhauer (1813/1960, pp. 1114 – 1115), citing a paper, Stele 10, 1859, writes on how in frightful situations (e.g., squirrel suddenly confronting a snake) a reflex may reversely act against an animal. He also adds that such situations are proofs of pessimism, as Aristotle says, “Nature is more a demon than a goddess”.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051         All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

On occasion, emotional processes shortcut a (behavioral) reaction, without the need of going through cognitive processes; as in conditioned behavior. When a stimulus is sudden and strong (e.g., a rat’s life is threatened by sudden confrontation with a snake) and there is not enough time for HOPs, parts with central role employ sudden reactions (e.g., freezing reflex); that is, by affirming the sudden and strong stimulus, controlling processes (e.g., through gating mechanism) suppress all movements, even the transmission of pain. A stressful event without a warning sign causes sudden arousal, and the animal is “caught off guard” losing control with no “outlet for frustration” only exhibiting reactions such as the flight-or-fight response, or the freeze response[2] (Banks & Hirschman 2016, pp. 29-30). (Similar suppression of all movement occurs during deep sleep or REM.)


From Totality to Field and Gestalt

The primacy of feeling over perception, or emotion over cognition, not only shapes the basic nature of this paper, it gradually shows that excitation of the former is automatic. For instance, once we are immediately filled with anger (this process begins automatically after the organism is affected by an internal or external impression), we need to spend considerable amount of time and energy (this process is secondary and not automatic, because it works with the aid of cognitive processes) to subdue the anger, i.e., the anger reaction. For instance, parts of the neocortex (e.g., prefrontal cortex) indirectly participate in majority of emotional processes. So, when we talk about emotional processes and affective behavior, we must consider the fact that they obey all-order processes. With the consideration that the role of centrality, and consequently totality, in HOPs proper, should not be underestimated. All these considerations take us to the next topic, field, in specific.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051        All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Field implies that the task under consideration cannot be pigeonholed. For instance, in studying salient emotions (such as a conditioned phobia) amygdala mediates in responding to them by means of various networking processes (e.g., processes of brain stem, autonomic, endocrine and somatic motor components). In weighing the emotional value of stimuli – within the domains of social and individual learning, memory and behavior – it is again amygdala that plays a central role. And besides, centrality of amygdala in emotional coloring has a survival value, because, it provides the organism with properly reacting to a stimulus (e.g., how to react to a happy face, or to reply to an angry comment in a political debate). Behavioral (both emotional and cognitive) determinants with totality of networks (i.e., field) merit further consideration.

The substrate of emotional processes (e.g., limbic system), within a field, may only seem different from that of cognitive processes (e.g., neocortex). Both processes, nonetheless, have distributed networks participating in complex tasks. The only difference to consider is that emotional processes have evolutionary precedence over cognitive ones. If for a particular emotional reaction, a part shows dominance (e.g., hippocampus and emotional expressions, or amygdala and emotional coloring), it is because of the evolutionary importance of the signals (e.g., emotional aspects of pain), based on which the part has developed dominance (e.g., circuitry relation) over other parts giving the part a central role (e.g., the famous circuit of Papez).

By means of circuitry networks, a part (e.g., amygdala) achieves an ability to access both loaded information (e.g., unpleasant or threatening stimuli from the reticular formation, at subconscious level) and unloaded signals (e.g., stimuli of the context of the unpleasant stimuli from cortex: a higher-order area). A circuit enables the individual to have a conscious experience of emotions. For example, the fear-provoking confrontation with the sight of a bear (a context that is provided by association component within HOPs) and palpitations (evoked by reflexes within LOPs) that engage amygdala (with its circuitry role) provides the animal with conscious experience of the fear.

Reciprocity (i.e., the nuclei receives afferents from the same area to which they send their efferents) is one important feature of a circuit. Which is why, amygdala nuclei (and hippocampal formation) are in direct communication of signals with the higher-level parts, such as the cerebral cortex, which thus indirectly influence the hypothalamus. Or, conditioned emotion-related behavior by means of one particular organ – e.g., amygdala and its fear-related conditional reactions such as freezing (engaging autonomic and somatic) and endocrine responses (e.g., involving increased secretion of cortisol) – has evolutionarily provided the organ to relay signals directly and indirectly within itself (e.g., amygdala’s “talk” with hippocampus for contextual conditioning as seen in fear reaction to environmental clues such as odor), giving it a circuitry advantage, within totality. Centrality of amygdala, the “emotional brain,” is so important that, for instance, in many cases of treating epilepsy its removal is recommended (cf. Brodal pp. 461, 500).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA      USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051       All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

In its early inception, Christianity (1 Corinthians 12:12ff) gave a very apt analogy on how despite differences in shape, form, functionality and structure, parts or members are related and constitute one entity. This one which I have called field has the following short story. Signals, from their inception through coupling(s) gradually begin a “talk” or “dialogue” and as they continue their communicating life their processes follow particular modes or forms, which I call gestalts. Gestalt is the mode of a dialogue (i.e., a process) between different areas. Gestalts provide a field with local integrity, essential to its processes of synthesis (or integration of information) and regulation (of attention and memory). For example, after conscious experience of a fear (e.g., one is confronted with a bear), a gestalt effectively combines an arousal (e.g., the reticular formation increases the EEG and attention spikes) with an emotional coloring (e.g., amygdala interpret that the scene as bad and dangerous), and by means of integration (which is a particular process of a field) of emotional and cognitive information (specific to HOPs) enables the individual with a proper decision,[1] and then an (integrated) action is accompanied. Thereafter, field by means of controlling mechanisms modifies the experience, which may evoke synaptic plasticity and the individual learns something – the entire procedure is known as the effects of motivation on learning.


Superego: A New Envoy

The subjective, primordial moral feelings work within a field with a specific gestalt, whose behavioral (emotional and cognitive) determinants are founded upon order processes first, and then on cognitive ones; remembering that the default-mode network of HOPs suffice for moral tasks. Bichat traces moral affections to lower parts of the individual (1805, p. 185). Emotional deficit in psychopaths has been reported to have strong link with morality, yet, intellectual deficits were not as such (Joyce 2006, p. 125).
[1] The exposition of decision has been given in A.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA          USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051          All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Furthermore, doing wrong accompanies inner pain of conscience (or the sense of guilt), referring to the so-called natural (moral) law or the state of nature [Naturzustande], valid only for human conducts. But, such a state cannot extend outwardly; it only inhibits one from wrongdoing, before an offence has occurred. It works as anti-motive [Gegenmotiv] to overcome any excitations. It identifies others as oneself, and in this way, extends the power of the dynamic ego. Thus, by means of identification, a new agency emerges that functions within one as the minister of the people (of the outside world). Through inhibition (e.g., threat of punishment), and by means of control mechanisms (and iGLS), the new agency, called the superego, interferes with the affairs of theoretic ego and rules as judicial conscience (cf. Freud 1940, p. 65). And, since theoretic ego has sensitive periods (during early childhood) and is affected by education and learning, the responsible gestalt for superego is developed alongside theoretic ego (cf. Freud 1940, p.10). In this way, transition from sensory stimuli to their emotional value[1] (especially in terms of reward or punishment, and particularly during childhood) becomes the foundation of teaching moral standards, disobedience of which is coincided with a sense of guilt, and thus guilt reaction (e.g., a need to be ill). For instance, before one responds to someone’s smile as “proper” (e.g., in a party), or “improper” (e.g., in a funeral), a (moral) transition must precede the response. Besides, proper perception of information is vital to adjust “social behavior properly” (Machado et al. 2008, p. 263) – especially during childhood and child’s attitude toward its parents. The importance of early childhood experiences in social and moral learning has been studied in a valuable work by S. Anderson et al. (1999). According to their findings, once prefrontal cortex in humans is damaged (early in life) patients later, despite a normal performance in intellectual abilities, show difficulties in solving social reasoning and moral dilemmas.

The increase in total sum of inhibitory mode, by this new agency, brings pressure (influence) to bear on the animal (basically humans) to limit satisfactions. The responsible gestalt (of certain networks) for this new agency, through this aggregation of inhibition, later establishes a fixation of self-destructive aggression (cf. Freud 1940, pp. 13 – 14). Now, with the possible exposure to genetic disposition, by which one inherits a cultural (collective) past,[2] the newly developed superego later takes the position of a re-educator. One example of presumed inherited past is seen in individuals whose amygdala was stimulated in lab. They have reported “memory-like hallucinations and déjà vu experiences – the feeling of having experienced the same situation before …” (Brodal 2010, p. 466).
[1] Similar to SCP. See §3.
[2] Totality, or in a wider sense, field may have reciprocal connections all the way to reproductive organs – to communicate some of the new changes in them. These changes later may transform into a form of mutation (cf. Sansom 2011, p. x).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA          USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051        All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Inhibitory role of the re-educator works by means of anti-striving [Widerstreben] and resistance [Widerstand], and when they are applied to one’s experience, it is said that they have a “need to be ill or to suffer” (Freud 1940, p. 42). That is, when something is not of their interest, the mechanisms for this inhibition cover or defend against it. When cognitive processes assimilate unfavorable episodes [Vorfall] of life, due to anti-striving, resistance, and their time-consumption – i.e., not following the usual processes of a motivation[1] – the individual subconsciously goes through a sense of guilt. In Neuro-Psychosis of Defense, Freud (1976) writes about a female patient, suffering from obsession, with a sense of guilt which had such a powerful influence that she would accuse herself (or her relatives or doctors) of actually committing crimes that she had read somewhere (p. 310). The after-effects of anti-striving and resistance has changed into a cruel and hostile agent; the external world has become the internal envoy (cf. Freud 1940, p. 41- 42).

When between stimuli and their emotional values associated links are constructed (especially through high activities of LOPs) they are restored and retrieved by means of HOPs; particularly in dealing with conflicts or unlearning a behavior, constant inhibition (from parts involved in HOPs) takes the upper hand. These links can be seen in conditioned behavior, psychic stress, and depression. Patients who suffer from depression, have shown considerable change in their regional cerebral blood flow. The association and its retrieval, for instance, were observed in monkeys, in whom during conditioned fear response and its recollection, amygdala and parts of the prefrontal cortex were constantly active (cf. Brodal p. 467-468).


Field and Gestalts

The concept of field helps not to assign specific functions to totality. Widespread networks execute complex, especially goal-oriented tasks. A field, with its distinguished feature, gestalt, organizes and inhibits manifold information to adjust a goal-oriented behavior, e.g., the adjustment of autonomic responses. The concept of gestalt is utilized because in relation to emotional processes, as opposed to mere cognitive processes, cortical areas show multifarious activities, whose integrity follow a pattern, a mode or gestalt. Such a moderate integrity within a part with fractionated functions is the highlight of field-concept. An example of fractionated functions can be shown in the rostral part of the anterior cingulate cortex which participates in the regulation of affects, while its caudal part deals with cognitive affairs, and its anterior cingulate cortex is responsible for “the choice of behavior in response to conflicting stimuli” (cf. Brodal p. 469).
[1] That is, the most satisfactory relation is displaced [verdrägen = repressed] within the system of interests during order processes, in which other energy-forces have control [beherrschenden] (e.g., one wishes everything for oneself; he or she likes to possess or at least to control them).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA          USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051           All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Field is also helpful to explain body-mind processes, especially in identifying errors and conflicts, because emotions supply the brain with vital information about the values of various stimuli, and consequently the brain, facing conflicts, can change information and select the proper one.[1] Monkeys, for instance, confronted with snakes blocking their food have shown activities of amygdala first (a part of totality) and then those of orbitofrontal cortex (a part of field), thus evaluating the situation, and enabling them with a necessary behavioral flexibility.

The demands raised by external factors (e.g., to provide one’s family with food) and internal needs (e.g., one is hungry) come with their cost, i.e., the mental fatigue, which meanwhile calls for the adjustment of the raised energy conflicts. Field evaluates such energetical costs. When the economic cost of a stimulus is very high, field sends an integrated (special) command, “behavior will only proceed if this evaluation turns out favorably toward spending (additional) energy” (Boksem and Tops 2008, p. 125). It has been shown that such energetic demands are monitored by processes functioning in both totality (e.g., the amygdala), and field (e.g., the nucleus accumbens, the orbitofrontal cortex, the insula, and the anterior cingulate cortex).[2]

Memory, whose processes consist of networks working together, can be described by field and its distinguished gestalts. For instance, to cause considerable memory damage, in monkeys, the septal nuclei, the diagonal band of Broca, and the basal nucleus – all parts functioning as a field – must be damaged; whereas, the mechanism of attention can be described by totality and is mainly maintained by the basal nucleus. Different forms of memory and learning evidently suggests considerable divisions in field, whose gestalts, can reveal and describe such divisions. 
[1] Primary studies on §§3-5 is recommended.
[2] Cf. Boksem and Tops 2008, pp. 125-139.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA               USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051            All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

To see how gestalts integrate and adapt the individual with environmental changes, we find that the gestalt (embodying functions of the hippocampal formation) receives afferents from highly processed sensory information – such as visual, auditory, and somatosensory from second cognitive processes or association areas (e.g., temporal and frontal lobes) of the neocortex, which its gestalt integrates sensory signals[1]– all of which contain vital data, and then its projection sends processed signals back to the entorhinal area and mammillary nucleus; information that are necessary for effective adaption and integrated responses[2] (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 464 – 476).

As they retain their unity within a field, gestalts with their topographically organized zones and lamellas (with access to both hemispheres of the brain) indicate that different functions have different locations. One example of these gestalts is a grid of neurons in hippocampal formation that influence spatial orientation and navigation with an impact on the association between objects and space.

With their access to different networks in a field, gestalts follow displacement and sharpening mechanisms in case one gestalt disfunction or is completely idle. For example, left hemispheric brain, responsible for language, damaged in infancy has less effects on language learning (because right hemispheric area sharpens) comparing with those happening in later life. Corresponding experiments show that after losing a finger, the related sensory cortical neurons shrink, due to inhibition, while the neighboring ones enlarge (cf. Brodal pp. 471 – 512). Freud (2014: Das Ich und das Es) also refers to an integrated displacement of higher-thinking by sublimated “erotic driving force” (p. 48).
[1] For instance, hippocampus receives verbal information in whatever way in nature, reading, hearing, or by touch (Braille writing) (Brodal 2010, p. 475).
[2] Before further discussion on learning and memory, a few words about our distinction of the present, on the one hand, and the past and the future, on the other, may be related. As I partially explained in A., the concept of time has a complicated exposition. There is a “sense of the present” (and its continuity), which is a characteristic of neuronal activity in itself – this sense is fundamental for first cognitive processes and cognitive processes thereafter. And, there exists a “concept of time” – i.e., connecting the present to a past and a future – which is a result of meshes (i.e., separated, localized networks, each executing a particular task) and networks prerequisite for third cognitive processes. So, LOPs are active in the sense of the present; whereas, HOPs are necessary, mainly in humans, for the formation of the concept of time. Putting it simply, the present is a property belongs to all animals; the concept of time forms in higher level animals and is dynamic. This exposition about time, should not be confused with timing, i.e., the ability to form temporal anticipations, which have evolutionary significance. When a tiger weighs time intervals as to when to run for a prey, or a person on a crosswalk judges the needed duration to avoid a passing car, they are all practicing that which is called interval timing. Interval timing is an ability that engages both cognitive and order processes. Parallel to timing and employing a proper energy-force, coordination of different body parts may be under the influence of inter-gradation loop spaces.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA             USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051           All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Gestalts with considerable number of variability in quality can be categorized under two major tiers of organization. These tiers help to better interpret the networking relationships within a field and with something outside them. Under the first tier, information processing occurs within limited networks (i.e., they concern intralayer organization), and, by means of various neurotransmitters, the precision of signal transference is maintained in order to improve the signal-to-noise ratio and thus influencing arousal-focused attention, and motivation. It is thought that, for instance, epilepsy could be related to losing the inhibitory neurotransmitters of this tier in cortical interneurons, while the central role of the amygdala outside their domain is also influential. The second tier undertakes task-specific networks with variety of connections with functionally different specializations; they deal with interareal organization (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 493 – 500).

In both tiers, regions receiving raw materials differ from those sending processed information. The tiers also differ in connections. That is, they consist of interconnections within one network or group of networks; each ensuring integration of information of same nature, within their specific domains. Synaptic actions still remain as excitatory or inhibitory. Depending on the types of synaptic activity, frequency and pattern of signals differ, resulting in different processes of information (signals), and redirecting signal or impulse traffic. For example, the cortical sensory area of index finger can be altered to another finger by training to play an instrument. Or, motor components of lower areas (e.g., brain stem) and higher parts (e.g., the cerebral cortex) “can switch the impulse traffic from one route to another in the cord, depending on the motor task” (Brodal 2010, p. 179). Signal traffic may take different routes in a network and can be modified by context and expectation. For instance, the cortical taste part sends signals to the lower parts, depending on the context and expectation residing in the brain stem (Brodal 2010, p. 274).

Context (related to SCPs) and expectation (related to TCPs) refer to the internal significance of services of signals. For instance, how elegant is “to see and hear a Gentleman or Lady not only play with their Hands, and sing with their Voice [i.e., context] but with their Understanding and Judgment [i.e., expectation component] also?” (Martin 1822, p. 380).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051        All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

The significance is subjected to a broader view, because by (how) acting on our brain, signals bring about the significance. For example, “That the Tune of a string depends upon the Time of its Vibration; therefore, the shorter the Time of the Vibration, the higher the Note will be; and in Vibrations that are performed in different Times, there will, at certain Intervals, be a Coincidence of those vibrations in all of the musical Kind …” (Martin 1822, p. 377).[1] Furthermore, “alle Harmonie der Töne auf der Koincidenz der Vibrationen beruht” (Schopenhauer 1813/1960, p. 1226). Schopenhauer, then, continues by considering the rational relation of two notes (with their constantly recurring coincidence) as a condition for them to be connected together in our apprehension; while coincidence of vibrations with an irrational relation cannot be apprehended. Today, more than one hundred years later, we know that cortical neurons are coincidence detectors (Brodal 2010, pp. 492 – 493) – even though, we have not yet researched rational or irrational relations of simultaneously-occurring events and their relation to our apprehension!

The evolutionary priority of second cognitive processes (and thus causal law) over third cognitive processes, helps to infer that evidently the cortical neurons are coincidence detectors; because, these coincidence of information being fundamental for association learning, have significance in animal's survival, relying on second cognitive process to perceive their world. It is on the sensory basis of gestalts with their power in providing integrity that second cognitive processes could be arrived at in A. We can find this disturbance in the function of a gestalt in a type of agnosia (inability to recognize objects), in which the transition from cause to effect, in regard to spatial position of objects, is seriously impaired (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 492 – 503).

The importance of context of signals proves that HOPs from their (receptive) inception are dynamic. For instance, the single cells of visual cortex react more sharply when the visual stimulus draw the attention of the individual. Adding to excitability by context, binding parts within a gestalt (e.g., the thalamocortical connections) produce a recruiting task associated with arousal. Whether through context, and/or by means of binding, the goal is to improve awareness (wakefulness and phases of sleep) and coincidence detection, with arousal-focused attention; all of which are fundamental for the animal’s survival and adaptation.
[1] Boldface type by me.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA        USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051       All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Here, I focus on (reciprocal) interconnections of areas involved in HOPs. These areas are not entirely recipients of information; they do project (processed) information. Now, if the projection is aimed at the same area, from which they receive the initial signals, that means that parts involved in different processes have reciprocal and distributed connections and they “talk” to each other. The crosstalk suggests that the information received from HOPs are not merely copies of signals sent from the same regions; i.e., there is a hierarchy of information processing. For instance, if connections from cortex to ventral posterolateral nucleus, or VPL (part of the thalamus) are damaged, the receptive neurons in the VPL begin to grow profusely to send more signals for higher order processing; indicating that HOPs have top-down dominance in controlling the mechanisms involved in a gestalt.

Two groups of networking make the processing of information in HOPs profoundly complex. One is the (mostly reciprocal) interconnection of areas within HOPs, and the other is the existence of two separate (yet connected) hemispheres of the brain. Added to the complexity of connections and structure are the divergence and convergence of information to or from these areas. The total structure and function of these complex networks, which I called field, illustrate why complex functions and behavior such as attention (a fruit of lower field) and language (a product of upper field) are yet to be studied.

Within the nervous system, field, because of convergence, is larger at higher areas than at the lower ones. The origin of a pain coming from the stomach, as an example, may not precisely be located due to its primacy of couplings rather than networking. But once the information reaches higher areas, based on convergence of signals, one may locate it more precisely; a phenomenon called referred pain. (One reason why the magnitude of feeling of pain is higher in humans.)


Universal Adaptation of Gestalts

Taking various gestalts responsible for psychological functions of all kinds, among which tasks are distributed within the responsible field, suggests that they (i.e., gestalts) must necessarily have a relation to one another. Every gestalt has adapted its function to the neighboring ones, as they have adapted themselves to it. This universal and reciprocal adaptation and accommodation of everything to each other is actually what is called consensus naturae.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA           USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051     All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

The genetic code [Charakter] of each animal, as far as it is individual (gamete) and has not yet fused [Begreiffen], (during fertilization) as species (i.e., sexual reproduction), has free energy and is not bounded. When external circumstances provide the proper ground or occasion, and the individual, reacting to it, adapts and accommodates oneself (first during embryonic development, then in early childhood) to the influence of the environmental ground, which is the historical or de facto gestalt of one’s cycle of life [Lebenslaufes], we deal with generation.

Phenomenologically, the reproductive organs are responsible for generation (or the sense of species) which possesses bounding energy. In the entire body, the reproductive organs are the direct result of this energy with sexual drive [Geschlechtstrieb] which is the focal point of animal life. Other organs and areas are in indirect service of those drives (such as the sucking reflex, the grapping hand, and so on). Universal adaptation to each other, at this point, keeps all parts within one united self. The universal adaptation also makes self time-independent; i.e., one I (Atman) exists in all times. In this respect, gestalts must integrate what is (i.e., the early childhood) to what is yet to come.

Now, in a field, specialized gestalts, which have evolved in different times, integrate information differently, and issue different (specific) commands. The functionality of integration of different signals and information (which enables the animal to behave consciously) is not inborn but acquired during embryonic development and learned in early life. In this respect, gestalts in a field, are task-specific and have sensitive (critical) periods – basically during early childhood. For example, in a decade-long research, Hyvärinen (1982) has shown that sensory integration during infancy were vital in monkeys to converge (combine) signals from vision and body parts, to the extent that it changed the properties of neurons (e.g., the primary somatosensory cortex). And, once the signals of these changed neurons converge as specialized gestalts, they can perform the so-called higher mental functions.[1] (During sensitive periods of organism’s growth, synaptic plasticity plays a decisive role in learning.)
[1] Among many tasks, some of them are very important, such as: grasping and manipulating objects, appraisal of distances and object’s size, fixing the gaze, and identifying of objects; drawing an object or a scene, and using tools; controlling visually guided behavior and spatial orientation; mediating the influence of emotions, attention, and motivation on behavior; planning and initiating goal-directed behavior; high-level processing of auditory and visual information; involving in noticing and reacting to pains, homeostasis and bodily awareness; and in social behavior, selecting a specific behavior among many possible ones as well as suppressing the unwanted ones; also, learning, language, and memory (Brodal 2010, p. 500).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA          USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051      All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

After a critical period has passed, without its corresponding gestalt being adapted (e.g., people who were born blind and only gained their sight back after operation in adulthood), a particular function in question is no longer attainable; because, the universal adaptation has not accommodated the responsible gestalt (within a field), and consequently it cannot contribute to its presumed task – e.g., the operated blind individuals could not see objects and only limitedly regained the visual sense (cf. Brodal 2010, p. 501).[1] (I hope this exposition clears the confusion of feeling and perception, which was briefly mentioned (in regard to the psychoanalytic school) in the Prologue, where it says, according to Thomas Twyman, “external is something felt, not perceived.”)

Task-specific gestalts are most active when the stimuli draw the attention of the animal, or the animal self-initiates a particular action, under “a command apparatus … for the exploration of the immediately surrounding extrapersonal space” (Mountcastle et al 1975, p. 895-896). But, to act – as the main subject of this paper[2] – is for the object (or animal) “to occupy [erfüllt] space and persist [beharrt] in time.” Therefore, in an action, specified gestalts in both (cognitive and order) processes must be active (e.g., one is conscious of oneself and one’s external world, while exhibits bodily movements); even though, order processes (OPs) may work in the background. In other words, the role of one’s body is to act (like other external objects) and provide one with information. The inner information, provided in such a fashion, is the only way one knows of one’s own existence. Cognitive processes, through the bodily movements, look inward to the only source [Quelle] of their functionality (hence, I know) and that of the immediate body’s actions (hence, I act); the inflection point of both was taken as the “I.” The role of cognitive processes is like that of a mirror, i.e., the unconscious inner signals or information look into it and “see” themselves: that is, OPs become CPs (cognitive processes). The bodily action is the objectification of the source, or the so-called I; with the exception that I know is secondary, a mirror, and I act is primary. Taking it more broadly, ενεργω αρα ξερω.[1] Giving the analogy of the horse (i.e., I act) and horseback rider (i.e., I know), Freud (2014: Das Ich und das Es, pp. 30ff), giving priority to will’s action over the secondary nature of the knowing ego, attributes two tasks to the latter: access to motility, and blindly taking the action as its own.
[1] There are other (task-specific) gestalts that may face similar fate. For instance, gestalts responsible in recognizing objects (Agnosia: inability to recognize objects). Also, Constructional Apraxia (inability to copy a drawing); Alexia (inability to recognize letters); Disturbances of the body image and self-awareness; left-right confusion; Neglecting body parts, and Anosognosia (denial of loss of body functions); and Agraphia (inability to write), Alexia (inability to read), and Dyscalculia (inability to calculate) (cf. Brodal 2010, p. 502).
[2] As it was mentioned earlier, throughout this paper feeling and acting, in a general sense, are taken as identical.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051     All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

A warning finds its way here. Cognitive and order processes are distinct processes, yet both correspond to the principle of Metron, and anatomically their parts may overlap. For instance, control mechanism of eyes’ movement overlaps with parts associated with shifting attention.

One source, called the intelligible character [intelligibeln Charakter], through OPs disintegrates [Zersallen] into bodily movements, and another, the empirical character [empirischer Charakter] by means of CPs, into self-consciousness. The intelligible and empirical characters are identical, and their virtual differences lie in their modes of appearances: one is inner, the other is outer.

The whole processes begin directly from the genuine [wirkliche] energy-force, the “in-itself” [erkannte?] (Schopenhauer 1969, p. 505) or the carrying-charge. It can be bound with movements of the body, or be working in CPs, hence the term “intentional,” as motives, that is, as the probability of different processes with relative intensity [Stärke]. The term probability implies that there is no “wrong” intention, but (as circumstances change) the estimation of the effect of a motive was wrong.

The gestalts working in OPs go beyond the body and its actions, they more importantly, within the domain of CPs, analyze (and synchronize) numerous pieces of information (e.g., color, texture, heaviness, time-space movements, and more sophisticated such as semantic analysis, phonologic analysis). Binding and synchronizing the always-changing bits of information into maps of steady “pictures” provide the animal with a world that “it looks precisely as it should look.”

That specialized gestalts are in networking operation with others has been attested by manifold of divergence (as well as convergence) of connections, measurements of regional cerebral blood flow, and metabolism, during the time when a subject performed higher mental tasks (e.g., imagining, solving math problems and lecturing) (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 501-502).

[1] I act; therefore, I know.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051         All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

A gestalt that has developed a higher-level “dialogue” (a two-way crosstalk) with other gestalts is able to share sensory information and exchange emotional calibrations. These highly developed gestalts are responsible for higher-level tasks, such as planning, initiating goal-oriented tasks, directing attention, emotional regulation, forming a sense of reality or having a solid existence of an object, (even though it is suddenly out of sight) bodily awareness/ownership, selecting a specific task while suppressing others, learning daily rules (e.g., green traffic light means go), classifying visual information, and, as a result of employing all the previous tasks, the animal is able to adapt socially with the application of sympathy and empathy. Anatomically, these gestalts can be found, for instance, in the prefrontal cortex and its cooperation with the basal ganglia, temporal cortex, and the insula.

Because, tasks of the higher levels employ long-term memory (and traces of working memory), it goes without saying, that the said gestalts also account for functions related to them. For instance, it has been shown (using functional magnetic resonance imaging) that in the processes of retaining declarative memory (via the temporal lobe and the hippocampus), related prefrontal cortex – which has connection with the temporal lobe and the hippocampus – must also be active. Based on the complexity of these gestalts, it is not surprising to see them having the power of altering and sub-serving complex behavior (such as reorganizing personality and moods) as opposed to perseveration of behavior. Lesions of the prefrontal cortex has shown that these patients have developed de-emotionalization and social isolation, with increased distractibility (cf. Brodal 2010, p. 505 – 506; Penfield and Perot 1963).

We finally arrive at the multivalence concept of a mental disorder (e.g., schizophrenia). Overthrowing the notion of “single-center” theory, the field theory gives evidence (e.g., structural and metabolic changes; signal-to-noise ratio; changes of neurotransmitters; coping of other networks with a pathologically dysfunctional unitary network) on how to deal with psychic issues. For instance, “This would be so, regardless of whether schizophrenia turns out to be due to defective receptor genes, a prenatal disturbance of neuronal migration, or (most likely) a combination of many factor.”[1]
[1] To illustrate the role of chemical compounds in the central nervous system and its various forms of networking relations, one can see the significant responsibility of dopamine, as a neurotransmitter, in schizophrenia. In these patients, dopamine is unable to normalize signal-to-noise ratio in (prefrontal) networking systems, which show unstable low ratio. The role of the dopamine is independent of other factors (e.g., genetic predisposition, embryonic neuronal migration, among other factors) leading to schizophrenia (cf. Brodal 2010, p. 509).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA               USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051        All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071


Field and Language

The field, mainly responsible for cognitive processes (see A. §§ 2 – 4), deals with mechanisms involved in language. Two of the field’s gestalts are within the speech areas, discovered in late nineteenth century (by the French physician Paul Broca, and the German neurologist Carl Wernicke). Since these discoveries, a concept has been formulated, lateralization of function, which takes the dominance of a brain hemisphere as the area responsible for specific behavior. However, by my conceptualization of field and its gestalts (with their variety of networking connections), lateralization of function is only accurate when it is related to one or a few gestalts, not to the entire brain hemisphere(s); an economical impossibility in consequence of “lex parsimonies: Nature does nothing in vain and creates nothing superfluous.”[1] The lateralization hypothesis can be taken a step further by the consideration of overlapping gestalts, based on universal adaptation of all things to each other.

The differences of the brain hemispheres concern use-dependency and how efficient a hemisphere fulfils its processes (e.g., language functions, emotional procedures, visual cues, among others). For instance, mathematical logic and analysis are carried out within the left hemisphere, while the right one practices mastering of patterns and drawing in spatial domain. Lateralization of language is said to be one of the most obvious lateralization in hemispheric dominancy. Nevertheless, some of the examples of dominant/recessive hemispheres are worth mentioning. The left hemisphere knows of objects by (abstract) language and in order to express it through concrete language (a specialty of the right hemisphere) it must access through commissural connections, depending on which hemisphere is dominant and which one is recessive. At the same time, while the entire brain is involved in emotional experiences, the right hemisphere is excited more deeply, especially from negative feelings.[2]

Now, in regard to a complex behavior, such as language, not only such behaviors are the result of several different processes in various gestalts, but also, their connections with lower networks, meshes, and perhaps even couplings (e.g., from the function of short-term memory to the activation of motor areas in lips to utter a word) need to be taken into consideration. The necessity of such a web of connexion [Verknüpfung] supports a multifunctional theory of language. Bühler (2011) analytically refers the term Verknüpfung to knüpft (knot), i.e., tying together parts as soon as one thinks of connexion (p. 438). Shalom and Poeppel (2008) have suggested an assembly of pieces, with basically three main anatomic areas (i.e., temporal, parietal and frontal) which are functionally (i.e., memorizing, analyzing, and synthesizing, respectively) responsible (i.e., memorizing, analyzing, and synthesizing, respectively) for learning language.
[1] See further on Schopenhauer’s “The Will in Nature” under Comparative Anatomy.
[2] We may also find lateralization of ear (music), of vision, of hand, and even of emotions (cf. Brodal pp. 513-514).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA           USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051       All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

These assembly of networks (now, a field) create our reality and choose, classify, and represent that reality in form of concepts. They also undertake the connexion of the representations with our behavior; the connexion controls and maintains [Erhaltung] the body with its inner milieu, on the one hand, and with its outer environment by means of actions and language, on the other. It is with respect to connexion that the cortical brain, depending on the type of processed information, becomes specialized. This mechanism of specialization, called functional localization or specialization, optimizes the performance of a task (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 238, 315-316).

Task-specific networking (i.e., the beginning of gestalt formation) occur in early childhood and thereafter. In later life (perhaps after puberty), task-specification, and (hemispheric) specialization or lateralization are highly active (cf. Brodal pp. 508-509; see below under imitation). On the development of networking functions responsible for sexual drives I attempt to write a separate paper (a brief aspect of the subject is given below). The only point that I need to add here is that, as the focal point of animal life, sexual drives and their related networks begin their activities during infantile life (Freud 1940, p. 16); related couplings, though, stretch as early as embryonic development.

That the final chapter in one’s life is written by genetic influences, environmental factors or both may be premature to lay emphasis on one over aganist the other, but individual differences “are so far in distance, which cannot be matched with the distance between a king and a servant.” Meanwhile, one fact always pushes itself to the surface. That is, development is dynamic, and it always engages synaptic plasticity. Moreover, the power of third cognitive processes increases the radius of desire for mobility to exploration. We stop, for instance, in our walk with someone with whom we are in deep intimate conversation; because, third cognitive processes have cathected all its energy from the moving organs, living them “immobile.”

Synaptic plasticity implies that neuronal matrix is activity-dependent, and their properties may change by use (use-dependent). For instance, during memory formation plasticity of synapses induces many synapses and alter their efficiency within distributed networks of neurons. To forget something, according to this view, is associated with decays or changes in learning-related synapses, and synaptic effectiveness.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051       All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071


Learning and Memory

That how a relation is formed, and what kind it is, may occur at the level of coupling or meshing. In this paper, nonetheless, learning and memory are attributed to the howness and the whatness of changes in networks.

Physiological operations (in memory, mood, cognition, and so forth) are functions of rate of changes of pre- and/or post-synaptic terminal releases; this claim only sounds easy, its mathematical procedures are yet to come. These releases are, furthermore, closely related to an enriched environment with meaningful[1] information, and social interactions. Taking it more broadly, learning is physiologically linked with formation and modification of synapses. As I partially described earlier[2], in the cognitive field, majority of animals’ learning are of associative nature. That is, second cognitive processes (with their corresponding order processes) participate in learning when two phenomena coincide, as in (classical and operant) conditioning learnings. Later, the animal, by means of habituation, gradually loses to enhance the attention – because the stimuli lack economic value – and these learned materials work in the background.

On the contrary, the economic value of imitation has proved to play an important role in learning. That is, already learned (linguistic or non-linguistic) rules and patterns are imitated by another animal until a permanent synaptic relation is constructed. In this way, the newly learned behavior (once practiced enough, especially by many individuals) helps the animal (e.g., social norms) without going through years of genetic mutations to produce a particular behavior; a horizontal advantage with intergenerational exchange and “cultural group selection.”[3]

Imitation is “inborn;”[4] and after the discovery of mirror neurons this form of learning is now being extensively researched at neurobiological level (cf. Iacoboni et al. 1999; Ramachandran 2000; Rizzolatti et al. 2001; and Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). Some studies, additionally, claim that these neurons are active in “mind reading,” and action understanding in communicating content of actions (or social cognition) (cf. Brodal 2010, p. 318), yet, data on imitation support less on the activities of mirror neuron in newborns (Heyes 2010, p. 579), who mainly rely on associative learning – which is based on second cognitive processes. So, it is predictable that networks responsible for imitation may have sensitive period during childhood.
[1] That is, the animal can use the information to adapt to its environment.
[2] See §§3 – 4 in A.
[3] For this citation and more on the subject I refer the reader to M. Chudek et al. “Culture-Gene Coevolution, Large-Scale Cooperation and the Shaping of Human Social Psychology” in Sterelny 2013, pp. 425 – 457.
[4] Schopenhauer (1813/1960, p. 1157) quotes one of Goethe’s letter.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA            USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051        All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

Imitation acts (as agent) [vermitteln][1] a) with conscious intention (i.e., higher order processes), b) by means of conception (i.e., third cognitive processes), to c) compute relative magnitude of various opposing motives[2]. Therefore, imitation requires prior development of specific networks, working as gestalts, to provide the animal with integrity of representations (i.e., the fruits of second cognitive processes) – e.g., imitating rules and patterns of ancient works by modern artists.

Furthermore, the verb “imitate” (which in Greek is closely related to mimic or literally “to monkey”) needs an object (e.g., another person); so, learning by imitation is a second-hand learning, a copy, a repetition, and accordingly it may come with shame (e.g., imitating idiosyncrasies) or errors (e.g., works of Hegel and Fichte, basically trying to imitate Kant). Imitation additionally limits one to the present without the major far leap, taken by genius. For example, the element of beauty [Schöne], a priori function of the brain, cannot be imitated; imitation belongs to knowledge a posteriori.

On the matter of phenomenology of changing patterns of behavior, i.e., the howness of what is learned, two distinct memories have been differentiated. When memories of events and facts, whether conscious (e.g., one recalls a problem encountered last night) or unconscious (e.g., remnants of an unconscious childhood event affecting one’s adult life) occupy one’s recollection we call it declarative (or explicit) memory. But, when one retrieves skills and habits to accomplish a certain job, or they are used in the process of conditioning, habituation, or attitude-formation, we term the memory in process procedural or nondeclarative (or sometimes it is called implicit) memory.
[1] vermitteln implies mediation of an agent along with action. This verb may help researchers to study mirror neurons more carefully and comprehensively.
[2] Motives as representations – occasioned by external stimuli of sensory receptors – arise through HOPs and work up into concepts to resolve the occasional situation.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA          USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051       All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

The declarative memory is time consuming, i.e., one spends time to consciously search the mind for something; whereas, the abilities involved in nondeclarative memory are mainly heterogenous and unconsciously expressed in one’s performance (cf. Coon & Mitterer 2010, p. 260; Lynch 2003, p. 88). One related conclusion is that nondeclarative memory involves LOPs more or less than declarative memory which relies basically on HOPs. Such a differentiation between the two kinds of memory, furthermore, suggests that, the capacity  of declarative memory (i.e., its reliance on the development of HOPs) is more limited during the infantile life, partly describing the infantile amnesia (cf. McKee & Squire 1993, pp. 397-404). The increase in weight implies increase in networking structures, which means that the old connections may not exist anymore, or are intercalated without a trace, hence “infantile amnesia.”

Now, events of a recollection may orbit around one’s own life and experience (e.g., where is my pen?) or around one’s general knowledge or facts of those events (e.g., Who made the pen?); such differentiated functioning indicates that the declarative memory is composed of two different kinds. Because of the irregularity nature of the first events (i.e., being here and there) the former memory is termed episodic. It suggests that anatomical parts involved in episodic memory must be dispersed more than those in the latter, called semantic memory (cf. Coon & Mitterer 2010, p. 272). (After all, homo ergasters were before homo sapiens.) Once networks of both types of memory are combined with amygdala’s emotional coloring, the resultant memory is called autobiographic (cf. Brodal 2010, pp. 477-478).

Whether procedural or declarative, sensory memory can last an instant or a life-time. Therefore, the distinction between short-term and long-term retention of information is fundamental to understanding memory. We all have experienced to “hold information actively in mind,” which initially requires a considerable amount of time (i.e., encoding); this momentary mechanism explains what is called short-term memory. But, economically speaking, this short-term memory confronts a twist of fate. That is, either it has to vanish for the next sensory information to be encoded, or it is to be stored for a latter usage. The mechanism that determines the destiny of the latter fate is called long-term memory. The short-term memory can, thus, occur at the level of neuronal transmissions, while the long-term memory presupposes changes in neuronal structures (Woolf 1998, pp. 61-63; cf. Shrager et al. 2008).

Meshing structure of memory with various networks already pointed to the multivalence of its meaning. And, it can be deduced that there is no such a thing as “memory center.” And, because, a theory of field predicts such distributive networking structures, it seems plausible that integrity of a field (i.e., strengthening memory traces by gestalts) determines (type of a) memory. It should, then, not take us by surprise if we found that the entire field is affected (e.g., anterograde amnesia, or a major loss of recent memory) anytime one network is down (e.g., bilateral lesion of hippocampus) (cf. Scoville & Milner 1957, p. 11).

Functions of a cavity resonator is determinant for second cognitive processes, SCPs, (e.g., the context-rich episodic memories), whereas, third cognitive processes, TCPs, (e.g., context-free semantic memories) operate relatively independent. Relative abilities of different semantic memories, resisting degradation, despite early damage to the hippocampus is a testimony to the fact that HOPs can accomplish tasks of TCPs in the absence of SCP[1] (cf. Vargha-Khadem 1997). This differential preservation of TCPs, without the functionality of SCPs, was partially explained as filling gaps in memory by fictions.[2] For instance, in a form of amnesia, called confabulation (which is based mainly on damages to parts of hippocampus), patients create fictional narratives as parts of their reality (cf. Brodal 2010, p. 481).
[1] Cf. §§ 3-5 of A.
[2] Cf. §5 of A.; Also, on the abstract concepts that have no (or completely lost their) relation with representations.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA      USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051        All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071


“That, we called motive, till now;

Turned out to be will, but how;

Object of knowledge, now the subject;

Blindly acts with a secret project;

Leaving its candlelight behind, walking with instinct [Trieb];

Getting rid of complexity, seeing, crafting more distinct;

Preferred certainty rather than an assistant;

Seeing more than ever, far distant;

Without interruption, from her own image;

Bringing into her way, mere disadvantage;

Exposing her to illusion and deception;

It thus brings them to my description;

I refer to mechanical instincts [Kunsttrieben], guided by no motive;

Yet having the appearance, the power of forgetive;”

On the subject of instinct/drive [Trieb], I shall write with fuller exposition in future. There are a few related points that I explore them here. We have seen earlier that the marriage of head and heart is that which made mankind an individual. In fact, if mankind were only knowing subjects, there would be near eight billion “angels” on Earth by now; humans are additionally grounded in the world, i.e., in the body. I have also shown that affections of the sensory receptors have primacy over cognitive processes.

The distinction of cognitive segment [gliederung] of physiological functions should not veil the common knowledge that any study of animal kingdom confirms that (human as well as non-human) animals may function without the guidance of cognition, or knowledge (e.g., the instinct, that is, animals’ artistic drives, which blindly operate as occasion arises).

Now, in the domain of instincts sexual instinct is of utmost importance, because individual life is bounded by his or her lifetime, whereas this instinct takes the limit of one’s life to infinity, ensuring individual, now one’s generation, lives beyond one’s death. So, sexual drives become the focal point of animal life. Once, conservation of individual is satisfied, there remains nothing but preservation of species; it strives endlessly and there is no final satisfaction for it. For sexual drives, obstacles are only local hinderances; any suppression is, in fact, a loop that goes into itself.

Now, the question that pushes its way into mind is that how is that some people despite healthy and functionable reproductive organs are able to overcome urges of sexual drives. In these cases, the motives that correspond to sexual instinct are unresponsive and none of its drives are satisfied.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA         USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051      All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071

In the analysis of such cases a distinction is important to consider, that is, in them, what is at stake is not a motive, but a quietive; i.e., a mode of suppression that comes into view as a result of (third) cognitive processes. But, overall, both motive and quietive are “self-regulating” [selbst bestimmende]; i.e., despite the changes of states of organism’s life, in space and time, and thus multiplicity, they both try to restore a state that has been troubled by inner strife, conflict, or resistance, or by outer struggle. In other words, passage of affection or passion clouds (and sometimes distorts) individual’s cognition [Erkenntnis]; indeed, every inclination [Neigung] and/or repulsion [Abneigung] disfigures, colors, or blurs not only the judgment, but also the original perception [Anschauung]. Once, the organism (individual) is out of balance, motive or quietive try to restore the troubled state of affairs, no matter how.

For instance, in my recent trip to Greece, I met a friend who suffers from a paranoid type. During the years that I have known him, I noticed that he had grown a homosexual fixation to one of his friends. Once his friend, whom he loved exaggeratedly, married, he treated his married friend with highly unreasonable aggression. Slandering and defaming him, even before his friend’s mother who was diagnosed with cancer, and any stress could worsen her condition. (Interestingly enough, the aforementioned friend is himself a general surgeon.) Here, in this case, we confront a transformation of homosexuality to de-sexualization, where “violent feelings of rivalry are present which lead to aggressive inclinations [Neigung] … by force of a reactive cathexis-displacement, freeing the energy of the erotic excitement, and feeding it with hostile energy” (Freud 2014: Das Ich und das Es, p. 46). Here, the experience has verified that “that which, as a rule, happened to be a vigorous yet still manageable inclination [Neigung] may grow, under certain circumstances, into a passion which in intensity outperforms all others, and with no regard or respect to anything, … such that for one’s pleasure life is risked without hesitation, nay, if that pleasure is denied [life] is given as its price” (Schopenhauer 1813/1960, p. 1324).

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA            USA Library of Congress: 1-6978747051    All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071



Anderson, S. W. et al. “Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex.” Nature Neuroscience. Vol. 2, No. 11 (1999) pp. 1032 – 1037).

Aston-Jones, G., Cohen, J.D. An integrative theory of locus coeruleus- norepinephrine function: adaptive gain and optimal performance. Ann. Rev. Neurosci. 28 (2005) pp. 403–450.

Banks, A. & L. A. Hirschman. “Wired to Connect: The Surprising Link Between Brain Science and Strong, Healthy Relationships.” Jeremy Tarcher/Penguin: New York (2016) pp. 29-30.

Baddeley A. “Working Memory: Looking Back and Looking Forward.” Nature Reviews: Neuroscience (2003) pp. 829 – 839.

Bartlett, J. “The Shakespeare Phrase Book.” Little, Brown, and Company: Boston (1882)

Bichat M. F. X. “Recherches Physiologiques sur la Vie et la Mort” (3rd Ed.). France (1805).

Boksem, M. & M. Tops. “Mental Fatigue: Costs and Benefits.” Brain Research Reviews: 59 (2008) pp. 125-139.

Brodal, P. “The Central Nervous System: Structure and Function” (4th Ed.). Oxford University Press (2010).

Bromiley G. “Theological Dictionary of the New Testament: Abridged in One Volume” (ed. Gerhard Kittle). William Eerdmans Publishing Company (1985).

Bühler, K. “The Theory of Language: The Representational function of language” (trans. D. F. Goodwin & A. Eschbach). John Benjamins Publishing Company (2011).

Campton, A. “Making Progress on the Natural History of Multiple Sclerosis.” Brain: 129 (2006) pp. 561 – 563.

Coleridge, S. T. “Aids to Reflection” University of Michigan: 2009.

Coon D. & J. O. Mitterer. “Introduction to Psychology: Gateway to Mind and Behavior” (12th Ed.). Wadsworth Cengage Learning. (2010).

Felleman D. & D. Van Essen. “Distributed Hierarchical Processing in the Primitive Cerebral Cortex.” In Cerebral Cortex 1 (1). Oxford University Press. NY (1991) pp. 1 – 47.

Freud, S. “Die Natur des Psychischen” (in Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Image) Band 25, Die Psychoanalytische Hochschule in Berlin (1940).

Freud, S. “Complete Psychological works of Sigmund Freud” (1st ed. trans. J. Strachey). W. Norton & Company (1976).

Freud, S. “Gesammelte Werke.” Anaconda Verlag (2014).

Goodale M. & A. Milner. “Separate Visual Pathways for Perception and Action.” Elsevier: Trends in Neurosciences, Vol. 15, Issue 1, Jan/1992, pp. 20-25.

Grillner S. et al. “The Intrinsic Function of a Motor System: From Ion Channels to Networks and Behavior.” Brain Research Interactive, 886 (2000), pp. 224 – 236.

Harrison, B.J., et al. “Consistency and functional specialization in the default mode brain network.” In Proceedings of the Natural Academy of Science USA 105 (2008) pp. 9781 – 9786.

Heyes C. “Where Do Mirror Neurons Come From?” Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 34 (2010) 575 – 583.

“History of the Hindu Triad (Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva): As Described in the Sacred Books of the Hindus.” (Regents of the University of Minnesota: Twin Cities Campus (1897)).

Hyvärinen, J. Functional Properties of Neurones in the Primary Somatosensory Cortex. In “Studies of Brain Function” (Vol. 8) New York: Springer-Verlag (1982) pp. 13 – 42.

Iacoboni, M., Woods, R.P., Brass, M., Bekkering, H., Mazziotta, J.C., Rizzolatti, G., “Cortical Mechanisms of Human Imitation.” Science 286 (1999) 2526–2528.

Joyce R. “The Evolution of Morality.” MIT: Cambridge MA (2006).

Knobil, E. & J. Neill. “Physiology of Reproduction.” DA Information Services (1988).

Koffka, K. “Principles of Gestalt Psychology.” Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. (1936).

Köhler, W. “Gestalt Psychology: An Introduction to New Concepts in Modern Psychology.” Liveright: New York (1947).

Lewin, K. “A Dynamic theory of Personality.” McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. New York (1935).

_________ “Principles of Topological Psychology.” McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. New York (1936).

Lynch M. “Long-Term Potentiation and Memory.” American Physiological Society, in Physiology Review: 84 (2004) pp. 87-136.

Machado, Ch. Et al. “Bilateral Neurotoxic Amygdala Lesions in Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta): Consistent Pattern of Behavior Across Different Social Contexts” Behavioral Neuroscience. Vol. 122, No. 2 (2008) pp. 251 – 266.

Malmierca, M. & D. Irving. “Auditory Spectral Processing (1st Ed. Vol. 70). International Review of Neurobiology: Elsevier Academic Press (2005).

Martin, B. “The Young Gentleman and Lady’s Philosophy, in a Continued Survey of the Works of Nature and Art: By Way of Dialogue” (2nd Vol.) W. Owen: London (1822).

McKee R. & L. Squire. “On the Development of Declarative Memory.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. Vol 19, No. 2 (1993) pp. 397 – 404.

Mountcastle, V.B. et al. “Posterior Parietal Association Cortex of the Monkey: Command Functions for Operations Within Extrapersonal Space.” Journal of Neurophysiology. 38 (1975) pp. 871 – 908.

Nielsen, K.J., Callaway, E.M. More than a feeling: sensation from cortical stimulation. Nat Neurosci. 11 (2008) pp.10 – 12.

Papez, J. “A Proposed Mechanism of Emotion.” Archive of Neurology & Psychiatry, 38 (1938) pp. 725 – 743.

Park D. & P. Reuter-Lorenz, “The Adaptive Brain: Aging and Neurocognitive Scaffolding.” The annual review of psychology: 60. (2009).

Penfield, W., Perot, P. “The brain’s record of auditory and visual experience.” In Brain 86 (part 4) (1963) pp. 596–696.

Ramachandran, V.S., Mirror neurons and imitation learning as the driving force behind ‘the great leap forward’ in human evolution. In “Edge.” (2000) Available at:

Rizzolatti, G., Craighero, L. “The Mirror-Neuron System.” Annual Review of

Neuroscience 27 (2004) 169–192.

Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V. “Neurophysiological Mechanisms Underlying the Understanding and Imitation of Action.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2 (2001) 661–670.

Sansom R. “Ingenious Genes: How Gene Regulation Networks Evolve to Control Development.” MIT: Cambridge MA (2011).

Schneider, G. “Two Visual Systems.” Science: Vol. 163, Issue 3870, (1969) pp. 895-902.

Schopenhauer, A. Manuscript Remains (trans. E. Payne: 4 Vols.). Berg Publishers. Oxford (1985).

––––––––––––– On the fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (trans. E. Payne). Open Court Classics. IL. (1999).

––––––––––––– On the fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and On the Will in Nature (trans. K. Hillebrand). George Bell and Sons (1903).

––––––––––––– Parerga and Paralipomena (trans. E. Payne: 2 Vols.). Oxford University Press. London (2000).

––––––––––––– Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will (Ed. Günter Zöller). Cambridge University Press. MA (1999).

––––––––––––– Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde. (Online edition

––––––––––––– The World as Will and Idea (trans. R. Haldane and J. Kemp: 3 Vols.). Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd. London (1909).

––––––––––––– The World as Will and Representation (trans. E. Payne: 2 Vols.). Dover Publications, Inc. NY (1969).

––––––––––––– Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. (2 Vols.) Grossherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe: Erschienen im Inselverlag zu Leipzig (dissertation 1813: reprinted 1960).

Schwitzgebel E. “Perplexities of Consciousness.” MIT, Cambridge MA (2011).

Scoville A. & B. Milner. “Loss of Recent Memory After Bilateral Hippocampal Lesions.” Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, Psychiatry. 20 (1957) pp. 11 – 21.

Segerstrom, S. “Optimism and immunity: Do positive thoughts always lead to positive effects?” Journal of Brain, Behavior, and Immunity. May 19: 3 (2005) pp. 195 – 200.

Shalom, D.B., Poeppel, D. “Functional Anatomic Models of Language: Assembling the Pieces.” In Neuroscientist 14 (2008) pp. 119 – 127.

Sherman, S. M. “Thalamic Relays and Cortical Functioning.” Progress in Brain Research, Vol. 149 (2005) pp. 107 – 126.

Shrager Y. et al. “Neural Basis of the Cognitive Map: Path Integration Does not Require Hippocampus or Entorhinal Cortex.” Proceedings of the Natural Academy of Science USA 105: 33 (2008) pp. 12034 – 12038).

Simmons, G. “The Journal of the American Medical Association” (Vol. 35) Chicago: American Medical Association Press (1900).

Sterelny, K. et al. “Cooperation and Its Evolution.” MIT, Cambridge (2013).

Sofroniou, A. “Psychology, Concepts of Behavior.” (2013).

Swaney, W.T., Keverne, E.B. The evolution of pheromonal communication. Behavioral Brain Research 200: 239–247, 2009.

Taylor J. “Rise of the Moon of Intellect” (2nd. Ed.). Tookaram Tatya. (1893).

Treviranus, G. R. “Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen Leben” (Vol. 2: Part I). Druck und Verlag von Johann Georg Heyse. Bremen (1832).

Vargha-Khadem F. et al. “Differential Effects of Early Hippocampal Pathology on Episodic and Semantic Memory.” Science: Vol. 277 (1997) pp. 376 – 380).

Wang, R. et al. “Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics.” Springer Science Business Media B. V. (2008).

Woolf, N. “A Structural Basis for Memory Storage in Mammals.” Progress in Neurobiology, Vol. 55: Elsevier Science Ltd. (1998) pp. 59-77.

Copy right©2018 Massachusetts, USA      USA Library of Congress: 1-69787470    All right reserved: Reg. No. TXu 2-118-071